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CHILDHOOD ABUSE AND ADULT MURDER:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
PHYLLIS L. CROCKER*
A jury that convicts a defendant of capital murder must then
decide whether that defendant deserves a life sentence or death.
Mitigating evidence is crucial to the defense at this stage because
such evidence may provide the jury with a basis for imposing a
life sentence. In this Article, Professor Crocker argues that
evidence that a defendant was abused as a child is paradigmatic
mitigating evidence. A detailed presentation of the defendant's
childhood experience and a cogent explanation of its long-term
repercussions will enable the jury to understand why the
defendant committed the crime, perhaps allowing the jury to
sympathize or empathize with the defendant. By humanizing the
defendant, an effective presentation of evidence of childhood
abuse may make the difference between a life and a death
sentence. But despite its potential mitigating effect, evidence of
childhood abuse is not always effectively presented to the jury.
Professor Crocker identifies and discusses impediments in the
death penalty system that account for this failure. She then
proposes changes to the system that could ensure the proper
presentation of evidence of childhood abuse. Professor Crocker
concludes with a reflection on the moral tension within society
that underlies the legal system's difficulties: a tension between
conflicting reactions that must be reconciled in the case where the
child who has been abused and the adult who has committed
murder are the same person.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. B.A., Yale University, 1978; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law,
1985.
From 1989 to 1994 I was a staff attorney at the Texas Resource Center in Austin,
Texas, representing men on death row in their post-conviction appeals. Many of these
men had histories of childhood abuse similar to the cases presented herein. Their stories
and the response of the legal system to their circumstances formed the catalyst for this
Article. I thank those who read drafts of my arguments as they progressed: Joel Finer,
Patricia J. Falk, Peter D. Garlock, Daniel J. Givelber, and Sheri Lynn Johnson. My
research assistants, Shari A. Slawinski and Jennifer L. Whitney, made valuable
contributions. A special thanks to Jeffrey A. Coryell. I also thank the Cleveland-Marshall
Fund for its financial support.
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[T]he childhood shows the man,
As morning shows the day.1
INTRODUCTION
When a child suffers brutal physical abuse, society is shocked by
the cruelty carried out against a defenseless person. When an adult
murders another person, society is angered by the violence inflicted
on an innocent victim. These values conflict, however, when the
adult who committed the murder was once the child who was
physically abused. On the one hand, a societal understanding exists
that a child may suffer long-lasting psychological and behavioral
impairments from physical abuse2 Yet, a fundamental societal
precept is that adults are responsible for their decisions and actions.
The tension between these two beliefs is especially acute when the
murder is one for which the death penalty is a possible consequence.
A defendant who was physically abused as a child certainly may
be found guilty of committing a first-degree murder.3 It is unlikely
that the adverse adult repercussions of childhood abuse would excuse
the defendant's actions or negate the defendant's responsibility for
the crime.4  In a death penalty case, however, the decision still
remains whether to sentence the defendant to death or life
imprisonment.5 As a question of punishment, the defendant's
impairments from childhood abuse may explain his background or
1. John Milton, Paradise Regained, Book IV, lines 220-21, in JOHN MILTON:
PARADISE LOST AND PARADISE REGAINED 341, 386 (Christopher Ricks ed., Penguin
Books 1968) (1671).
2. See infra note 53 (citing cases that recognize the long-term damage caused by
childhood abuse).
3. In general, an adult is assumed to have "the capacity to understand what he is
required by law to do or not to do, to deliberate and to decide what to do, and to control
his conduct in the light of such decisions." H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 218 (1968). Defenses that negate this assumption are extremely limited.
See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 16.01-.03, at 181-84; id.
§ 25.07, at 328 (2d ed. 1995); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 199,221-29 (1982).
4. A history of childhood abuse would meet this criterion only if the defendant could
prove that the impairments he suffered from the abuse excused his conduct-on the
grounds, for example, of insanity-so that he was not responsible for committing the
crime. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 16.03, at 183 (stating that the insanity defense
excuses a defendant because, "as a result of his mental disease or defect, he lacks the
moral blameworthiness ordinarily attached to wrongdoers"); Robinson, supra note 3, at
221-25 (explaining that insanity is an internal disability that causes conditions that excuse
the defendant from criminal liability).
5. See infra note 20 (explaining how the decision at the guilt phase differs from the
punishment phase).
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character, or the circumstances of the crime, in a way that persuades
a juror that life imprisonment is appropriate and sufficient to punish
this defendant.
A history of childhood abuse exemplifies the kind of evidence a
defendant should want the jury to consider in making its punishment
decision because such evidence has the potential to transform a
juror's perception of the defendant in a way that allows the juror to
vote for a life sentence. Concomitantly, evidence of childhood abuse
typifies the problems encountered in many death penalty cases with
ensuring that this information is properly investigated and presented
by the defense and adequately considered by the jury. This Article
argues that system-wide barriers to the effective presentation and
consideration of such quintessential mitigation evidence as childhood
abuse reveal the depth of the death penalty system's inability to
implement the constitutional command to ensure that a death
sentence is a judgment about the appropriate punishment for the
individual defendant.
Part I of this Article explains how a history of childhood abuse is
paradigmatic of mitigating evidence that the jury should consider as it
decides how to punish the defendant. This Part discusses the
constitutional parameters of mitigating evidence and how such
evidence serves to identify those qualities about the defendant or the
crime that may make a death sentence an inappropriate punishment.6
Next, this Part reviews the psychological and medical literature on
the long-term consequences of childhood abuse, including research
that documents lasting behavioral and perceptual impairments.7 It
then examines the prevalence of histories of childhood abuse among
defendants sentenced to death as presented in appellate court
decisions and studies of death row inmates.' Finally, this Part
explores the relationship between a history of childhood abuse and
mitigation.9 This analysis shows that evidence of childhood abuse has
the power to change a juror's perception of the defendant because it
documents the strong connection between the defendant's history
and his adult behavior.
Part II examines how, despite its mitigating potential, a
defendant's history of childhood abuse may not become part of what
informs the jury's judgment about whether to sentence the defendant
6. See infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 86-133 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
1146 [Vol. 77
HeinOnline  -- 77 N.C. L. Rev.  1146 1998-1999
1999] CHILDHOOD ABUSE AND ADULT MURDER
to life imprisonment or death. This Part identifies three impediments
in the death penalty system that hinder the proper presentation and
consideration of mitigating evidence of childhood abuse. First, this
Part explores common misperceptions that courts hold about the
relationship between a defendant's childhood abuse and his adult
conduct. 10 Second, it analyzes how circumstances at the punishment
phase of the trial-including ill-prepared defense attorneys and
inadequate jury instructions--contribute to the inability of a jury to
consider effectively a defendant's childhood abuse." Finally, this
Part analyzes how some of the standards used in post-conviction
review of death sentences further obstruct the potential role of
childhood abuse as mitigating evidence. 2
The cumulative effect of these barriers is that evidence of
childhood abuse, rather than providing the jury with a basis on which
to sentence the defendant to less than death, gets caught in the
maelstrom of death penalty law. This persistent failure to recognize
the significance of such evidence demonstrates the tenacity of the
system's arbitrariness and capriciousness. Part III of this Article
identifies fundamental changes that must be made to ensure that
childhood abuse receives due consideration as mitigating evidence. 3
It also explores how the legal system's difficulties with this issue point
to an underlying moral tension in how society perceives the two
tragedies of childhood abuse and adult murder. 4
I. CHILDHOOD ABUSE AS PARADIGMATIC OF MITIGATING
EVIDENCE
Childhood abuse exemplifies both the potential value and
difficulties inherent in presenting mitigating evidence. Courts and
scholars frequently cite evidence that the defendant had a difficult
childhood, and specifically that he" was abused as a child, as an
example of the kind of circumstances that a defendant would want to
10. See infra notes 147-201 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 202-70 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 271-314 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
15. This Article intentionally uses "he" to describe defendants. As of April 1, 1998,
98.73% of those on death row were men. See DEATH Row U.S.A. REP. (NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Spring 1998, at 1137. In all but one of the cases
discussed in this Article, the defendant was a man. For an explorafion of some of the
reasons for this discrepancy, see Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and
the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 501 (1990).
1147
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present as mitigating evidence. 16  This focus is justified. A
defendant's history of childhood abuse fits the constitutional
conception of mitigating evidence.' The individualized presentation
of factors in the defendant's background and character showing
childhood abuse and its long-term negative repercussions on
judgment and behavior may make the defendant's commission of the
murder more understandable to the jury and, therefore, may provide
the jury with a basis on which to sentence him to life imprisonment.18
16. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) ("Evidence of a difficult
family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in
mitigation.") (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 187-88, 193 (1971)); DAVID
VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF DEATH Row 289
(1995) (analyzing the operation of Florida's death penalty, including individual stories of
men on death row, so many of which involved histories of child abuse that he remarks,
"Perhaps it is dull by now to say that Daniel Thomas was the product of a ghastly
childhood, but he was"); Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven". Mercy in
Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1035-36 (1996) (creating a scenario to
examine the role of mercy at the punishment phase that begins with a defendant "weaned
on violence, fear, abuse, and deprivation at the hands of a sadistic father and alcoholic
mother"); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. Cr. REV. 305, 361 (suggesting
that in "most cases" the defendant will want to proffer an explanation for the crime
"often" showing a history of child abuse); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel
in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 363
(identifying child abuse as one of the three most common types of mitigating evidence, in
addition to mental retardation and mental illness). Many of the U.S. Supreme Court
death penalty cases concerning the presentation and consideration of mitigating evidence
involve evidence that the defendant was abused as a child. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 319-28 (1989) (holding that the absence of instructions informing the jury it
could consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of child abuse and mental retardation
precluded the jury from providing a "reasoned moral response"); Burger v. Kemp, 483
U.S. 776, 788-95 (1987) (concluding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to
investigate the defendant's background, that included both parents throwing him out of
their homes and his stepfather beating him); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 107-09 (reviewing
mitigating evidence that the defendant's father beat him and he suffered emotional and
mental difficulties); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 682-83 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern that the jury might not consider the defendant's history of
sexual abuse as a child given the Court's holding that the Constitution does not preclude
states from requiring proof of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 399-402, 401 n.14 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the 16-year-old defendant in the companion case was physically
abused by his mother); cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 860 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the 15-year-old defendant was sentenced to death for killing his
former brother-in-law in part because the brother-in-law physically abused the defendant's
sister).
17. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing how childhood abuse constitutes mitigating
evidence).
18. See infra Part I.B.3 (analyzing how evidence of childhood abuse may change a
jury's perception of the defendant). A history of childhood abuse also encompasses
pragmatic considerations attendant to mitigating evidence that the defense must confront.
While it may allow the jury to perceive the defendant in an empathetic light, it also may
bring to the fore evidence of the defendant's other criminal behavior. See infra notes 247-
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This Part explores the connection between a history of childhood
abuse and its use as mitigating evidence by first explaining the
purpose of mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of a death
penalty trial. It then reviews the psychological and medical literature
on the long-term effects of childhood abuse and analyzes the
prevalence of childhood abuse among defendants sentenced to death.
Finally, this Part examines the ways in which a defendant's
experience of childhood abuse and its long-term consequences may
affect a juror's decision to sentence the defendant to death or life
imprisonment.
A. The Purpose of Mitigating Evidence
At the punishment phase of a death penalty trial the jury 9 must
determine whether death or life imprisonment is the appropriate
punishment for the individual defendant. The focus shifts from the
narrow question at the guilt phase of whether the defendant
committed the murder to a broader judgment about how to sentence
this particular defendant for committing the murder.' Under the
59 and accompanying text (discussing the mitigating and aggravating potential of
childhood abuse).
19. The sentencing decision may be made by the judge or the jury. See Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment does not require
sentencing by a jury); James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The
Sentencing Provisions in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19, 20-27 (1995)
(reporting that in four states judges have exclusive sentencing authority, in four states the
jury verdict is only advisory, in five states the judge may set aside the death penalty in
certain circumstances, and in all others the jury decision is binding). Throughout this
Article, I wvill refer to the sentencer as the jury.
20. A death penalty trial occurs in two phases, one to decide guilt and the other to
decide punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The death penalty may not be inflicted as a mandatory
punishment. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288-305 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The jury must decide that the defendant's crime makes
him eligible for a death sentence and then must decide whether death or life imprisonment
is appropriate.- See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-75 (1994) (identifying
two aspects of capital trials: eligibility for a death sentence and selection of the death
sentence as the appropriate punishment). The punishment-phase decision is qualitatively
different from the guilt-phase decision. The central issue in conviction is establishing that
the necessary elements of the crime are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but no such
central issue exists at the punishment phase, where the jury considers a "myriad of factors
to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment." California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 1007-08 (1983); see also WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE
NINETIES 74-76 (1991) (explaining how the jury makes qualitatively different decisions at
guilt and penalty trials). In a prior article, I argued that the punishment-phase
determination is not a recapitulation of the guilt-phase decision but a reconceptualization
of the defendant's culpability and a consideration of new factors unrelated to guilt but
related to the defendant's deathworthiness. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of
HeinOnline  -- 77 N.C. L. Rev.  1149 1998-1999
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Eighth Amendment, the question of punishment must be
individualized to ensure that the sentencer may consider "the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the
diverse frailties of humankind. "21
Mitigating factors are "any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."'  Within these
parameters, death penalty statutory schemes may not restrict the
evidence that a defendant presents in mitigation of his sentence, 2 and
the jury may not refuse to consider mitigating evidence 4.2  A state
may, however, structure how the jury considers the mitigating
evidence2 For example, a state may require that in order for a juror
to consider the defendant's evidence "sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency," the defendant must establish that it exists by a
preponderance of the evidence.26 Some states require the jury to
weigh mitigating evidence against aggravating evidence to determine
the defendant's sentence,27 while others merely require the jury to
consider mitigating circumstances in assessing punishment.28 Despite
Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death
Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L REv. 21 (1997).
21. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). "[T]he
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances
of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death." Id. (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (citation omitted).
22. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (adopting the rule from Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
23. See id. at 113-15 (holding that the sentencer must not be precluded from
considering, and may not refuse to consider, any mitigating factors); see also James R.
Acker & Charles S. Lanier, In Fairness and Mercy: Statutory Mitigating Factors in Capital
Punishment Laws, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 299 (1994) (analyzing the purpose and types of
mitigating factors).
24. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15 & n.10 (declining to prescribe the amount of
weight that a juror must give to mitigating evidence, but noting that "Lockett requires the
sentencer to listen"); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding that a
juror who would automatically impose the death penalty regardless of the mitigating
evidence may be challenged for cause).
25. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1993) (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S.
484,490 (1990)).
26. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990); see also Acker & Lanier, supra note
23, at 341-42 (analyzing state statutory requirements and noting that most states assign no
burden of proof to the defendant regarding mitigating factors). The jurors need not agree
on which circumstances are mitigating. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,373-75 (1988).
27. See Acker & Lanier, supra note 19, at 27-52 (analyzing the different types of
sentencing formulas that states have adopted for how the jury decides between life
imprisonment and death).
28. No one scheme is constitutionally required. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,
464 (1984); see also Acker & Lanier, supra note 19, at 27-52 (analyzing the different
1150 [Vol. 77
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the individual vagaries from state to state, the purpose of mitigating
evidence remains the same: to provide the jury with a basis on which
to consider sentencing the individual defendant to life imprisonment
rather than to death.29
The challenge facing the defense is to change jurors' focus from
the facts of the murder on which the jury convicted the defendant to
facts about the defendant that will convince the jury to vote for a life
sentence. 0  Courts and scholars often refer to this process as
"humanizing" the defendant.31  The defense must counter the
prosecution's depiction of the defendant as an evil being who
deserves to die.32 This action requires providing the jury with a
statutory schemes). The U.S. Supreme Court has not identified the burden of proof on the
prosecutor for establishing the appropriateness of the death penalty. See Acker & Lanier,
supra note 19, at 34. Most states require the prosecution to prove the existence of
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See Acker & Lanier, supra note 23, at
341-42.
29. Despite this fundamental role, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that the
Eighth Amendment does not require that the jury be instructed on the concept of
mitigation or on the particular mitigating circumstances present in an individual case. See
Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757, 763 (1998). For a discussion of the importance of
jury instructions in capital sentencing, see infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
30. Professor Goodpaster describes this challenge as a "trial for life." Gary
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 303 (1983). Empirical research confirms the importance and
difficulty of refocusing the jury because many jurors make up their minds about
punishment before hearing evidence at the punishment phase. See, e.g., William J.
Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70
IND. L.J. 1043, 1089-90 (1995) (reporting that one-third of jurors surveyed in seven states
thought, prior to the start of the punishment phase, that the defendant should be
sentenced to death); Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their
Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183,
1191-95 (1995) (finding that the majority of jurors made guilt and punishment decisions
simultaneously).
31. See, e.g., Emerson v. Gramley, 883 F. Supp. 225, 245 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (concluding
that testimony about the defendant's caring nature could have humanized him to the jury),
affd, 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1996); Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(referring to the need for the attorney to attempt to humanize the defendant at
sentencing), vacated and remanded, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1992); Goodpaster, supra note
30, at 321 ("[I]t is essential that the client be presented to the sentencer as a human
being."); Weisberg, supra note 16, at 361 ("The overall goal of the defense is to present a
human narrative, an explanation of the defendant's apparently malignant violence as in
some way rooted in understandable aspects of the human condition, so the jury will be less
inclined to cast him out of the human circle."); White, supra note 16, at 361 ("In every
case, the capital defendant's attorney should seek to 'humanize' the defendant.").
32. See David C. Stebbins & Scott P. Kenney, Zen and the Art of Mitigation
Presentation, or, the Use of Psycho-Social Experts in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial,
CHAMPIoN, Aug. 1986, at 14, 14 (arguing that defense counsel must show that the
defendant is not evil). Reported cases and articles present numerous examples of how the
prosecution characterizes the defendant as evil and less than human. See, e.g., Devier v.
Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1453 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing the district court opinion, noting that the
HeinOnline  -- 77 N.C. L. Rev.  1151 1998-1999
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different way of understanding the defendant and his conduct-one
that provokes the jury to empathize with the defendant,33 to
sympathize with him,34 or to be merciful toward him.35 Thus,
prosecutor argued in closing that the defendant was "like a cancer which should be
exorcised to protect society"); Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting
that, in adopting the jury recommendation to sentence the defendant to death, the trial
court said " 'we cannot tolerate the James Brewers of our community' "); Bowen v. Kemp,
769 F.2d 672, 680 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that the prosecutor characterized the defendant
as "'a product of the devil,'" who was "'no better than a beast'" (quoting trial
transcript)); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985) (calling defendant "less
than human"); Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 478 (Fla. 1993) (approving a jury instruction
that defined "heinous" as "extremely wicked or shockingly evil"); WHITE, supra note 20,
at 84-85 (recounting a case where the prosecutor's expert testified at the punishment
phase that "crime is a 'product of evil' and nothing else"); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at
335 (remarking that the prosecutor will portray the defendant as "evil and inhuman,
perhaps monstrous"). See generally Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder:
Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 548-59 (1995)
(discussing how the media turns defendants into monsters and arguing that "demonizing
the perpetrators of violence facilitates their extermination at the hands of the state");
Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 19, 51-52 (1993) (maintaining that evil is a dominant cultural motif for representing
violence and victimization).
33. See William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 273, 286 (1990-1991) (arguing that evidence causing the jury to
empathize with the defendant is "the key to winning a life verdict"). Professor Pillsbury
distinguishes sympathy, when another's "situation reminds us of our own," from empathy,
which "promotes feeling for another as good in itself, not because it makes the empathizer
feel good." Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 655, 695-96 (1989). He maintains that in capital cases
courts should "informf juries of their obligation to try to empathize with the offender as
part of assessing deserved punishment." Id. at 703.
34. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (holding constitutional an
instruction telling the jury not to rely on "mere sympathy" because the trial court directed
the jury "to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the
evidence adduced during the penalty phase"); State v. Bey, 548 A.2d 887, 911-12 (N.J.
1988) (noting that jury instructions "must not mislead the jury into rejecting sympathy
engendered by the defendant's background, character, or other mitigating
circumstances"). But see Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 371 (1993) (noting that the Court
has not interpreted its jurisprudence on jury consideration of mitigating evidence "to
mean that a jury must be able to dispense mercy on the basis of a sympathetic response to
the defendant"); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 487, 494 (1990) (casting doubt on the
defendant's argument that Brown suggests that "the Constitution requires that the jury be
allowed to consider and give effect to emotions that are based upon mitigating evidence"
and holding that an instruction directing the jury to "avoid any influence of sympathy ...
or other arbitrary factor" may be proper guidance).
35. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 190 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that past conduct may shed light on the defendant's character in a way that evokes a
merciful response); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199-203 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasizing the importance of the jury's ability to exercise
mercy); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 336 (positing that one element of mitigation is to
"spark in the sentencer the perspective or compassion conducive to mercy"). But see
Garvey, supra note 16, at 992 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has no coherent
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humanizing the defendant may entail presenting the defendant's
positive attributes and/or factors in his character or background that
explain his commission of the crime.
A defendant's good character qualities may include being a
caring37 or religious person,8 or a person without a criminal record or
history of violent conduct.3 9 The defense may use this evidence to
frame the crime as a departure from the defendant's otherwise
positive and worthwhile character.4 ° Similarly, if the defendant has
been a well-behaved prisoner, the defense may use this fact to
demonstrate that the defendant's life should be spared because he
understanding of mercy and proposing that mercy should be considered separately, after
the sentencer decides whether the defendant deserves death or not).
36. See, e.g., Geimer, supra note 33, at 286 (identifying four types of mitigating
evidence: empathy, good guy, positive prisoner, and crime-related) (citing Deana Dorman
Logan, Is It Mitigation or Aggravation? Troublesome Areas of Defense Evidence in
Capital Sentencing, CAL. ATr'YS FOR CRIM. JUST. F., Sept-Oct. 1989, at 14, 14);
Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 335-37 (positing four elements of the case for mitigation:
presenting the defendant's positive qualities; making the defendant's crime
understandable in light of his past history; presenting evidence about the
inappropriateness of the death penalty in this case; rebutting the State's evidence of
aggravation); Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death
Different?, 42 MERCER L. REV. 695, 703 (1991) (identifying three types of mitigating
evidence: the defendant's good deeds; his "psychiatric, addiction, or family problems"
that explain his bad conduct; and his potential for being productive in prison); Weisberg,
supra note 16, at 361 (suggesting that the defendant consider, when appropriate, casting
doubt on his guilt, presenting his good character, or proffering a "causal, determinist"
explanation of the crime). Professor Bilionis notes that Lockett encompasses
circumstances of the defendant's formative years, adjustment to prison, and positive traits
such as "remorse, general good character, hardworking nature, success in overcoming
considerable hardships, service to the community or the military, or relatively minor
criminal record." Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the
Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 304-05 (1991) (footnotes omitted)
(compiling types of mitigating evidence recognized in state statutes and presented in
cases).
37. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987) (noting that mitigating
evidence included the fact that the defendant was "a fond and affectionate uncle to the
children of one of his brothers"); State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162, 168 (Or. 1994) (holding
that the jury could infer positive aspects of the defendant's character from testimony
about the destructive effect his execution would have on his young daughter).
38. See, e.g., Franklin, 487 U.S. at 186 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(observing that mitigating character evidence may include good behavior in prison,
honorable military service, kindness toward others, and regular church attendance).
39. See, e.g., Acker & Lanier, supra note 23, at 313-17; cf. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S.
66, 80-82 (1987) (noting that even if the defendant has a criminal record, the nature and
quality of the crimes may be mitigating).
40. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 335 (suggesting that every defendant has
some good characteristics that the defense attorney must use to convince the jury of his
redeeming qualities); Weisberg, supra note 16, at 361 ("Where the defendant has evidence
of good character, the defense wants to plead that the crime was an aberration.").
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will not be a danger as long as he is in prison.41
A mitigation theory based on a defendant's positive qualities has
a certain appeal because it readily recasts the defendant from an evil
and unredeemable monster into a person who committed a serious
crime but to whom the jury may still relate as a human being.42 A
high probability exists, however, that the defendant's background or
character is not respectable or virtuous.4 3 It is far more likely that the
defendant's life history will include prior criminal convictions or
violent behavior.' Thus, while building a mitigation theory around a
defendant's nonviolent character may appear desirable, it is likely to
be unrealistic and, therefore, ultimately unpersuasive to the jury.
A more promising form of mitigating evidence is that which
provides an explanation for the defendant's commission of the
crime.45 By presenting explanatory mitigating circumstances, the
defense seeks to show why the defendant committed the crime46 and,
41. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 157-58 (1994) (noting that the
defendant presented evidence that he would not be violent in prison because his
dangerousness was directed only toward elderly women); Franklin, 487 U.S. at 178-79
(noting that a defendant's clean disciplinary record in prison may be mitigating); Skipper
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986) (holding that the defendant must be allowed to
present mitigating evidence of his good behavior in jail); see also Geimer, supra note 33, at
286 (explaining that "'[p]ositive prisoner' evidence shows that life imprisonment is
sufficient punishment").
42. See Weisberg, supra note 16, at 361 (arguing that the goal of the defense is to
make the jury "less inclined to cast [the defendant] out of the human circle").
43. See Haney, supra note 32, at 601 n.121 (observing that "many capital defendants
are outliers on a continuum of risk factors like abuse and neglect"); Stebbins & Kenney,
supra note 32, at 14 (arguing that the problem with planning a case for mitigation as a
compilation of good deeds is that "most people facing the death penalty are not choir boys
with paper routes who took care of their mothers, obeyed their fathers, and placed flags
on graves on Memorial Day").
44. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1995, at 9 tbl.8 (1996) (reporting that 66% of death row inmates have prior
felony convictions and 8% have at least one prior homicide conviction).
45. See Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832, 846 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting a lawyer who
testified as an expert at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that jurors were more
likely to impose a life sentence if the defense attorney could explain why the crime
occurred); Geimer, supra note 33, at 285-87 (positing that the key to a life verdict is
explanatory evidence); Haney, supra note 32, at 560 (emphasizing the importance of using
mitigating evidence to explain, not excuse, the defendant's conduct); Weisberg, supra note
16, at 361 (noting that mitigating evidence explaining the crime is what defendants should
most often want to use); White, supra note 16, at 361 (explaining that providing a reason
for the crime is the most important purpose of mitigating evidence).
46. See WHITE, supra note 20, at 76 ("Defense counsel must ... explain where the
defendant has come from and why he has become the man he is now."); Haney, supra note
32, at 560 ("[M]itigating evidence ... is not intended to excuse, justify, or diminish the
significance of what [the defendant has] done but to help explain it .... "); Sarat, supra
note 32, at 41 (maintaining that penalty phase evidence must explain but not excuse the
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in so doing, to transform the jury's understanding of the defendant
and the murder.47 This kind of mitigating evidence is not offered to
excuse the defendant's conduct' or to undermine or negate the jury's
guilt-phase determination of the defendant's responsibility for the
crime. Instead, the defendant's goal is to demonstrate how he came
to be the kind of person who committed the murder, that his
judgment and behavior are not entirely of his own making, and/or
that circumstances outside of his control contributed to and affected
his conduct.49 This type of mitigating evidence is important because
it allows the jury to understand the crime within the broader context
of the defendant's life and may convince the jury that exacting the
most severe punishment is neither appropriate nor necessary.50
defendant's conduct); Stebbins & Kenney, supra note 32, at 16-18 (suggesting that the jury
must be told how and why forces in the defendant's life caused him to commit murder);
see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death
Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 346-49 (1996) (noting the difficulty
and the importance of distinguishing excuse from explanation).
47. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 32, at 39-47 (analyzing how a defendant's attorney used
evidence of childhood violence against him to assist the jury in understanding, but not
excusing, why the defendant killed the victim).
48. By convicting the defendant, the jury rejected any defense based on excuse.
Furthermore, mitigating evidence need not rise to the level of a defense for the underlying
crime. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (rejecting the lower court's
limitation of mitigation evidence as that which provided a "legal excuse from criminal
responsibility"). Even if a mental impairment related to childhood abuse does not
constitute a defense to committing the murder, it is still relevant mitigating evidence at the
punishment phase. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 309-10, 319-28 (1989)
(considering evidence of brain damage related to childhood abuse and mental retardation
as relevant to sentencing where the jury had rejected that same evidence when it was
presented as part of the defendant's insanity defense); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d
1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that investigation into the defendant's
mental state for the guilt phase was sufficient for the punishment phase).
49. See, e.g., Geimer, supra note 33, at 286 (contending that the most important
mitigating evidence is that which shows that the defendant's impairments were not his
fault or that the fault is shared); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 335-37 (arguing that part of
the mitigating case must include a connection between the crime and the defendant's prior
history-the "unique circumstances affecting his formative development ... [that show]
that he is not solely responsible for what he is"); Stebbins & Kenney, supra note 32, at 18
(noting that expert testimony serves to connect the pieces of the defendant's history and to
explain "the factors beyond the client's control that may give the jury a reason to keep the
client alive").
50. See WH=TE, supra note 20, at 76 (emphasizing the importance of providing a
context for the defendant's crime); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 335-36 (asserting that
making the defendant's crime understandable in light of his history may evoke forgiveness
and mercy). But see Alfieri, supra note 46, at 347 (arguing that focusing on how the
defendant is not solely responsible for his conduct "suppresses the norm of moral agency,
rendering the task of conceptualizing and legitimizing mercy even more difficult").
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B. Mitigating Characteristics of Childhood Abuse
Evidence that the defendant was abused as a child is one of the
more intuitively recognizable forms of mitigating evidence.51 A
general societal understanding exists that a person abused as a child
will likely suffer some kind of long-term negative behavioral and
perceptual effects. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in Santosky
v. Kramer,52 a non-death penalty case: "A stable, loving homelife is
essential to a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being. It
requires no citation of authority to assert that children who are
abused in their youth generally face extraordinary problems
developing into responsible, productive citizens." 53 While the long-
term problems that an abused defendant may encounter may not
constitute an excuse for his conduct, a jury may find that such
problems impair the defendant's judgment or behavior sufficiently to
justify punishing him with life imprisonment rather than death.
In order for the defense to persuade the jury that the defendant's
history of childhood abuse should influence its punishment decision,
however, the jury must have more than a vague sense of the abuse
51. See supra note 16 (citing Supreme Court cases and other authorities that recognize
the mitigating potential of childhood abuse); see also Haney, supra note 32, at 591
("[M]ost people recognize intuitively that background experiences can shape and
influence who we are and what we are capable of becoming."). Evidence of childhood
abuse is distinguishable from, for example, mitigating evidence of mental illness, which
many people do not understand and therefore fear or distrust. See James S. Liebman &
Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate":
Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 817-21, 819 n.275 (1978)
(analyzing how mental illness should be considered as mitigating evidence and noting the
importance of jury instructions because many people fear and distrust the mentally ill);
Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense
Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 599, 709-30 (1989-1990) (arguing that the
movement to abolish the insanity defense is driven by persistent myths about mental
illness, including the belief that the defendant is faking his illness, that mental problems
are not as severe as organic ones, and that the defendant should "look crazy" if he is
insane); cf Tamsen Douglass Love, Introduction to Special Project, Current Issues in
Mental Health Care, 50 VAND. L. REV. 677, 681 (1997) (noting that fear of persons with
mental illness affects the allocation of governmental resources for treatment).
52. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
53. Id, at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
682 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Presumably, no individual who suffers [sexual
abuse as a child] is wholly unaffected."); Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287, 1292 (5th Cir.
1993) (acknowledging that child abuse as "generally understood" would "have the
tendency to affect the child's moral capacity by predisposing him or her toward
committing violence"); Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 590 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (taking
"judicial notice" that a defendant's background that included childhood neglect and sexual
abuse "increases the probability of [maladjustment and mental] problems"); Haney, supra
note 32, at 562 (remarking on the increasing societal recognition that children need
protection and guidance).
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suffered and an intuitive understanding of its general effects.
Without a detailed presentation of the defendant's experience and a
cogent explanation of its long-term repercussions, a juror's
assumptions about childhood abuse may skew her understanding of
its significance.5 4 It is necessary, therefore, for the jury to know the
kind, duration, and severity of abuse the defendant suffered and to
understand how this abuse, in concert with other factors, 5 affected
the defendant. Such a showing will affect the jury's understanding of
the defendant's explanation for the murder.
The following Parts draw on psychological and medical literature
to identify the contours of childhood abuse and its possible long-term
effects; discuss how these features are reflected in death penalty
cases; and analyze the connection between a history of childhood
abuse and mitigating evidence.
1. Psychological and Medical Research on Childhood Abuse
Research on the correlation between childhood abuse and adult
violence is in a nascent stage, yet it provides critical information
about the possible adult consequences of a traumatic childhood.56
54. See, e.g., Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1511 (11th Cir. 1990) (accepting the trial
attorney's failure to present mitigating evidence of the defendant's deprived childhood
because the attorney thought many jurors had difficult lives but did not turn to crime);
Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive
Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1137 (1997) (noting that the response of
many jurors to an expert's testimony "about the defendant's hardships ... was 'Yeah, well,
I went through that and I didn't end up a killer.' "); see also Haney, supra note 32, at 591
(observing that "clear thinking succumbs to fear and denial" when child abuse is proffered
as a basis for moderating punishment). For a discussion regarding judges'
misunderstandings about childhood abuse, see infra Part II.A.
55. See infra notes 66, 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction of the
effects of childhood abuse with other impairments).
56. See Robin Malinosky-Rummell & David J. Hansen, Long-Term Consequences of
Childhood Physical Abuse, 114 PSYCHOL. BULL. 68, 68 (1993) (reviewing the literature on
the long-term consequences of child abuse and observing that while current research
shows a correlation, it does not establish a causal relationship between child abuse and
adult impairments); Sheree L. Toth & Dante Cicchetti, Child Maltreatment: Where Do We
Go from Here in Our Treatment of Victims?, in CHILD ABUSE, CHILD DEVELOPMENT,
AND SOCIAL POLICY 399, 421 (Dante Cicchetti & Sheree L. Toth eds., 1993)
(recommending increased research on the longitudinal effects of child maltreatment);
Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence Beget Violence? A Critical Examination of the
Literature, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 24 (1989) (reviewing the literature on the relationship
between violence to a child and that child's violence as an adult and noting the need for
further research because "[w]hy some children succumb and others do not remains an
open question").
This Part is based on published literature in the psychological and medical fields. I
initially consulted two articles that synthesize much of the current information about child
abuse and maltreatment as it informs the development and presentation of defendants'
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Certainly, not every child who is abused will, as an adult, engage in
violent behavior.5 7  The relationship between the abuse and later
adult behavior is both complex and uncertain.5 8 Nonetheless, strong
evidence exists that a person who was abused as a child is at risk of
suffering long-term effects that may contribute to his violent
behavior as an adult.59 This Article focuses on physical childhood
abuse because it appears to have a closer correlation to later adult
aggressive or criminal conduct than does sexual abuse.60 The concern
social histories in death penalty cases. See Haney, supra note 32 (combining social science
research data and anecdotal information from cases on which he worked during the last 20
years); Deana Dorman Logan, From Abused Child to Killer: Positing Links in the Chain,
CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 36, 39 (providing a "theoretical orientation" for defense
attorneys). These articles were instrumental in advancing my thinking about the effects of
child abuse and their relationship to understanding defendants who are on death row.
57. See, e.g., Dorothy Otnow Lewis, From Abuse to Violence: Psychophysiological
Consequences of Maltreatment, 31 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
383, 388 (1992) ("[Mjost abused children do not turn into violent criminals."); Cathy Spatz
Widom, Child Abuse, Neglect, and Adult Behavior: Research Design and Findings on
Criminality, Violence, and Child Abuse, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPsYCHIATRY 355, 364 (1989)
(reporting results of the author's own study showing that while 29% of abused children
had adult criminal records, 71% did not); Widom, supra note 56, at 23-24 (concluding that
the literature demonstrates that the majority of abused children do not become
delinquent).
58. See, e.g., DAVID A. WOLFE, CHILD ABUSE 121 (1987) (describing the correlation
between childhood abuse and adult behavior, emotions, and cognition as "circuitous and
unpredictable"); Raymond H. Starr, Jr. et al., Life-Span Developmental Outcomes of
Child Maltreatment, in THE EFFECTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1, 21 (Raymond H.
Starr, Jr. & David A. Wolfe eds., 1991) (concluding that the "connections between
childhood experiences of maltreatment and later developmental outcomes are the result of
multiple factors that interact dynamically with each other," but that "the best available
evidence does suggest that there are significant adult sequelae of child maltreatment");
Widom, supra note 57, at 364 ("Being abused as a child significantly increases one's risk of
having an adult criminal record (and, for males, a violent one). However ... the route is
not straight-forward or certain.").
59. It is critical to note that the operative language is the "risk"--not the
inevitability-of continuing the "cycle of violence." See, e.g., Pamela Y. Blake et al.,
Neurologic Abnormalities -in Murderers, 45 NEUROLOGY 1641, 1644-45 (1995)
(documenting a history of severe and prolonged childhood abuse in 26 of 31 murderers,
which, in concert with brain damage and paranoia, "may have an etiologic role in
violence"); Lewis, supra note 57, at 387-89 (noting that the author's own studies show that
child maltreatment combined with neuropsychiatric and cognitive deficits is "an especially
potent precipitant of aggression"); see also ARTHUR H. GREEN, CHILD MALTREATMENT
76 (1980) (suggesting that one could expect the cumulative impact of child abuse to
jeopardize an individual as an adult). But cf. Widom, supra note 56, at 3, 23-24 (noting
that despite an intuitive sense that "'violence breeds violence,' " existing research is too
incomplete to be certain).
60. See, e.g., JOHN N. BRIERE, CHILD ABUSE TRAUMA 57-58 (1992) (citing studies);
Arthur Green, Childhood Sexual and Physical Abuse, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
TRAUMATIC STRESS SYNDROMES 577, 579-80 (John P. Wilson & Beverley Raphael eds.,
1993) (noting that aggressive behavior is more often associated with physically abused
children, while sexual impulse problems are associated with sexually abused children);
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is principally with severe physical abuse-that' which causes serious
injury to the child.61
Researchers in the psychological and medical fields posit that
the connection between abuse as a child and adult violent behavior
depends on a multitude of factors. For example, the extent of the
long-term consequences from physical child abuse may be affected by
the type and severity of abuse inflicted on the child, as well as by the
individual vulnerabilities of the child.62 Abuse by a caretaker has the
Haney, supra note 32, at 573 (referring to the synergistic relationship between specific
types of child abuse and their adult manifestations as "isomorphism").
61. Two researchers used a conservative definition of abuse that included being
"punched or hit on areas of the body other than the buttocks with whips, switches,
extension cords or boards," and "deliberate infliction of cuts, burns, broken limbs, and
causing bleeding or loss of consciousness," but not "being hit on buttocks with a hand, the
leather part of a belt, or a switch" or being "slapped on the face with an open hand."
Abby Stein & Dorothy Otnow Lewis, Discovering Physical Abuse: Insights from a
Follow-Up Study of Delinquents, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 523, 524 (1992). The
authors chose this conservative definition in part to distinguish between "extreme physical
brutality and culturally condoned physical discipline." Id.; see also Janice H. Carter-
Lourensz & Gloria Johnson-Powell, Physical Abuse, Sexual Abuse, and Neglect of Child,
in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRYJVI 2455, 2456 (Harold I. Kaplan &
Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter Kaplan & Sadock] (defining physical
abuse as "nonaccidental physical injury" that most often results from "unreasonably
severe corporal punishment or unjustifiable punishment," and also includes "intentional,
deliberate assault, such as burning, biting, cutting,... or otherwise torturing a child"). As
discussed infra text accompanying notes 126-32, this abuse is the kind most often
documented in death penalty cases.
Some scholars suggest that most adults were maltreated as children. See, e.g.,
BRIERE, supra note 60, at xvii (stating that one of his central tenets is that "the majority of
adults in North America, regardless of gender, age, race, ethnicity, or social class,
probably experienced some level of maltreatment as children"). The defense attorney
must be prepared to counter this type of inference about childhood abuse; it too easily
belittles the trauma experienced by the defendant and feeds into the misconception that
the abuse must not have had long-term effects because most adults, even if maltreated, do
not commit murder. Contributing to this perception may be the plethora of novels that
involve adults telling their stories of abuse as children. See, e.g., DOROTHY ALLISON,
BASTARD OUT OF CAROLINA (1992); URSULA HEGI, SALT DANCERS (1995). While
psychologically damaged in devastating ways, the narrators in these stories emerge as
functional adults. One exception to this phenomenon in current novels is JANE
HAMILTON, THE BOOK OF RUTH (1988), in which the climax of the book occurs when the
protagonist, severely abused as a child and mentally slow, kills his mother-in-law in a fit of
rage. See id. at 292-98.
The point, however, is not that everyone was maltreated and, therefore, that the jury
may discount the defendant's experience. As Briere carefully observes, the significance of
the maltreatment depends on its severity and other factors such as "social and familial
support, external stressors, and developmental level." BRIERE, supra note 60, at xvii. It is
critical that the defense attorney make this point when presenting this kind of information
in mitigation.
62. See WOLFE, supra note 58, at 101 (noting that it is more accurate to say that
problems resulting from child abuse are the "product of interaction between the child's
emerging personality characteristics, parental treatment, and circumstantial factors");
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potential for greater long-term damaging consequences,63 as does
abuse that lasts for an extended period of time, for example,
beginning when the child is an infant or toddler and continuing into
adolescence.6 Within a family, one child may be singled out for
more extreme or repeated abuse than other children.65 In addition,
the degree of risk and the severity of the violent behavior are
exacerbated when the abused child, as an adult, has other
psychological, neurological, and cognitive impairments.66  The
likelihood that an adult who was abused as a child will be violent
toward others increases when these factors coincide.
In order to understand the long-term consequences of child
abuse, it is necessary to know more than the types and degrees of
abuse that may contribute to an adult's violent behavior. It is also
Green, supra note 60, at 586 (explaining that the long-term sequelae of child abuse depend
on the individual's age, developmental level, preexisting personality; the onset, duration,
frequency and severity of the abuse; the relationship between the child and the
perpetrator; the family and institutional response; and the availability and quality of
therapeutic intervention); Logan, supra note 56, at 37 (positing that the effects of child
maltreatment will depend on the extent of the abuse and the personal characteristics of
the individual); Malinosky-Rummell & Hansen, supra note 56, at 75-77 (concluding that
the long-term consequences of child abuse may be moderated by the interaction between
several factors, including the character of the maltreatment, the individual, his family, and
his environment).
63. See Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Psychological Consequences of Overwhelming
Life Experiences, in PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA 1, 16 (Bessel A. van der Kolk ed., 1987).
64. See Green, supra note 60, at 583 (observing that the "ongoing nature of the
trauma in cases of abuse is more likely to result in pathological changes in character
structure and personality" than one-time catastrophic events).
65. See, e.g., Alan R. Felthous, Psychosocial Dynamics of Child Abuse, 29 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 219, 229-31 (1984) (noting that "[a]dopted children and stepchildren may
be more vulnerable to abuse" and other children may be susceptible because of sex,
physical appearance, circumstances attending birth, or congenital anomalies); Green,
supra note 60, at 585 (noting that severe abuse is "usually limited to one child in a
family"). Even if other children in a family are abused, their different ages and stages of
development may lessen the consequences of the trauma for them. See Haney, supra note
32, at 593-96 (explaining that different stages in a family's history and different
developmental stages of children will create different experiences of abuse and different
perceptions of options available to the individual for how to react); id. at 597-98
(describing siblings' explanations for why they may not have been as traumatized by
abuse: age, gender, "some idiosyncratic characteristic," "fortuitous events and critical
moments of good fortune").
66. See Blake et al., supra note 59, at 1646 (noting the interaction of childhood abuse
and mental impairments among study subjects who committed homicide); Dorothy Otnow
Lewis et al., Toward a Theory of the Genesis of Violence: A Follow-Up Study of
Delinquents, 28 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 431, 436 (1989)
(concluding that the combined effect of childhood abuse and mental or neurological
impairments is not "merely additive," but increases the "risk and severity of adult violent
criminality"); infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing how a combination of
impairments creates a "matrix of violence").
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essential to identify the ways in which the experience of child abuse
may help explain an adult's aggressive behavior. The literature on
child abuse identifies possible long-term impairments as
developmental, psychological, and physiological.67 While some of the
damaging effects of child abuse may be ameliorated by therapy,68 the
absence of treatment creates a greater likelihood that an individual
will suffer life-long difficulties.69
Researchers posit that abuse may disrupt a child's normal
emotional and cognitive development.70  "[]ssues at one
developmental period lay the groundwork for subsequent issues....
[T]he child who fails to develop interpersonal trust, receives little
affection from others, and is governed by authoritarian rule-
67. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing how impairments damage
a child).
68. See GREEN, supra note 59, at 87 (noting the necessity of "vigorous
psychotherapeutic and psychoeducational intervention" and observing that reversing the
effects of abuse may be more difficult once an individual is past adolescence); see also
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 107 (1982) (stating that a psychologist concluded that
Eddings could be rehabilitated with 15-20 years of intensive therapy).
69. See Arthur H. Green, Children Traumatized by Physical Abuse, in POST-
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN CHILDREN 135, 151-52 (Spencer Eth & Robert S.
Pynoos eds., 1985) (stating that, absent intervention and treatment, "abused children are
vulnerable to subsequent psychological impairment, vocational and educational failure,
violence, delinquency, and criminality, and are likely to repeat the patterns of
maltreatment with their own children"); Logan, supra note 56, at 39 (positing intervention
and treatment as key elements in altering the link between child abuse and homicidal
behavior); Toth & Cicchetti, supra note 56, at 413 (highlighting the absence of treatment
as putting children at risk for psychopathology as adults); see also Haney, supra note 32, at
574-76 (identifying the lack of psychological services as one component of institutional
failure that contributes to later criminal behavior).
70. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 59, at 81-82 (identifying cognitive impairments as
including mental retardation, low intellectual functioning, learning difficulties, and speech
and language disorders); WOLFE, supra note 58, at 101-10 (explaining how child abuse
interferes with behavioral, socio-emotional, and social-cognitive development); Stephen
R. Shirk, The Interpersonal Legacy of Physical Abuse of Children, in ABUSE AND
VICTIMIZATION ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 57, 57-75 (Martha B. Straus ed., 1988)
(explaining how, depending on the developmental stage of the child, abuse will differently
affect social cognition, competence, and aggressive behavior); Toth & Cicchetti, supra
note 56, at 400-13 (discussing how child maltreatment may interfere with the normal
development of attachment to others); see also Cynthia M. Perez & Cathy Spatz Widom,
Childhood Victimization and Long-Term Intellectual and Academic Outcomes, 18 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 617, 626 (1994) (reporting the results of a follow-up study that
showed individuals 20 years after childhood abuse had "lower levels of intellectual ability
and academic attainment" than the controls); cf. Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Complexity
of Adaptation to Trauma: Self-Regulation, Stimulus Discrimination, and Characterological
Development, in TRAUMATIC STRESS 182, 182-203 (Bessel A. van der Kolk et al. eds.,
1996) (identifying the effects of childhood trauma as including lack of self regulation, self-
destructive behaviors, impaired character development, repetition of trauma, and mental
disorders).
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common characteristics of the abused child-has missed important
socialization experiences that may interfere with adolescent and adult
relationships. ' 71 Rather than learning and integrating healthy and
appropriate social skills, a child who experiences violence and
rejection as the predominant modes of interpersonal relationships
may develop primitive defense mechanisms,72 impaired impulse
control, or masochistic and self-destructive behavior.73
Child abuse may also have negative psychological consequences.
A person may internalize the experience of child abuse as a negative
judgment about himself and blame himself for the abuse as a way of
making sense of what was done to him.74 Children may turn to
alcohol or drugs as a form of self-medication to dull or escape the
trauma of the abuse, which may then turn into a long-term substance-
71. WOLFE, supra note 58, at 98. As Briere, a leading psychologist, observed:
Like other victims, abused children experience significant psychological distress
and dysfunction. Unlike adults, however, they are traumatized during the most
critical period of their lives: when assumptions about self, others, and the world
are being formed; when their relations to their own internal states are being
established; and when coping and affiliative skills are first acquired.
BRIERE, supra note 60, at 17.
72. See GREEN, supra note 59, at 65 (noting that primitive defenses include "denial,
projection, introjection, and splitting, in order to cope with threatening external and
internalized parental images").
73. See id. at 65-70; van der Kolk, supra note 70, at 187 (noting that abused children
may develop problems with regulating anger and anxiety). A child may also model his
behavior on that of his parents. See Logan, supra note 56, at 38 (observing that modeling
includes learning violence as appropriate behavior and failing to learn positive alternative
behaviors).
74. See BRIERE, supra note 60, at 24-25 (stating that parental justifications for the
abuse "are likely to increase the victim's sense of guilt, shame, and responsibility for the
abuse, and thereby intensify the child's sense of personal badness"); Bessel A. van der
Kok & Alexander C. McFarlane, The Black Hole of Trauma, in TRAUMATIC STRESS,
supra note 70, at 3, 15 (observing that traumatized children often blame themselves). An
individual may be embarrassed or ashamed that he was abused, or he may deny being
abused. See, e.g., Green, supra note 69, at 143 (discussing denial as a way to avoid
retraumatization); Lewis, supra note 57, at 384 (noting that "most grotesquely and
recurrently maltreated children dissociate themselves from the abusive experiences" and
deny the abuse); cf. Shirk, supra note 70, at 60-61 (concluding that the age and stage of
development when abuse occurs will affect how a child internalizes his guilt for causing
the conduct). Self-blame may result in the individual's reluctance, refusal, or inability to
discuss being abused. See Stein & Lewis, supra note 61, at 523 (identifying reluctance,
minimization, and denial among the reasons why it is difficult to obtain data about child
and adolescent maltreatment); Cathy Spatz Widom & Robin L. Shepard, Accuracy of
Adult Recollections of Childhood Victimization: Part 1. Childhood Physical Abuse, 8
PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 412, 418 (1996) (summarizing reasons given in the psychological
literature for misleading retrospective reporting of abuse, including forgetting, redefining,
denial, and repression and noting that their own study revealed that 40% of individuals
with documented histories of abuse did not report the same, although the reasons for not
doing so were not explored in the study).
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abuse problem.7' An adult abused as a child may also manifest
mental disorders,7 6 such as post-traumatic stress77 or dissociation.78
Finally, but perhaps least understood and documented,
childhood abuse may cause damage to the central nervous system,
particularly to the brain.79 If his mother abused alcohol during her
75. See BRIERE, supra note 60, at 59-61 (noting that substance abuse is often linked to
childhood abuse); Haney, supra note 32, at 584-85 (discussing drug and alcohol use as ways
to reduce "emotional pain"); Bessel A. van der Kolk & Mark S. Greenberg,, The
Psychobiology of the Trauma Response: Hyperarousal, Constriction, and Addiction to
Traumatic Reexposure, in PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA, supra note 63, at 63, 65
(characterizing substance abuse as an "ill-fated attempt to relieve their posttraumatic
symptoms").
76. See, e.g., BRIERE, supra note 60, at 18 (identifying seven major types of
psychological disturbances which adults may suffer: post-traumatic stress, cognitive
distortions, altered emotionality, dissociation, impaired self-reference, disturbed
relatedness, and avoidance); Logan, supra note 56, at 37 (listing psychiatric illnesses often
associated with child maltreatment, including Organic Personality Syndrome, Organic
Mental Disorder, Multiple Personality Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, and
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder).
Childhood abuse is one of the risk factors associated with antisocial personality
disorder. See John G. Gunderson & Katharine A. Phillips, Personality Disorders, in
Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 61, at 1425, 1442. "Antisocial personality disorder is
characterized by a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others
beginning in early adulthood." Id. at 1441. Individuals who are labeled as antisocial are
often viewed as epitomizing the most dangerous type of person because "the hallmark of
antisocial personality disorder is lack of remorse in regard to the violence and other
antisocial behaviors." Kenneth Tardiff, Adult Antisocial Behavior and Criminality, in
Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 61, at 1622, 1625. However, antisocial personality disorder is
not the correct diagnosis if the antisocial behavior is generated by organic causes. See
Gunderson & Phillips, supra, at 1444. As Dr. Tardiff explains, the term "antisocial
behavior" is confusing because it refers to behavior not due to a mental disorder. See
Tardiff, supra, at 1623. Before an individual may be said to be "antisocial," a "mental
disorder must be ruled out as a cause of or factor contributing to violence by the person."
Id. at 1625. An adequate neuropsychological workup is imperative to determine the
existence of a mental disorder before an individual may be classified as antisocial. See id.
at 1623; see also Jonathan H. Pincus, Evaluation of the Violent Adolescent, in
APPLICATION OF BASIC NEUROSCIENCE TO CHILD PSYCHIATRY 357, 358 (Stephen I.
Deutsch et al. eds., 1990) (noting that the problem with not accurately diagnosing organic
brain damage and psychosis is that individuals are mislabeled sociopathic and wrongly
viewed as unfeeling, amoral, and untreatable).
77. See BRIERE, supra note 60, at 18; Green, supra note 60, at 581, 583; Logan, supra
note 56, at 37; van der Kolk, supra note 70, at 184 (positing that intrafamily abuse may
cause complex post-traumatic stress syndromes). Significantly, post-traumatic stress
disorder symptoms may have a long latency period so that its effects may be triggered over
15 years later by a subsequent traumatic incident. See van der Kolk, supra note 63, at 9
(citing a study on responses to combat).
78. See Green, supra note 60, at 583 (noting that Multiple Personality Disorder
usually has its origins in childhood trauma of physical or sexual abuse); van der Kolk,
supra note 70, at 191-93 (explaining that "[d]issociation can be an effective way to
continue functioning while the trauma is going on, but if it continues to be utilized after
the acute trauma has passed, it comes to interfere with everyday functioning").
79. See GREEN, supra note 59, at 71-74 (noting the high incidence of central nervous
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pregnancy, a child may be neurologically impaired in utero and thus
suffer Fetal Alcohol Syndrome.80 The physical act of abuse itself may
damage a child's brain."' Lastly, research is beginning to suggest that
the neurophysiological makeup of the brain literally may be altered
as a result of abuse and its attendant trauma 2
system impairments among abused children but stating that the etiology is unclear: the
impairment may precede, result from, or be concomitant with the abuse); Lewis, supra
note 57, at 386-88 (explaining how the brain learns to respond to aggressive behavior);
Logan, supra note 56, at 37 (noting that brain damage may be localized or diffuse); Bessel
A. van der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score, in TRAUMATIC STRESS, supra note 70, at 214,
214-34 (discussing how trauma affects the functioning of the mind, brain, and body). Dr.
Green reported central nervous system damage among abused and neglected children that
ranged from moderate to severe. See GREEN, supra note 59, at 73. He characterized the
type of neurological impairment as "subtle" rather than structural: "developmental lags
and deficits in perception, coordination, and integration of sensory stimuli." Id. Notably,
these results "would not have been detected by the usual neurological examination" but
were present in the tests devised to detect subtle neurological impairment. Id. Green
concluded by suggesting that neurological examinations should be "specifically devised to
detect these manifestations." Id. at 74; cf Pincus, supra note 76, at 359-67 (explaining the
requirements for neurological evaluation of violent adolescents as including history and
neurologic examination and neuropsychological testing).
80. See, e.g., Ann Pytkowicz Streissguth et al., Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in Adolescents
and Adults, 265 JAMA 1961, 1961 (1991) (stating that Fetal Alcohol Syndrome ("FAS")
"represents the severe end of the continuum of disabilities caused by maternal alcohol use
during pregnancy"). Studies of adults who were born with FAS document that FAS is the
leading known cause of mental retardation and that, as adults, persons with FAS
experience "major psychosocial problems and life-long adjustment problems." Id. at 1965-
66; see also Blake et al., supra note 59, at 1645 (noting that five of 31 murderers studied
showed signs of FAS).
81. See Green, supra note 69, at 145 (noting that brain damage may occur from
"direct trauma to the head (skull fracture, cerebral hemorrhage), or indirect trauma" such
as shaking a baby); see also Robert Geffner & Alan Rosenbaum, Brain Impairment and
Family Violence, in PREVENTABLE BRAIN DAMAGE 58, 59-62 (Donald I. Templer et al.
eds., 1992) (observing that brain damage from child abuse is usually not accurately
diagnosed, resulting in a person's behavioral changes being attributed to his environment
rather than to brain impairment). It may be that a child's mental deficits, such as mental
retardation, provoke abusive behavior by a parent. See Green, supra note 69, at 145
(citing a study that found a high rate of mental retardation in abused children that "had no
evidence of head trauma"); Lewis et al., supra note 66, at 436 ("[NJeuropschiatrically
impaired children, by virtue of their hyperactivity and impulsivity, often invite abuse.").
82 See Lewis, supra note 57, at 388 (describing how childhood abuse may affect the
neurophysiology of the brain); Bruce D. Perry, Incubated in Terror: Neurodevelopmental
Factors in the "Cycle of Violence," in CHILDREN IN A VIOLENT SOCIETY 124, 131 (Joy D.
Osofsky ed., 1997) (explaining how "lack of critical nurturing experiences and excess
exposure to traumatic violence will alter the developing central nervous system,
predisposing to a more impulsive, reactive, and violent individual"); Robert S. Pynoos et
al., Traumatic Stress in Childhood and Adolescence: Recent Developments and Current
Controversies, in TRAUMATIC STRESS, supra note 70, at 331, 350-51 (observing that
trauma may result in physiological changes and reactions in children); van der Kolk, supra
note 79, at 227-28 (discussing studies that suggest child abuse may cause neurobiological
abnormalities); Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Separation Cry and the Trauma Response:
Developmental Issues in the Psychobiology of Attachment and Separation, in
[Vol. 771164
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The significance of identifying possible impairments a person
may suffer as a result of childhood abuse is not just that the
individual may be developmentally, psychologically, or neurologically
damaged, but that he may be impaired in ways that negatively affect
his perceptions and behavior. Dr. Dorothy Lewis posits that the
presence of neuropsychiatric and cognitive deficits in a person who
was abused as a child create a "matrix for violence. '83 A person's
ability to make appropriate judgments, to understand adequately the
consequences of his actions and make logical choices, or to control
his impulses may be so impaired that in stressful, unfamiliar, or
threatening situations he will overreact and engage in impulsive and
inappropriate aggressive behavior.' 4
PSYCHOLOGIcAL TRAUMA, supra note 63, at 31, 51 (explaining that disruptions of
attachment during infancy can lead to lasting neurobiological changes).
83. Lewis, supra note 57, at 388. Lewis explains that the impulsivity, hypervigilance,
and cognitive deficits set the stage for violence because:
First, brain dysfunction of almost any kind is often associated with irritability,
impatience, and mood lability. Second, paranoid ideation and misperceptions,
symptoms associated with so many different kinds of psychiatric disorders,
increase fearfulness and a tendency to retaliate for both genuine and imagined
threats. Finally, cognitive deficits not only impair judgment but also diminish the
ability to conceptualize feelings and put them into words rather than actions.
Id.; see also Blake et al., supra note 59, at 1646 (concluding that the "interaction of abuse,
paranoia, and neurologic dysfunction provides the matrix of violence").
84. See Lewis et al., supra note 66, at 436. Lewis and her co-authors explain that the
interactive effect of an individual's intrinsic vulnerabilities (such as episodic psychotic
symptoms, neurologic and limbic dysfunctions, or cognitive impairments) and
environmental stressors will "increase the risk and severity of adult violent criminality."
Id- They identify four factors that may contribute to adult violence: (1) family violence is
a model of aggressive behavior-a neurologically and cognitively intact child will be able
to resist modeling his behavior in violent ways whereas a vulnerable child will not; (2)
abuse engenders rage, so that an impaired person will have a harder time controlling his
rage impulses; (3) abuse that causes injury to the central nervous system creates
psychological, neurological, and cognitive vulnerabilities; and (4) neuropsychologically
impaired children invite abuse by their hyperactivity and impulsivity. See id; see also
Blake et al., supra note 59, at 1646 ("[A]bnormal psychological development caused by
long-standing exposure to severe abuse, together with paranoia and an impaired ability to
deal with frustrating environmental factors due to [brain damage], may provide an
explanation for the commission of a homicidal act."); Green, supra note 69, at 146
(summarizing the "cumulative impact of the repeated physical assaults" as including
becoming a "suspicious, hypersensitive adult paranoid," identifying with the aggressor so
that "violent assaultive behavior" is his "adaptive response to potentially dangerous
situations," and being an individual distrustful of nonthreatening persons); Logan, supra
note 56, .at 38 (identifying four types of behavioral consequences: paranoid thinking and
ideation, which may mean that the person sees others as threatening and so responds in a
hostile manner; heightened aggression; inability to solve problems; and a modeling
response pattern); van der Kolk & Greenberg, supra note 75, at 64-65 (concluding that, as
adults, abused children may develop extreme reactions and exhibit poor tolerance for
arousal; unmodulated anxiety; aggression; or withdrawal).
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Although the relationship between childhood abuse and adult
violent behavior is both complex and not yet fully understood,
experts who study the long-term consequences of childhood abuse
recognize important connections. As Dr. Lewis concludes:
"[W]hatever increases impulsivity and irritability, engenders
hypervigilance and paranoia, diminishes judgment and verbal
competence, and curtails the ability to recognize one's own pain and
the pain of others, also enhances the tendency toward violence.
Abusive, neglectful caretaking does all of these things."8 5 While the
particular manifestations will vary with each individual, the
experience of being abused as a child may cause significant long-
lasting negative effects as an adult. Many of these impairments are
relevant to a juror's assessment of the appropriate punishment in a
death penalty case.
2. The Prevalence of Childhood Abuse Among Defendants
Sentenced to Death
The kinds of childhood abuse and their long-term effects
documented in the psychological and medical literature are evident
among defendants on death row. Many death penalty cases86 involve
defendants who were physically, 87 sexually,88 and/or psychologically
85. Lewis, supra note 57, at 388-89.
86. These examples are drawn from court opinions in which defendants sentenced to
death were appealing the constitutionality of their sentence. Based on my own experience
representing men on death row, they are representative of the kinds of abuse defendants
encountered. See Haney, supra note 32, at 559-603 (analyzing the role of social histories as
mitigating evidence based on his 20 years of experience studying the backgrounds and
histories of capital defendants). An exhaustive study of the cases in which evidence of
childhood abuse is present would be extremely difficult. Cases in which the defendant
received a life sentence based on this type of evidence are often not appealed and are,
therefore, unreported. Even when the defendant suffered abuse as a child, it may not be
apparent from the opinion. Compare Shriner v. Wainwright, 570 F. Supp. 766, 770 (N.D.
Fla. 1982) (summarizing evidence about the defendant that the attorney presented at the
sentencing hearing as "the defendant's lack of education, sociopathic personality, and
harsh childhood"), affd, 715 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1983), with VON DREHLE, supra note 16,
at 252 (describing Shriner's upbringing as including being "raped by an older relative" and
being sent to juvenile reform schools where "[b]eatings and rapes were so commonplace
that Shriner actually welcomed his periodic stints in the 'strip cell' where the boy would
sit, naked and alone, for as long as three weeks").
87. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (describing the kinds of childhood
physical abuse defendants suffered, as reported in court decisions).
88. In this category, descriptions of the abuse are usually limited to an identification
of the perpetrator. See, e.g., Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 1996)
(defendant alleged that his stepfather physically and sexually abused him); Parkus v. Delo,
33 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 1994) (defendant was sexually abused by his uncle); Middleton v.
Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant was "sexually assaulted while at a
school for boys"); Squires v. Dugger, 794 F. Supp. 1568, 1577 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (defendant
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abused.89 Expert testimony presented either at trial or during post-
conviction review recounts the multiple impairments individual
defendants suffer.90 In addition to cases that show histories of abuse
and its consequences, research on death row inmates documents
similar patterns of pervasive childhood abuse.91
The physical abuse described in the cases usually constitutes
what researchers would classify as serious or severe injury.92 The
cases include defendants who were tied or hung up and beaten by
their parents,93 hit with buckles and cords, 94 or beaten until the abuser
was allegedly beaten and sexually assaulted by his stepparents); Robinson v. State, 574 So.
2d 108, 110 (Fla. 1991) (defendant was sexually abused by his uncle when defendant was
seven, by the 15-year-old wife of grandfather, and at migrant camps); State v. Murphy, 605
N.E.2d 884, 910 (Ohio 1992) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (defendant "alleged sexual abuse as
a child by family friends and staff members at two institutions").
89. See, e.g., Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the
defendant's stepfather mentally and physically abused him); Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d
1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1986) (defendant was mentally and physically abused at home); Ford
v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447, 1454-55 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (defendant was the victim of
severe physical and psychological abuse), aff'd on other grounds sub nor. Ford v. Norris,
67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995); see also infra note 107 (citing cases in which defendants were
forced to witness the beatings of other family members).
90. See infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (describing expert testimony).
91. See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text (discussing studies of men and
women on death row).
92. See supra note 61 (citing different definitions of physical abuse used in the
psychological and medical fields). Often the particular manifestations of abuse are
described only generally: for example, "father beat and occasionally seriously injured [the
defendant]," Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989), or the defendant
lived in a "violence-ridden and abusive home," Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 979 (4th
Cir. 1995).
93. See, e.g., Ford, 861 F. Supp. at 1454-55 (reporting that the defendant was put in a
cotton sack, hung up over rafters in the garage, and whipped with an extension cord; when
he grew too big for the sack, he was hung by his wrists); Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 480
(Fla. 1993) (Barkett, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the defendant was tied in a" 'croaker' "
sack and swung over a wire, his hands tied to rope attached to a ceiling beam and beaten
while naked); Robinson, 574 So. 2d at 110 (stating that the defendant was beaten with a
switch while his hands were tied and was beaten while "forced to squat with a broom
handle between his legs for indefinite periods"); Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331, 334
(Fla. 1990) (stating that the father tied and beat the defendant with his hands, a
broomstick, and a belt).
94. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 309 (1989) (noting that the defendant
was beaten over the head with a belt); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 107 (1982)
(stating that defendant's father hit him "'with a strap or something like this'" (quoting
the trial record)); Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 1996) (reporting that
the defendant was beaten with objects such as hammers, screwdrivers, the heel of a glass
slipper, and tree limbs, and was threatened with bar bells); May v. Collins, 904 F.2d 228,
231 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (observing that the defendant was beaten with coat
hangers, belts, and extension cords); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1494 (4th Cir. 1986)
(stating that the defendant was "beaten with a belt, sometimes knotted with a buckle");
Brooks v. Francis, 716 F.2d 780, 792 n.7 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that the defendant had
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drew blood 95 or the defendant was rendered unconscious. 96 Some
defendants were locked in closets' or locked out of the house,
sometimes while naked.98 Some defendants may have been abused in
utero.99
In addition to the serious nature of the abuse, other significant
factors were often present. Usually the abuser was a caretaker. 00
scars from being whipped with a belt buckle); Thompson v. Cain, No. 96-2268, 1997 WL
79295, at *27 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 1997) (stating that the defendant was struck with "coat
hangers, extension cords, fists and anything around the house"), affd, 161 F,3d 802 (5th
Cir. 1998); People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839 app. A at 876 (Cal. 1987) (in bank) (reporting
that the defendant was "hit with belts, cable wire, an axe handle, extension cords, or
'whatever [his father] could get his hands on' ").
95. See, e.g., Ford, 861 F. Supp. at 1455 (stating that the defendant was whipped until
"the blood just run from him"); Mann v. Lynaugh, 690 F. Supp. 562, 566 (N.D. Tex. 1988)
(noting that the defendant's father beat him with fists, belts, switches, and other objects,
sometimes drawing blood); Elledge v. State, 613 So. 2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1993) (reporting that
the defendant's mother regularly beat him until she drew blood).
96. See, e.g., Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1506 (9th Cir. 1990) (referring to the
testimony of the defendant's sister that their father beat the defendant and other children
"'into unconsciousness several times when they were kids' "); May, 904 F.2d at 231 (per
curiam) (noting that the defendant "on at least one occasion was beaten to
unconsciousness").
97. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 309 (stating that the defendant was "routinely locked
in his room without access to a toilet for long periods of time"); Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d
1557, 1563 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the defendant's father locked him in the closet "for
days at a time"); Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1994) (reporting that the
mother's boyfriend locked the defendant in a closet "for hours at a time"); Abdur'
Rahman v. Bell, 999 F. Supp. 1073, 1097-98 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (noting that the petitioner's
father "made him take off his clothes, placed him hog-tied in a locked closet, and tethered
him to a hook with a piece of leather tied around the head of his penis"); Rose v. State,
675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996) (reporting that the defendant's mother locked him in the
closet for "extended periods of time" and would try to lose him or leave him behind when
they went out).
98. See, e.g., Williams, 87 F.3d at 1211 (noting that the defendant's mother locked him
out of the house, sometimes when he was naked); Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503,
1517 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that the defendant was locked out of the house during the
day to protect the house from getting dirty).
99. See, e.g., Harris, 949 F.2d at 1506-07 (stating that experts concluded the defendant
suffered from fetal alcohol effect); Francis v. Dugger, 908 F.2d 696, 702 (11th Cir. 1990)
(noting that a doctor diagnosed Fetal Alcohol Syndrome); May, 904 F.2d at 231 (per
curiam) (noting that a doctor attributed brain damage to "head injury, malnutrition and
other fetal damage"); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing
that the family would have testified that the defendant was born prematurely due to his
father beating his mother); see also Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1510 (10th Cir.
1995) (raising the possibility of that Fetal Alcohol Syndrome or Effect should have been
part of a psychological evaluation); State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29, 63-64 (Wash. 1995) (en
banc) (noting that the defense attorney suspected Fetal Alcohol Syndrome or Effect when
he learned the defendant's mother drank heavily during her pregnancy, but the trial court
denied a continuance to secure an expert to confirm).
100. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 107 (1982) (father); Ford, 861 F.
Supp. at 1454-55 (same); Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla. 1990) (same); Penry,
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When one or both of the parents abandoned the defendant as a child,
he was sometimes left with a parent or relative who abused him.' 1 If,
as a young person, the defendant was placed in a detention facility or
juvenile home, his history may have included sexual or physical abuse
while incarcerated.' °z The abuse often lasted for many years, in some
cases extending into adolescence. 3 Some defendants were beaten
"daily,"" others "regularly."' 5  The defendant may have been
identified as the one who received the brunt of the abuse in the
family. 0 6 He may also have witnessed the abuse of his mother or
492 U.S. at 309 (mother); Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1365 (11th Cir. 1995) (same);
State v. Murphy, 605 N.E.2d 884, 910 (Ohio 1992) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (same);
Williams, 87 F.3d at 1211 (stepparent); Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir.
1986) (same); Thompson v. Cain, No. 96-2268, 1997 WL 79295, at *27 (E.D. La. Feb. 24,
1997) (stepfather and uncle), affd, 161 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1998); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d
1487, 1494 (4th Cir. 1986) (older brother); see also People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839 app. A
at 876 (Cal. 1987) (in bank) (reporting that the defendant's father instructed the brother to
beat him if he misbehaved).
101. See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 107 (noting that the defendant's mother sent him to
live with his father who physically abused the defendant when he could not control him);
Parkus v. Delo, 33 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the defendant was left to live
with an alcoholic uncle who "brutalized and sexually abused him"); Pickens v. Lockhart,
542 F. Supp. 585, 595 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (observing that the mother left the defendant with
his father at age five knowing that the father abused him), rev'd on other grounds, 714 F.2d
1455 (8th Cir. 1983).
102. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
defendant was molested as a child in a detention home); Parkus, 33 F.3d at 935 (stating
that the defendant was abused and raped in state prison); Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 910
(Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the defendant alleged sexual abuse in two
institutions).
103. The range may include a relatively short period of time-such as two years-to
much longer. See, e.g., Jackson, 42 F.3d at 1365 n.32 (lasting throughout childhood until
age 13); Parkus, 33 F.3d at 935 (beginning at age three and continuing throughout
childhood and adolescence); Madden v. Collins, 18 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1994) (occurring
for the first two years of life, until the father left the family); Mann v. Lynaugh, 690 F.
Supp. 562, 566 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (lasting from age four to age 18); Pickens, 542 F. Supp. at
595 (continuing from when the defendant was a young child until age 15).
104. See, e.g., Jackson, 42 F.3d at 1365 (stating that the defendant's mother abused her
"on an almost daily basis"); People v. Perez, 592 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ill. 1992) (stating that
the defendant's brother described their childhood as living in daily fear that their father
would come home drunk and whip the defendant and other family members).
105. See, e.g., Mann, 690 F. Supp. at 566-67 (stating that the father beat the defendant
four to five times a week as a teenager); Elledge v. State, 613 So. 2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1993)
(reporting regular beatings for 15 minutes at a time); Robinson v. State, 574 So. 2d 108,
110 (Fla. 1991) (noting "constant physical abuse"). But see Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d
1287,1292 (5th Cir. 1993) (observing that the defendant suffered a single severe beating by
stepfather who beat him in the face with a baseball bat and then tried to shoot him).
106. See, e.g., Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447, 1454 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (noting that
the defendant suffered the brunt of the abuse), affd on other grounds sub nom. Ford v.
Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995); Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 908 (observing that the
defendant received "the brunt of taunting by his parents and siblings"); id. at 910 (Moyer,
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siblings.'0 Often the abuse was not limited to one kind or one
perpetrator, but was a pervasive presence in the defendant's early
years.103
The damaging consequences of childhood abuse identified in the
psychological and medical literature are also found in these cases.
Mental health experts in individual cases have testified that the
defendant's psychological and social functioning was impaired due to
abuse.10 9 The lack of nurturing and protection as a child may have so
affected a defendant's psychological development that he had an
C.J., dissenting) (describing the defendant as the "family scapegoat").
107. See, e.g., Ford, 861 F. Supp. at 1455 (noting that the defendant was "made to watch
while his father brutalized his mother"); People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839 app. A at 876
(Cal. 1987) (in bank) (stating that the defendant saw his father hit his mother); Phillips v.
State, 608 So. 2d 778, 782 (Fla. 1992) (observing that the defendant's father physically
abused the defendant's mother in front of him and other children).
A child may personally experience the abuse and may witness abuse of his parent or
siblings. See Haney, supra note 32, at 572 (discussing research by developmental
psychologists and the author's own knowledge of defendants' social histories that
document the experience and psychological trauma of witnessing abuse); Logan, supra
note 56, at 36-37 (explaining that a child is traumatized by seeing the abuse of other family
members and fearing his own physical danger if he tries to intervene).
108. See, e.g., Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
defendant was beaten by his mother and paternal grandmother and was sexually abused by
his stepfather); Ford, 861 F. Supp. at 1454-55 (describing various kinds of severe physical
and psychological abuse inflicted on the defendant); Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062,
1065 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (characterizing the defendant's background, which included verbal
and physical abuse by his father, as "disadvantaged, indeed tormented"), vacated and
remanded, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1992); Mann, 690 F. Supp. at 566 (characterizing the
physical abuse experienced by the defendant as "extraordinary"); Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d
473, 479 (Fla. 1993) (Barkett, C.J., dissenting) (describing the defendant as having
"suffered tremendous physical abuse and torture as a child"); Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 909-
10 (Moyer, C.J. dissenting) (describing the defendant's childhood environment as one of
"neglect, abuse, and psychological torment" by family members).
109. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 (1989) (reporting that a psychiatrist
testified at trial to the defendant's inability to learn from experience and his poor impulse
control, which "may have been caused by beatings and multiple injuries to the brain at an
early age"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 107 (1982) (noting that experts testified
that the defendant was emotionally disturbed and mentally and emotionally
underdeveloped); Gardner v. Dixon, No. 91-4010, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971, at *9 (4th
Cir. June 4, 1992) (noting that a psychologist on post-conviction review testified that when
the defendant was stressed, child abuse influenced his behavior and impaired his
judgment); May v. Collins, 904 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (stating that in
post-conviction proceedings a neurologist and a psychiatrist found that the defendant
suffered from trauma caused by child abuse that may have impaired his social functioning
and emotional development); Robinson, 574 So. 2d at 110 (stating that a clinical
psychologist testified to the defendant's antisocial personality disorder and psychosexual
disorder); Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 910 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (noting that a psychologist
testified at trial that the defendant suffered from a "severe, chronic, and disabling"
personality disorder that impaired his psycho/social functioning, that he had the emotional
age of a five or six year old, and that he had low intelligence).
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impaired ability to make proper judgments about how to respond and
act in relation to others. 10 He may have acted out of anger without
thinking about the consequences or otherwise engaged in destructive
behavior."' In some cases, defendants also were diagnosed as
suffering from abuse-related brain damage that may have made them
less able to control their impulses to act." While the long-term
nature of many of these impairments might have been ameliorated by
professional treatment," that treatment was often absent."4 As a
result, an individual defendant may have been incapable of
110. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that experts
reported that the absence of proper psychological development caused confusion and
primitive defenses); Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971, at *9 (noting that a
psychologist concluded that childhood abuse influenced the defendant's behavior and
impaired the defendant's judgment); May, 904 F.2d at 231 (per curiam) (stating that
experts found an impaired ability to reflect on the appropriateness of his action); Sarat,
supra note 32, at 44 (reporting that a social worker at defendant's second sentencing
hearing testified that his childhood abuse caused fear, anxiety, and anger).
111. See, e.g., Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 910 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
psychological testimony revealed that the defendant was "'motivated by very primitive
feelings of rage, which have their origin in an extremely chaotic, dysfunctional family' ");
Sarat, supra note 32, at 44 (quoting a social worker's testimony that the defendant "'did
not develop internal controls or mechanisms for dealing with his anger' "). Sometimes,
the State's experts will characterize this kind of behavior as antisocial. See, e.g., Harris v.
Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1504-05 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a state psychiatrist testified
that the defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder and linked it to being
abused as a child). As discussed supra note 76, however, the label of antisocial personality
disorder is often inappropriate and damaging to the defendant.
112. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 308-09 (identifying an organic brain disorder that
impaired the defendant's ability to control his impulses, which may have been caused by
birth trauma or beatings); May, 904 F.2d at 231 (per curiam) (noting that an expert
concluded that "May's impulse control was substantially impaired from neurological brain
damage" that probably resulted in part from child abuse); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487,
1495 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that an expert testified that the defendant suffered from
"organic brain dysfunction that impaired [his] ability to reason and make judgments"); see
also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 818 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
defendant possibly suffered brain damage from beatings). Brain damage may have
resulted from injury to the defendant as a fetus. See supra note 80 (discussing Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome).
113. See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 107 (noting that a psychiatrist testified that the
defendant could have been rehabilitated with 15-20 years of intensive therapy); Robinson,
574 So. 2d at 110 (stating that a clinical psychologist testified that the defendant's mental
disorders were treatable); cf Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir. 1988)
(noting that a clinical psychologist concluded that the chances of the defendant
overcoming his mental illness without treatment were almost nonexistent).
114. See, e.g., Deutscher, 884 F.2d at 1161 (noting that the defendant asked for but did
not receive treatment); Murphy, 605 N.E.2d at 910 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
the defendant was "never provided the intense treatment such as daily psychotherapy in a
stable setting, that was necessary to foster normal development"); Sarat, supra note 32, at
44 (reporting that the defendant needed, but did not receive, professional treatment); see
also Haney, supra note 32, at 574-75 (noting the inadequacy of treatment in prison).
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overcoming the deleterious consequences of his childhood upbringing
and so continued to bear its marks. 15
In many of these cases, a history of child abuse was not the only
deprivation or hardship with which the defendant had to contend.
Defendants may have been raised in poverty or otherwise
impoverished environments,"6 had substance-abuse problems," 7
suffered from mental retardation or low intelligence,18 brain
115. The kind of violence that some of the defendants perpetrated as adults, such as
physical or sexual abuse, may have been on the same continuum of violence that they
experienced as children. See, e.g., Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994)
(arguing on post-conviction that defendant's trial counsel should have presented evidence
that when the defendant killed his 10-year-old stepdaughter, he believed he was
disciplining her in the same way that he had been disciplined); Dobbert v. Strickland, 532
F. Supp. 545, 551, 554 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (stating that the defendant, abused as a child and
with a history of abusing his own children, was convicted and sentenced to death for killing
his nine-year-old daughter), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Samuel H.
Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and
Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 719-20 (1992) (describing in detail the abuse Dobbert
inflicted on his children and the abuse he suffered as a child). Of course the abuse is not
identical, because the defendant was not killed as a child. But the defendants may have
been subjected to severe abuse that was on the continuum of abuse that, if not stopped,
could have resulted in death. See infra note 327 (discussing the number of children killed
or permanently disabled by their parents each year).
116. See, e.g., Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705 app. at 749 (11th Cir. 1988) (describing
the defendant's "impoverished home" as abusive and lacking supervision); Mathis v. Zant,
704 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (noting that the defendant was repeatedly
verbally abused by his chronically alcoholic father, missed school one-third of the time,
was ridiculed because he was slow, and dropped out in fifth grade; thereafter, he spent
most of his time in prisons), vacated and remanded, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1992); Phillips
v. State, 608 So. 2d 778, 782 (Fla. 1992) (stating that the defendant grew up in poverty and
his parents were migrant workers "who often left the children unsupervised"); Murphy,
605 N.E.2d at 909 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (stating that trial testimony established that
the defendant was raised in "desperate poverty"; had an "unloving, unsupportive, and
abusive family"; lived in a home described as a shack with no hot water or plumbing; lived
on public assistance; and had a father who was an alcoholic).
117. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Johnson, 119 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
defendant began using drugs at age nine or ten and continued until his arrest) (citing
Cockrum v. Johnson, 934 F. Supp. 1417, 1443 n.22 (E.D. Tex. 1996)); Mann v. Lynaugh,
690 F. Supp. 562, 567 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating that a psychologist noted that drug abuse
beginning at age nine or ten may have adversely affected the defendant's development);
Heiney v. State, 620 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. 1993) (describing the defendant as a "chronic
substance abuser"). As noted supra note 75 and accompanying text, a defendant may have
begun drinking alcohol or using drugs at an early age as a form of self-medication.
118. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307-08 (1989) (describing the defendant
as mentally retarded); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1209 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
defendant's grade school classified him as mentally retarded); Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d
1350, 1365 (11th Cir. 1995) (classifying the defendant as having borderline intelligence);
Parkus v. Delo, 33 F.3d 933, 937 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing the defendant as borderline
mentally retarded); Wade, 29 F.3d at 1316 (same); Mathis, 704 F. Supp. at 1065 (describing
the defendant as "at best lower borderline intelligence and at worst mentally deficient");
Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996) (identifying the defendant as a slow learner
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damage, 119 mental illness," or may have endured a combination of
these factors.12' The presence of these additional impairments may
have further damaged the defendant's ability to perceive and respond
to stressful situations in a non-violent manner."z Indeed, Professor
with a low I.Q.); Phillips, 608 So. 2d at 783 (stating that the defendant had a borderline
I.Q.); Livingston v. State, 565 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1988) (noting that after severe
beatings, defendant's intellectual functioning could "best be described as marginal").
119. See, e.g., Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1509-10 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting a
neuropsychologist who assessed the defendant as suffering from a brain dysfunction that is
"'especially predictive of murder' "); Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208 (noting that the defendant
had neurological impairments, possibly from surgery that his mother had early in
pregnancy); Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1445 n.12 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
defendant suffered from organic brain dysfunction).
120. See, e.g., Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 1996) (schizophrenic);
Castro, 71 F.3d at 1510 (meets criteria for Paranoid Personality Disorder); Wade, 29 F.3d
at 1316 (alternate personality); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1160-61 (9th Cir.
1989) (mental disorder associated with uncontrollable violence); Middleton v. Dugger, 849
F.2d 491, 493-95 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant suffered from same mental illness he was
diagnosed with at age 12, "schizoid personality [disorder]"); Rose, 675 So. 2d at 571
(same); Robinson v. State, 574 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla. 1991) (psychosexual disorder); State v.
Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 191 (La. 1992) (schizophrenic). In some cases the defendants are
diagnosed as antisocial. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 309 (stating that two state
psychiatrists testified defendant had an antisocial personality); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 107 (1982) (noting that a state psychologist testified Eddings had a "sociopathic
or antisocial personality"); see also supra note 76 (discussing the problem of misdiagnosing
individuals as antisocial and noting the opprobrium associated with such labeling).
121. See, e.g., Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208-09 (describing the defendant as neurologically
impaired and mentally retarded); Middleton, 849 F.2d at 495 (stating that evidence
chronicled a childhood of brutal treatment and neglect, sexual and drug abuse, low
intelligence, and mental illness); Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 479 (Fla. 1993) (Barkett,
C.J., dissenting) (noting that the trial court found organic brain damage, mental
retardation, mental illness, tremendous emotional deprivation and disturbances,
tremendous physical abuse and torture as a child, and learning disabilities).
122. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 309-10 (stating that the defendant suffered from
mental retardation combined with organic brain damage, resulting in poor impulse control
and inability to learn from experience); Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 155 (5th Cir. 1992)
(noting that a doctor concluded the defendant's commission of the murder was triggered
by an organic impairment, although the form of the killing was affected by "'"emotional
or psychological factors" rooted in [his] childhood experience' " (quoting testimony of Dr.
Barry Scanlon)); Elledge, 823 F.2d at 1445 n.12 (reporting that a psychiatrist concluded the
"combination of organic dysfunction, psychotic paranoia and childhood abuse caused a
disorder that affected [the defendant]" during the homicide); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d
1487, 1495 (4th Cir. 1986) (observing that the defense argued that the defendant's organic
brain damage and antisocial personality disorder accentuated his inability to control his
impulses); Rose, 675 So. 2d at 571 (holding that organic brain damage, longstanding
personality disorder, and chronic alcoholism qualified as statutory mitigating factors of
extreme emotional disturbance or inability to conform his conduct to the law); Heiney, 620
So. 2d at 173 (noting that the combination of drug abuse, borderline personality disorder
and physical and emotional abuse as a child could make a person have "a very difficult
time coping with any extremely stressful situation"); Hall, 614 So. 2d at 480 (Barkett, C.J.,
dissenting) (finding that the defendant's mental deficiencies were not surprising in light of
a history of physical torture and abuse); Phillips, 608 So. 2d at 782-83 (noting that the
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Craig Haney posits that the "nexus between poverty, childhood abuse
and neglect, social and emotional dysfunction, alcohol and drug
abuse, and crime is so tight in the lives of many capital defendants as
to form a kind of social historical 'profile.' "123
The frequency with which this kind of evidence arises among
capital murder defendants is noteworthy. Haney's assertion that a
"social historical profile" exists is based on twenty years of studying
men charged with capital murder.24 Other studies of defendants on
death row support his conclusion. In related studies of defendants
facing execution, researchers documented extensive histories of
mental disorders, neurological impairments, and childhood physical
or sexual abuse."z A study focusing on the childhood histories of
defendant was emotionally, intellectually, and socially deficient, was passive-aggressive,
had life-long adaptive deficits, and had a schizoid personality and borderline intelligence
that made him extremely emotionally disturbed or unable to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law at the time of the murder).
123. Haney, supra note 32, at 580; cf Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 590 (5th Cir.
1990) (recognizing, in a non-death penalty case, that it should not be surprising that a
defendant whose parents abandoned him to an orphanage when he was 12, who was
sexually abused by a prostitute with whom he lived after running away from the
orphanage, and who suffered psychological problems from serving in Vietnam, would
suffer maladjustment or mental problems).
124. Haney, supra note 32, at 561 (explaining that 20 years ago little was known about
the social and psychological forces that shaped defendants, but that, over time, it became
apparent that many "shared a pattern of early childhood trauma and maltreatment"); see
also Michael Mello, On Metaphors, Mirrors, and Murders: Theodore Bundy and the Rule
of Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 887, 919 n.162 (1990-91) (citing numerous
authorities for the proposition that most defendants on death row grew up in poverty and
many are illiterate, mentally retarded, and/or mentally ill).
125. See Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational
Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838,
840 (1986) [hereinafter Lewis et al., Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates] (reporting
that of 15 individuals (13 men and two women) facing execution, five had major
neurological impairments (seizures, paralysis, cortical atrophy), seven had a history of
blackouts, dizziness, psychomotor epilepsy, and minor neurological impairments, 10 had
cognitive dysfunction, nine suffered psychiatric symptoms as children severe enough to
require consultation or special education classes, and six were chronically psychotic
antedating incarceration); see also Marilyn Feldman et al., Filicidal Abuse in the Histories
of 15 Condemned Murderers, 14 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 345, 347 (1986)
(explaining a separate study of these same 15 inmates that examined experiences of
intrafamily violence); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational,
and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 587 (1988) [hereinafter Lewis et al., Characteristics of 14
Juveniles] (reporting that a study of approximately 40% of juveniles on death row revealed
multiple handicaps, in particular, "[t]hey tend to have suffered serious [central nervous
system] injuries, to have suffered since early childhood from a multiplicity of psychotic
symptoms, and to have been physically and sexually abused"). Significantly, none of the
juries that sentenced these defendants to death heard any of this information. See Lewis
et al., Characteristics of 14 Juveniles, supra, at 587-88; Lewis et al., Characteristics of 15
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fifteen death row inmates substantiated "extraordinary abuse" in
twelve of the fifteen cases.'26 Eight of the twelve were classified as
victims of "potentially filicidal assaults"127-conduct by a parent that
was "likely to result in death were they not forcefully curtailed"'-
and four who were "brutally assaulted," albeit "short of actual
attempted murder."' 29 Five of the subjects had been sexually abused
as children,3 ' and in twelve cases, the adults in the abused childrens'
lives engaged in "extraordinary violence" toward other adults.''
Although this study did not explore the long-term effects of the
abuse on the defendants, the authors posit several possible adverse
effects: modeling, i.e., learning extreme violence as a way of relating
to others; organic consequences, i.e., brain injury that may result in
poor judgment and impulse control; and displaced rage, i.e., venting
one's rage over being abused not at one's parents but at outsiders. 32
The fact that a history of childhood abuse appears frequently
Death Row Inmates, supra, at 844. The reasons for this failure to present this evidence are
explored infra Part II.B.1. (discussing barriers to juries hearing mitigating evidence of
childhood abuse). These studies are part of an increasing body of research exploring the
connection between childhood abuse and the later commission of crimes. See, e.g., Blake
et al., supra note 59, at 1644-45 (reporting results of a study of 31 murderers and positing a
matrix for violence based on the combination of severe childhood abuse, brain damage,
and paranoia); Widom, supra note 56, at 15 (reporting on a study comparing adult criminal
behavior of individuals abused or neglected as children with a matched control group of
non-abused children).
126. Feldman et al., supra note 125, at 348. Sources of data for family histories
included psychiatric evaluations four to 16 hours long, interviews with parents or close
relatives, and records from hospitals, prisons, and schools. See id- at 347. In all but one
case, conclusions were based on the authors' own evaluations and four independent
sources of information. See id
127. Id. at 348 (describing examples, such as a mother who shot at her son and
threatened him with a knife, a father who held his four-year-old son outside a car speeding
down the highway, and a mother who burned her son with a hot iron).
128. Id. at 347.
129. Id. at 348.
130. See id. at 348-49 (reporting, e.g., that the mother forced her son to stimulate her
orally and fondle her breasts, and that the child was raped by a male cousin).
131. Id. at 349 (reporting, e.g., that one subject's mother tried to stab his father with a
knife; another subject's father threatened his mother with a gun, and she threatened him
with a butcher knife.
132. See id. at 350. The authors noted that the long-term effects on an individual would
be influenced not only by the nature of the abuse but also by other family dynamics such
as "continuing family hostility, neglect, and emotional abandonment," as well as the
presence of other psychological and cognitive impairments. Id. at 351; see also supra notes
56-61 and accompanying text (discussing factors affecting long-term consequences of
childhood abuse). The authors also discuss the effects of "lack of parental attachment" as
an ongoing consequence of child abuse which may contribute to family members'
unwillingness to assist the defendants when they face the death penalty. Feldman et al.,
supra note 125, at 350-51.
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among individuals sentenced to death certainly does not mean that
the experience or long-term effects are the same among those
defendants or that abuse is present in every case. The presentation of
mitigating evidence of child abuse, therefore, must be particularized
in accordance with the constitutional command for individualized
consideration of the appropriate sentence for the defendant.133
3. The Nexus 34 Between Mitigation and Childhood Abuse
The mitigating qualities of a defendant's childhood abuse and its
long-term consequences go to the heart of the purpose of mitigating
evidence: to provide a cogent and compelling reason, based on the
defendant's background, his character, or the circumstances of the
offense, for a juror to believe that life imprisonment is an appropriate
and sufficient punishment.135 At the same time, the prosecution may
use the defendant's impairments to suggest circumstances that
support its case against the defendant.3 6  Despite the seeming
c6ntradictions between these qualities of child abuse evidence, these
qualities in fact illustrate the way in which this evidence provides a
vital connection between the defendant's crime and his earlier life.
By revealing both mitigating and potentially aggravating aspects
about the defendant and his behavior, the evidence of long-term
impairments from childhood abuse demonstrates the link between
the violence the defendant suffered as a child and the violence he
committed as an adult.
133. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
134. I use "nexus" to mean the connection between a history of childhood abuse and its
ability to provide a basis for the jury to vote for a sentence less than death. This definition
is qualitatively different from the nexus requirement for mitigating evidence imposed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which requires the mitigating evidence to
be linked to the defendant's culpability for the crime: "Constitutionally relevant
mitigating evidence" is evidence that demonstrates that the defendant is less culpable for
the crime by showing: "(1) a 'uniquely severe permanent handicap[] with which the
defendant was burdened through no fault of his own,' and (2) that the criminal act was
attributable to this severe permanent condition." Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 460-61 (5th
Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d
1009, 1029 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), aff'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 461 (1993)). In a
previous article I criticized the Fifth Circuit's position. See Crocker, supra note 20, at 73-
78.
135. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the role of mitigating evidence).
136. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Court refers to the mitigating and
aggravating qualities as being a "two-edged sword." Id. at 324. This dual nature does not
mean the evidence should not be presented, but that the jury must be assured of a vehicle
for considering and giving effect to the evidence as mitigating, not merely as aggravating.
See id. at 327-28.
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Evidence of childhood abuse and its, long-term negative
consequences on the defendant's behavior may explain the
circumstances of the crime in a way that assists the jury in
understanding why the defendant committed the murder. For an
individual defendant, the experience of physical abuse may have so
damaged him psychologically or neurologically that he does not
possess the normal capacity to make accurate judgments, to control
his behavior, or to understand the consequences of his actions. The
fact that these impairments may become more pronounced or
debilitating in stressful situations could certainly play a role in
circumstances that ended in murder.137 While not excusing the
137. See Haney, supra note 32, at 600 n.120 (describing a model of causation that
connects risk factors in defendants' lives, such as childhood abuse, to the "immediate
situational pressures under which they act"); Lewis et al., supra note 66, at 436 (concluding
that individual vulnerabilities combine with environmental stressors to increase the risk
and severity of adult violent crime).
A poignant example of this appears in the Robert Alton Harris case. Harris was
convicted and sentenced to death for killing two teenage boys during a robbery. See
Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1990). On post-conviction review,
defense counsel argued that the court-appointed experts at trial failed to evaluate and
identify properly Harris's multiple disabilities of "organic brain damage, interrelated
mental disorders, and the psychological effects of unrelenting abuse and scapegoating
during his childhood." Memorandum in Support of Emergency Application for Issuance
of Certificate of Probable Cause and for Stay of Execution set for April 3, 1990 at 5,
Harris (No. 90-55402) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Defense counsel
argued that these disabilities would have explained why Harris committed the murders:
Together, these disorders have severely impaired Mr. Harris' ability to function
in fundamental ways: Mr. Harris has only limited access to the tools of
rationality that all of us take for granted in living goal-directed, thoughtful lives
in which we exert a fair degree of control over what we do, when we do it, and
why we do it. Mr. Harris has only limited abilities to direct his behaviors in a
rational way-to identify alternative courses of action, to weigh alternatives, and
to choose an alternative on the basis of this weighing process. He is, instead,
driven more by impulse, a sudden urge or emotion which springs out of the
intersection between himself and stressful contexts in the external world.
With these revelations, Mr. Harris' crime and his behaviors after the crime
take on a very different quality. All of Robert Harris' actions, both those
"planned" and those which arose on the spur of the moment were filtered
through a brain that had been damaged by a sea of alcohol in utero and by fists
and weapons wielded against him by his parents in early childhood. His conduct
was instead driven by impulse, without the mediation of that part of the brain
capable of reflecting upon and weighing alternative courses of action in
appreciation of the social fabric in which action takes place.
Every sequence in the crime reflected Robert's inability to reign in or
modulate his impulsivity with rational, socially-conscious judgment.... Thus,
the hallmarks of his interconnected disabilities-emotional lability, impaired
rational control processes, inability to rely on instinctive guidance by social
norms, and emotional distance from other human beings-were, when
unmasked, causally connected to his crimes.
Id. at 9-10.
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defendant's conduct, childhood abuse and its attendant long-term
impairments may cause a juror to empathize with the defendant's
inability to judge the situation accurately, to control his actions, or to
respond appropriately rather than overreact with anger or rage."' As
a result, the juror may find that the defendant is not worthy of death,
and that it is unnecessary to exact the most extreme form of
punishment.139
The evidence of childhood abuse also may evoke a juror's
sympathy in the sense of feeling pity or sorrow for the defendant
because of the pain he endured as a child. 40 Sympathy may be less
compelling than an explanation for the murder based on the
defendant's experience of childhood abuse,'14 1 but it is no less
relevant. Sympathy, based on the evidence presented, may be a
ground on which a juror decides to vote for a life sentence.14 2
Despite the identifiable mitigating qualities of a history of
childhood abuse, this evidence also may be fraught with adverse
138. Cf Logan, supra note 36, at 15-16, 18 fig.3 (observing that jurors may consider
some experiences of childhood abuse more compelling than others, e.g., physical or sexual
abuse may be seen as more mitigating than psychological or emotional neglect).
139. Although "worthy" often has a positive connotation, I use it to mean that the
"determin[ation] that the defendant is among the most heinous of murderers should
reflect an assessment that he is worthy of death as an extraordinary punishment."
Crocker, supra note 20, at 26 n.17. The jury's assessment of the defendant's
deathworthiness requires a judgment about his character, record, and background, the
circumstances and character of the crime, and the harm caused, all of which is broader and
different from the defendant's culpability for the crime. See id. at 82-85.
140. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (" '[A] jury could react with
sympathy over the tragic childhood [the defendant] endured.'" (quoting Burger v. Kemp,
753 F.2d 930 app. at 937 n.7 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam))); Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445,
1453 (11th Cir. 1993) (observing that it is "undoubtedly true" that evidence of a "troubled
childhood" will present the defendant "in a more sympathetic light to the jury"); Brewer v.
Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 858 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that evidence about the defendant's
"disadvantaged childhood" may have put the defendant "in a more sympathetic light").
141. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S. at 794 (stating that sympathy is not enough to show that
the outcome of the punishment phase would have been different); Devier, 3 F.3d at 1453
(noting that while presenting the defendant in a sympathetic light, evidence of child abuse
presented at the first trial had not caused the jury to vote for life sentence); State v.
Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383, 399 (Ohio 1987) (stating that while the court was "sympathetic
towards appellant's ... lamentable past," which included child abuse, it was not enough to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances); cf Brock v. McCotter, 781 F.2d 1152, 1160 (5th
Cir. 1986) (concluding that a tragic childhood is "just as likely to evoke sympathy" as to
show no hope of reform).
142 See, e.g., State v. Bey, 548 A.2d 887, 911-12 (N.J. 1988) (recognizing that
sympathy, based on the evidence, is a legitimate sentencing consideration). A deprived
background may evoke sympathy which, while not relevant to a defendant's responsibility
for a crime, may be relevant to punishment because "she has been punished before the
offense by the very conditions that produced her culpability." Stephen J. Morse,
Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1587, 1654 (1994).
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consequences. When a defendant suffers from long-term negative
behavioral effects, the prosecution may use that evidence to suggest
that the defendant will commit acts of violence in the future. 43 As
discussed in the next Part, while this complication should not stifle
the defense case at the punishment phase, ostensibly it often does."
Evidence of long-term negative behavioral consequences from
childhood abuse epitomizes the complexities faced in presenting a
compelling case for mitigation at the punishment phase. Childhood
abuse may be mitigating because it helps to explain the murder or
draws a sobering picture of the suffering the defendant endured as a
child in ways that may evoke juror sympathy or empathy. At the
same time, it may point to other violent behavior that the prosecution
may use against the defendant. While these factors may complicate
the presentation of child abuse as mitigating evidence, they may also
be part of what makes this evidence so powerful. The potency of
mitigating evidence of child abuse comes from its ability to explain
that which appears incomprehensible-the commission of a heinous
murder. It connects two seemingly unrelated stories of violence: one
perpetrated on the defendant as a child and the other committed by
the defendant as an adult. 45
C. Conclusion
A history of childhood abuse is paradigmatic of mitigating
evidence because it has the potential to transform how a juror
perceives the defendant and his commission of the murder.
Psychological and medical literature reveals how physical abuse as a
child may have long-term negative repercussions for the defendant's
ability to make appropriate judgments, to understand the
consequences of his actions, and to control his behavior. These
features may provide the jury with critical information that explains
why the defendant committed the crime. As such, a history of
childhood abuse represents the kind of "diverse frailties of
143. See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which the
State may try to turn childhood abuse against the defendant).
144. See infra notes 250-56 and accompanying text (discussing how the defense may
counteract the State's negative gloss on the defendant's childhood abuse).
145. See Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 335-36 (suggesting that a history of childhood
abuse may make the murder "inconceivable to many people, more understandable");
Sarat, supra note 32, at 51-52 (arguing that bringing in violence done to the defendant as a
child "contest[s] the dominant cultural conception of violence and victimization" in which
the defendant is seen only as the perpetrator of violence; it "requires the construction of a
more complex narrative of causation and accident, of mixed lives and mixed motives").
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humankind" '146 that are constitutionally relevant to the jury's decision
about the appropriate punishment for the defendant. As the next
Part demonstrates, however, despite this mitigating potential,
manifold misunderstandings exist that prevent child abuse evidence
from receiving its full and proper consideration.
II. BARRIERS TO THE PRESENTATION AND CONSIDERATION OF
CHILDHOOD ABUSE AS MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Just as evidence of childhood abuse is paradigmatic of mitigating
evidence on a substantive level, it is also paradigmatic of the system's
inability to ensure that the defendant receives individualized
consideration of whether the death penalty is his appropriate
sentence. This Part analyzes three barriers that impede the
presentation and consideration of mitigating evidence of child abuse.
First, it identifies common misperceptions that courts hold about the
relevance of child abuse and its long-term consequences to the jury's
sentencing decision. Second, it examines problems that arise at trial:
defense lawyers who fail to investigate or present evidence of the
defendant's childhood abuse and fail to anticipate the potential of the
long-term effects of childhood abuse as aggravating evidence, and
jury instructions that do not facilitate the consideration of childhood
abuse and its resulting impairments as mitigating factors. Finally, this
Part shows how courts' post-conviction review of death sentences
reinforces the barriers at the trial stage. The standard that governs
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, for example, fails to take
into account how a history of childhood abuse may inhibit a
defendant's interactions with his attorney and tacitly permits the
attorney to ignore the defendant's history. While these
misperceptions and barriers are not unique to mitigating evidence of
childhood abuse, they intersect in particularly pernicious ways that
graphically illustrate the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the death
penalty system. 147
A. Misperceptions of Childhood Abuse as Mitigating Evidence
Childhood abuse is a complex phenomenon. Despite the
intuitive understanding that it may seriously undermine a child's
146. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).
147. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 20, at 87 (concluding that "the penalty trial only
exacerbates the disadvantaged position of a defendant who for whatever reason is unable
to present a full picture of his background to the penalty jury").
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development into a well-adjusted adult, 18 misperceptions abound.
This Part focuses on two principal issues that courts misconstrue: the
possible long-term adverse behavioral consequences of childhood
abuse and the importance of explaining the mitigating connection
between the defendant's history of abuse and his commission of
murder. Finally, this Part demonstrates the import of judicial failures
in these two areas by analyzing decisions that recognize the
mitigating potential of a defendant's abuse as a child.
Court opinions reflect misunderstandings about childhood abuse
in two ways: some minimize the experience, while others ignore or
misconstrue the effects of childhood abuse identified in the mental
health literature. The result is that the individual defendant's history
of abuse is discounted. The very features that demonstrate his
unique "human frailties"'14 9 are dismissed rather than allowed their
due consideration.
The language that appellate courts150  use to describe a
defendant's history of childhood abuse and its consequences often
belittles the experience. Courts may describe a history of physical
abuse as "childhood woes,' 15 1  "unfortunate," '52  "obviously
lamentable," '53 "difficult,"'' or "unhappy."'15  These terms obscure
rather than acknowledge the severity of the particular histories of
148. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing general societal
recognition of long-term damage from childhood abuse).
149. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
150. Although the examples described in this Part are from appellate rather than trial
courts, they display a disregard for the mitigating potential of childhood abuse that lower
courts may see as normative.
151. Gardner v. Dixon, No. 91-4010, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971, at *23 (4th Cir.
June 4, 1992). This characterization is in contrast to county social service records,
introduced at the state post-conviction evidentiary hearing, that "revealed an extremely
difficult home life resulting from an abusive father and a drunken mother." Id. at *9. The
abuse was severe enough to "influence [the defendant's] behavior and impair his
judgment" as an adult. IL
152. Squires v. Dugger, 794 F. Supp. 1568, 1577 (M.D. Fla. 1992). The defendant
"assert[ed] that he was beaten and sexually assaulted by stepparents at a young age." Id
153. State v. Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383, 399 (Ohio 1987). The defendant's childhood
included "excessive, almost brutal discipline administered by his stepfather." Id at 397.
154. Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1511 (11th Cir. 1990). The childhood described as
"difficult" featured "harsh treatment by ... father and stepfather during ... early
childhood" including "specific instances of cruelty," head injuries, and being placed in
psychiatric care at the age of five or six. Id. at 1508-09.
155. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 789 (1987) (noting that the evidence would have
shown that the "petitioner had an exceptionally unhappy and unstable childhood"). As
the dissent noted, the defendant "had an I.Q. of 82, was functioning at the level of a 12-
year-old, and possibly had suffered brain damage from beatings when he was younger."
Id. at 818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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abuse.156 For example, in Penry v. Lynaugh,'157 where the evidence at
trial revealed that the defendant was mentally retarded and suffered
organic brain damage either from birth trauma or from beatings by
his mother,158 Justice Scalia, in dissent, described Penry's childhood
as "sad." '159 By using language that trivializes the abuse, courts
suggest that the evidence is inconsequential to the evaluation of the
appropriate sentence for the individual defendant. Although
evidence of childhood abuse will not result per se in a life sentence,
such minimizing language demeans its significance.
Courts also iake judgments about the relevance of childhood
abuse that contradict psychological and medical knowledge about the
consequences of abuse. For example, some courts discount the long-
term impact of physical abuse on the defendant when his siblings
appear to be unaffected."6 This attitude ignores the mental health
literature that identifies reasons why one child may be more affected
than others by abuse in the home, including receiving the brunt of the
abuse or being at a more vulnerable stage of development.161 Other
courts hold that the abuse happened too long ago for it to continue to
affect adversely the defendant's current behavior. 62 This conclusion
156. Within the same opinion, two qualitatively different depictions of the same
evidence may be presented. In State v. Murphy, 605 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1992), for example,
the majority characterized the defendant's upbringing, which included verbal, physical,
and sexual abuse, as "at times unsettling" but not enough to overcome the aggravating
circumstances of the murder. Id. at 908. The dissent, calling the majority's description
"accurate but not complete," painted a different picture of an "environment of neglect,
physical abuse and psychological torment" that directly affected the defendant's behavior
and should have made the death penalty inappropriate. Id. at 909-10 (Moyer, C.J.,
dissenting).
157. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
158. See id. at 308-10.
159. Id. at 360 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. See, e.g., Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1447 (11th Cir. 1987) (maintaining that
siblings' "emergence as normal citizens," although subject to similar abuse, could be used
against the defendant); State v. Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383, 397 (Ohio 1987) (finding
"enlightening" a psychologist's report noting that the defendant's siblings "were able to
survive and become well-adjusted, stable adults"); see also Stebbins & Kenney, supra note
32, at 18 (noting that many jurors react this way when the defendant's siblings appear to be
unaffected).
161. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (summarizing psychological
literature on reasons why one child may be more traumatized than another).
162- See, e.g., Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1565 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding childhood
events too remote by the time the defendant committed the murder at age 27); Francis v.
Dugger, 908 F.2d 696, 703 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence of childhood abuse had
"little, if any, mitigating weight" because the defendant was 31 years old); Francois v.
Wainwright, 763 F.2d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 1985) (concluding, in part because the
defendant was 31, that the mitigating evidence of childhood abuse would not affect the
outcome of the case); Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 807 n.4 (11th Cir. 1984)
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dismisses the extensive evidence that recognizes the great potential
for life-long psychological and behavioral consequences. 163 These
misperceptions permit courts to conclude that because the defendant
did not respond to the abuse the way others did or because the abuse
was too remote in time, his experience may be disregarded, rather
than factored into his individual circumstances that should be
considered at the punishment phase." 4
Apart from misunderstanding the nature of childhood abuse,
courts also fail to appreciate the value of the defense explaining to
the jury the connection between the abuse and the crime. A juror
may intuitively understand, based solely on facts of physical abuse,
that a childhood marred by abuse would have been traumatic.65 That
(concluding that because the defendant was 23, his history of turbulent family life could be
given little or no mitigating weight); Dobbert v. Strickland, 532 F. Supp. 545, 554 (M.D.
Fla. 1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the defendant, age 33, was
too far removed from his father's abuse to be acting under its influence); cf. Phillips v.
State, 608 So. 2d 778,782 (Fla. 1992) (stating that mitigating evidence of child abuse is "far
less compelling" for a defendant who is 36, but is still relevant); State v. Murphy, 605
N.E.2d 884, 910 (Ohio 1992) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (noting that when he committed his
crime, the 22-year-old defendant had not yet "matured to an age when education, normal
life experiences, and maturity could have intervened"). The courts in Raulerson, 732 F.2d
at 807 n.4, and Dobbert, 532 F. Supp. at.554, relied on Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115 (1982), to support their conclusion that the defendant was too old for his childhood
circumstances to be a relevant mitigating factor. This reliance is misplaced. In Eddings,
the Court held that childhood trauma was certainly relevant for a 16-year-old defendant,
see 455 U.S. at 115, but it does not follow that the mitigating nature of this evidence ceases
to exist at some arbitrary point.
163. See supra notes 62-85 and accompanying text (summarizing possible long-term
developmental, psychological, and neurological impairments from childhood abuse).
164. One court rejected the defendant's argument that his childhood abuse constituted
mitigating evidence that the jury should have been able to consider, deeming it instead "an
insult to people everywhere who have overcome their injuries and deprivations to become
successful contributing members of our community." Buxton v. Collins, No. H-91-494,
slip op. at 7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1991), afJd on other grounds, 925 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1991);
see also Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting the federal district
court judge from Buxton making the exact same remarks about a different defendant);
Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1511 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding the trial counsel's reason for
not presenting evidence of childhood deprivation, including abuse, persuasive because
"many jurors have had difficult lives, but have not turned to criminal conduct"). As
Professor Haney notes, it is "legally disingenuous" to act as though all individuals are
psychologically and socially affected in the same way: "To succumb to the argument that a
particular defendant is not entitled to mercy because not everybody who has shared his
experiences has reacted similarly would render all forms of mitigation irrelevant ......
Haney, supra note 32, at 602; see also Lewis, supra note 57, at 388-89 (noting that while not
all abused children commit crimes as adults, abuse, for a "vulnerable" child, "is often
sufficient to create a very violent individual").
165. Some courts are astonished and sobered by histories of childhood abuse and see
them as mitigating in and of themselves. See, e.g., Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447,
1454 (E.D. Ark. 1994) ("The Court is convinced that had the jury been presented evidence
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evidence may make a juror feel sorry for the defendant, but it is
unlikely to cause her to vote for a life sentence. 66 The critical part of
the defense case for mitigation is explaining how and why the
defendant's history of abuse caused long-term cognitive, behavioral,
and volitional impairments that relate to the murder he committed. 167
Without testimony making this connection, 168 jurors probably will not
comprehend the significance of the defendant's background to their
of the brutality Ford suffered as a child, along with evidence of intoxication, they would
not, in their weighing of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, have imposed the
death penalty."), affd on other grounds sub nom. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir.
1995); Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062, 1065-66 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (concluding, after
reviewing the mitigating evidence of the defendant's "tormented" childhood, which
included verbal and physical abuse, mental deficiencies, and mental illness, that the court
"cannot understand how trial counsel could fail to comprehend the significance of such
mitigating evidence"), vacated and remanded, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1992).
166. See supra note 141 (citing cases that recognize the minimal role sympathy may
play).
167. See, e.g., Stafford, 34 F.3d at 1565 (holding that physical abuse would have been
admissible mitigating evidence, but "[the defendant] presented no evidence that these
events had any continuing effect on his ability to conform his conduct to noncriminal
behavior"); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1502-06 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
family testified about the defendant's abuse as a child, but no experts testified for the
defense to explain the long-term consequences of the abuse); State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d
264, 300-01 (Ohio 1984) (giving the history of abuse little mitigating weight because "no
psychological testimony linked appellant's involvement in a bank robbery and shooting to
attitudes of hostility or aggression he acquired as the result of an abusive childhood");
Sundby, supra note 54, at 1170-78, 1181-83 (discussing cases where the defense effectively
used family and expert testimony to portray the defendant's childhood of abuse and its
relationship to his commission of the murder); see also supra notes 45-50, 137-39 and
accompanying text (discussing the importance of explaining to the jury the connection
between the defendant's history of child abuse and his commission of the murder).
168. This testimony will most often come in through an expert witness such as a social
worker, psychologist, or other mental health professional. See, e.g., Geimer, supra note
33, at 291 n.71 (citing interviews with a psychologist who emphasized the advantage of
using an expert who can link the crime to the defendant's background); Stebbins &
Kenney, supra note 32, at 17-18 (describing expert testimony as "the glue that cements all
the factors of the defendant's life into one cohesive picture; the explanation of how
accident of birth, injury, family and environmental background, accident, chance, disease,
or substance abuse put him/her in a position to commit the murder on the day in
question"); see also White, supra note 16, at 363-64 (citing a defense attorney who suggests
that lay witnesses and social workers may be most effective in presenting mitigating
evidence of child abuse). While it is critical for an expert to explain the relationship
between a defendant's childhood abuse and his adult behavior, especially the commission
of the murder, it is equally important that the defense attorney present lay witnesses who
can provide a first-hand account of the abuse and that the defense attorney integrate the
expert and lay testimony. See Sundby, supra note 54, at 1125-44 (explaining juror criticism
of expert testimony at the penalty phase, including the failure to link the defendant's
deficiencies to the crime); id. at 1145-62 (discussing jurors' reactions to lay experts and
family/friends, including the power of testimony recounting first-hand knowledge of the
defendant's abuse).
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sentencing decision.169
Courts deny the need to establish this relationship when they
hold that expert testimony on the effects of child abuse would not
contribute to the jury's understanding of the defendant and the
murder. 7 ' Gardner v. Dixon'7' represents a vivid example of a court
misunderstanding the mitigating relevance of the consequences of
childhood abuse. At trial, Gardner's counsel presented one witness
at the punishment phase, a state psychiatrist who had evaluated the
defendant for competency. She testified, "[w]ithout going into great
detail," that the defendant told her that he moved around a lot as a
child, his mother was an alcoholic, he failed several grades and never
finished high school, and he began abusing drugs as a teenager.72
She concluded that the defendant's drug abuse "could have impaired
his judgment at the time of the murders."1 3 The jury found that the
defendant's family history, alcohol abuse, and drug addiction were
mitigating circumstances but sentenced him to death. 74
On post-conviction review, Gardner argued that his attorney was
ineffective in part because he had failed to investigate and present
evidence of Gardner's childhood abuse.'75 At an evidentiary hearing,
Gardner's post-conviction counsel presented the evidence that his
trial attorney failed to find. 76 This evidence included testimony from
family members about his abusive father and alcoholic mother and
169. Other factors may also affect a juror's inability to understand the role of
mitigating evidence. See infra notes 219-33, 241-46, 260-63 and accompanying text
(discussing ill-prepared attorneys and inadequately-instructed juries).
170. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that expert
testimony on the developmental effects of child abuse "is not necessarily an essential
ingredient" of a competent presentation of mitigating evidence-trial counsel was
competent because he presented the facts of the abuse); Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1452,
1453 n.18 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding that expert testimony on the effects of child abuse
merely reiterated in clinical terms lay witnesses' testimony, but according to the court the
lay witnesses "generally testified that [the defendant] had been a good child and that he
was a nonviolent and pleasant adult"); Thompson v. Cain, No. 96-2268, 1997 WL 79295, at
*27 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 1997) (holding that the facts of child abuse were thoroughly
explored at trial and, absent evidence of mental defect, the court was not willing to require
a psychiatric examination), affd, 161 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1998); State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29,
63-65 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (affirming the trial court's ruling that an expert on Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome or Effect was not needed to draw a connection between the mother's
alcoholism while pregnant with defendant and defendant's later behavioral difficulties,
because the defense counsel could argue the inference).
171. No. 91-4010,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971 (4th Cir. June 4, 1992).
172 Id. at *21-*22.
173. Id. at *22.
174. See id. at *23.
175. See i& at *8-*10.
176. See iL at *8-*9.
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social service records documenting Gardner's childhood abuse. 77 A
clinical psychologist testified that "when stressed, [Gardner's]
abusive childhood would influence his behavior and impair his
judgment" and that at the time of the murder he was " 'under
stress,'" suffered from an emotional and mental disturbance, and
possessed an impaired ability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.178 The court held that this new evidence
"was different in its depth and detail, but not in kind. It presented in
greater 'color' the disadvantages suffered by Gardner as a child. '179
The court concluded that the evidence would not have "swayed the
outcome in this case."180
The court in Gardner ignored the qualitative difference that
testimony about childhood abuse may make to a juror's decision at
the punishment phase. The expert and lay testimony would have
provided a factual basis for Gardner's poor performance in school
and his drug abuse that began at such an early age. The testimony
alone would have given greater meaning to the mitigating
circumstances that the jury found, in a way that might have made the
mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating circumstances of the
murder. More important, however, is the psychological connection
between the physical abuse and Gardner's impaired judgment at the
time of the crime. The clinical psychologist's testimony would have
been significant because she located the precipitating cause of the
impairment-childhood abuse-outside the control of the
defendant. 8' This testimony provides a markedly different
explanation of the defendant's conduct from that created by relying
on drug abuse. Absent any contextual explanation, 18 drug abuse may
be seen as voluntarily self-inflicted and therefore less mitigating.1 83
The expert testimony suggested not only a possible reason for the
defendant's early drug use but also a more compelling and pernicious
explanation for his conduct. This difference could have transformed
177. See Ud
178. Id. at *9.
179. Id. at *24.
180. Id. at *25. The court concluded, therefore, that counsel was not ineffective;
because this evidence would not have affected the outcome of the case, Gardner was not
prejudiced by counsel's failure to present it. See id. at *24-*25; see also infra Part II.C.2
(discussing the standard governing ineffective assistance of counsel).
181. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
explaining the defendant's history).
182 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing how drug abuse may be a
form of self-medication against the emotional pain of childhood abuse).
183, See Logan, supra note 36, at 15 (observing that jurors may be more inclined to
condemn a drug abuser because of the large drug problem in this country).
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the way a juror understood the causal connection between the
defendant's childhood history and his impaired judgment at the time
of the murder such that she would have given greater weight to the
mitigating factors.'
In a related vein, in Thompson v. Cain,85 a federal district court
rejected the defendant's argument on post-conviction review that
trial testimony about his history of abuse supported his claim that his
attorney should have obtained a psychiatric evaluation to determine
whether he suffered from "any specific mental disorder or
syndrome." 86  The court's reasoning was two-fold: First, the
defendant's "history, of abuse and personal hardships" was
"thoroughly explored and presented" at trial,' and second, no
evidence in the record indicated any "mental defect at all."' Based
on the latter reason, the court refused to make what it considered "a
quantum leap" by requiring a psychiatric evaluation in every abuse
case where no indication of mental illness was present. 89 This
response, however, ignored the likelihood of mental problems that an
evaluation could have identified 9 More important, it discounted
the difference between a mere recitation of facts and an explanation
that could reveal the relationship between those facts and the
murddr, thus potentially affecting the punishment decision.'
184. See, e.g., Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447, 1457-58 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (noting
that "the jury would have been influenced by the compelling accounts of abuse [the
defendant] suffered at the hand of his father"), affd on other grounds sub nom. Ford v.
Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th
Cir. 1988) (assessing the value of expert testimony that the defendant still suffered from
the same mental illness with which he was diagnosed at age 12). The Middleton court
stated: "This kind of psychiatric evidence ... has the potential to totally change the
evidentiary picture by altering the causal relationship that can exist between mental illness
and homicidal behavior. 'Thus, [it] not only can act in mitigation, it also could
significantly weaken the aggravating factors.' " Middleton, 849 F.2d at 495 (quoting
Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1447 (11th Cir. 1987)).
185. No. 96-2268, 1997 WL 79295 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 1997), affd, 161 F.3d 802 (5th Cir.
1998).
186. Id. at *26. Thompson claimed his attorney's failure to obtain a psychiatric
evaluation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See id
187. Id. at *27. A sociologist testified that Thompson's step-father beat him with "coat
hangers, extension cords, fists and anything around the house," and that his uncle also
physically abused him. Id
188. Id.
189. Id The court stated that it was "not willing to analogize evidence of abuse and a
traumatic background with mental abnormalities or disorders." Id
190. See supra notes 76-78, 83 and accompanying text (identifying common mental
disorders and how they may contribute to inappropriate violent behavior). The court also
ignored the strong likelihood that even though the defendant appeared psychologically
normal, he was not. See infra note 318 (discussing the likelihood of mental illness among
victims of child abuse, especially violent offenders).
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Courts that understand the impact and long-term effects of child
abuse and their potential relationship to the crime recognize the
importance of fully and accurately conveying that connection to the
jury.'9l For example, in State v. Sullivan,' the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because
he neither investigated nor presented evidence that the defendant
grew up in an "abusive, alcoholic, often brutal environment" or that
the defendant's schizophrenia was related to the crime.19 Although
the defendant testified that he had once been diagnosed as
schizophrenic, 194 the court found it pivotal that trial counsel did not
present an explanation of the continued effects of the disease on the
defendant's judgment and behavior.' 95 According to the court, this
explanation, in concert with testimony about his severely abusive
childhood and the love family members still held for him, could have
191. See, e.g., Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing
that having a doctor testify about the relationship between the defendant's fetal injury,
subsequent mental disorder, and conduct "might have made a difference"); Middleton v.
Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to
investigate and present evidence of the defendant's brutal childhood and mental illness,
including expert testimony connecting them to "extreme emotional duress" and "very
limited capacity" at the time of the crime); cf State v. Murphy, 605 N.E.2d 884, 909-11
(Ohio 1992) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (stating that of all the death penalty cases be had
reviewed, he knew of "no other case in which the defendant ... was as destined for
disaster as was Joseph Murphy as a direct result of the conditions to which he was exposed
by his family"; those circumstances included a history of "neglect, physical abuse and
psychological torment" and enduring psychological difficulties). Cases that permit the
defense to rely on connecting child abuse to the defendant's antisocial personality fail to
appreciate the inaccuracy of that diagnosis and the damage it causes the defendant, given
its connotations of amorality and lack of remorse. See supra note 76 (discussing harm of
labeling someone as antisocial). Compare Pincus, supra note 76, at 358 (positing that the
failure to accurately diagnose psychiatric and neurologic disorders leads to labeling
defendants as sociopathic, which "conjures up the image of unfeeling, amoral, impulsive
individuals, who are ... untreatable, and in need of ... execution"), with Harris v.
Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a diagnosis of antisocial
personality disorder sufficiently explained the relationship between the defendant's
history of child abuse and his commission of the crime), and Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d
1494, 1508-14 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the defense argument that it would have been
more helpful to inform the jury that the defendant suffered from organic brain damage
and schizophrenia rather than presenting evidence that he was a sociopath, as presented at
trial).
192. 596 So. 2d 177 (La. 1992).
193. Id. at 191.
194. See id. The defendant also told the jury that he thought the death penalty was his
appropriate punishment. See id. at 181.
195. See id. at 191. According to the court, the jury was not told that "while Sullivan
may appreciate the difference between right and wrong at an intellectual level, his disease
prevents him from integrating the knowledge to the other, emotional side of his
personality.... [Nor did the jury hear] that in stressful situations Sullivan disassociates
into a fantasy world and cannot differentiate fantasy from reality." Id.
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altered the jury's decision at the penalty phase. 96
Similarly, in Loyd v. Smith,197 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that experts at
trial and on post-conviction review provided similar diagnoses of the
defendant's mental state: "While the district court's assessment of
the raw evidence [including the fact that the defendant was physically
abused as a child] is not in error, the court ignores the completely
different and polarized conclusions offered by the two sets of
doctors."'19  The doctors at trial principally diagnosed Loyd as
depressed and could offer no explanation for his abnormal
behavior,199 while the post-conviction doctors, based on further
psychological and neurological testing,' 0 "indicated organic brain
dysfunction such that Loyd could not control his impulses-a
statutory mitigating circumstance. 20 1
The courts in Sullivan and Loyd acknowledged what others
ignore: the critical difference that a history of physical abuse and its
long-term consequences may make to the jury's decision whether to
sentence a defendant to death or life imprisonment. The contrast
between courts that appreciate the significance of childhood abuse
and those that do not foreshadows the problems that the defense will
face in investigating and presenting childhood abuse as mitigating
evidence at both the trial and post-conviction stages. When the
experience and consequences of childhood abuse are not understood,
an attorney's investigation and presentation of that mitigating
evidence may be skewed and courts' expectations for and assessment
196. See id at 192.
197. 899 F.2d 1416, 1427 (5th Cir. 1990) (Loyd 1) (vacating the district court decision
for failing to give due deference to state court findings of fact on ineffective assistance of
counsel and remanding for reconsideration), opinion following remand sub nom. Loyd v.
Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992) (Loyd II) (granting writ of habeas corpus based on
ineffective assistance of counsel).
198. Id.
199. See id. at 1421.
200. A report prepared by one of the first set of doctors raised the possibility of brain
dysfunction, but "'there had not been any attempt at a full neuro-psychological
evaluation.'" Id. at 1422 (quoting the testimony of the doctor at the post-conviction state
court evidentiary hearing). This may be an example of the need for full neurological
examinations that Dr. Green has suggested. See GREEN, supra note 59, at 73; supra note
79 (discussing Green's work).
201. Loyd I, 899 F.2d at 1427. One of the doctors testified that he believed that the
form of the murder (raping, sodomizing, and killing a young girl) "'was probably
determined by "emotional or psychological factors" rooted in Loyd's childhood
experience. I believe, however, that what triggered his actions was largely an organic (or
physical) impairment of thought.'" Loyd I1, 977 F.2d at 155 (quoting the doctor's
testimony).
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of the attorney's efforts may be misguided.
B. The Intersection of a History of Childhood Abuse and the
Punishment Phase of a Death Penalty Trial
The trial in a death penalty case is unlike other criminal trials.
The possibility of death as a punishment heightens the need for
reliability in the process by which the sentence is imposed.20 A death
penalty trial occurs in two phases, guilt and punishment.203 The
punishment phase is not merely a postscript to the guilty verdict;2°4 it
is, as one scholar has stated, "a trial for life. '2 5 Thus, the punishment
phase is of equal, if not greater, significance than the guilt phase.2 6
An attorney representing a defendant facing the death penalty
should, therefore, recognize the importance of each phase and
prepare accordingly.2°7 Likewise, the trial court, cognizant of the
202. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) ("The fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment gives rise to a special '"need for reliability in the determination that death is
the appropriate punishment"' in any capital case." (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 364 (1977) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.))));
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (noting that the "qualitative
difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when
the death sentence is imposed"); see also Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense
of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REv. 331, 331 (1979) (arguing that capital cases are
different because of high emotions and publicity); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 304-05
(maintaining that capital trials are so different from other criminal trials that a higher
standard must be used to evaluate the competence of counsel); Ellen Kreitzberg, Death
Without Justice, 35 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 485, 488-96 (1995) (analyzing how "death is
different" jurisprudence infuses every part of a capital trial).
203. See supra note 20.
204. See Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 1991) (" '[C]ounsel may not treat
the sentencing phase as nothing more than a mere postscript to the trial.'" (quoting Kubat
v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 1989))).
205. Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 303 (characterizing the penalty trial as being for the
defendant's life and about the meaning and value of his life).
206. See Balske, supra note 202, at 353 (arguing that if evidence of guilt is
overwhelming, the defense's focus should be on the goal of life imprisonment, beginning
with voir dire); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 331 (noting that if the evidence of guilt is
strong, the penalty trial is the "only real trial").
207. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1208 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that "[i]f the
lawyers had done what they should have done" they would have been able to present
substantial mitigating evidence to the jury); Brewer, 935 F.2d at 857 (stating that the
attorney "'must make a significant effort'" to present mitigating evidence to the jury
(quoting Kubat, 867 F.2d at 369)); State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 191 (La. 1992)
(observing that "any time a defendant is charged with first degree murder, defense counsel
must prepare for the eventuality that a guilty verdict may be returned" and plan a penalty-
phase defense); Geimer, supra note 33, at 278-81 (maintaining that the possibility of a
death sentence should affect counsel's preparation and performance beginning with pre-
trial negotiations and continuing through the penalty trial); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at
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profound nature of the punishment-phase judgment, should seek to
ensure the jury's full and careful consideration of the sentencing
question.2 8 As others have documented, far too often this does not
occur: Attorneys do not adequately prepare for their own or the
prosecution's case at the punishment phase,0 9 and courts do not
sufficiently instruct jurors on the meaning of mitigating evidence.210
The next two Parts examine the ways in which these two problems
arise in the punishment phase for a defendant who was seriously
abused as a child.
1. Attorney Investigation and Presentation of Mitigating Evidence of
Childhood Abuse ,
A defense attorney must begin preparing for the punishment
phase of a death penalty trial at the same time she starts working on
the guilt phase2 1 She must develop a coherent theory of mitigation
that will inform every stage of the trial. This task requires, at a
minimum, a thorough investigation of both the defendant's life
history and the crime. Based on this investigation, the attorney can
then make strategic decisions about how to present the defendant's
case for life imprisonment at the punishment phase.2 3
317-39 (explaining the additional responsibilities that an attorney has in a capital trial);
White, supra note 16, at 325 (noting that attorneys familiar with the requirements of a
capital trial understand that the penalty phase is the "probable focal point").
208. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the need for jury instructions on mitigation).
209. See infra notes 219-46 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which defense
attorneys are ill-equipped to handle death penalty cases).
210. See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of jury
instructions on childhood abuse as mitigating evidence).
211. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 324 (asserting that starting after the guilt
phase is too late); Lyon, supra note 36, at 703 (stating that the attorney must begin
developing the case for mitigation as soon as she is assigned to the case). Scholarly and
practice-oriented journals contain many cogent articles explaining what an attorney should
do to prepare for the punishment phase. See, e.g., A.B.A,, GUIDELINES FOR THE
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 91-137
(1989) [hereinafter A.B.A. GUIDELINES] (containing Guidelines 11.3-11.8.6 and related
commentary); Balske, supra note 202; Jeff Blum, Investigation in a Capital Case: Telling
the Client's Story, CHAMPION, Aug. 1985, at 27; Geimer, supra note 33; Goodpaster, supra
note 30, at 317-39; Lyon, supra note 36; White, supra note 16, at 356-60.
212. See Balske, supra note 202, at 333-37 (explaining how the possibility of
punishment by death must make every step of case different: plea bargaining, pretrial
motions, voir dire, trial, and penalty trial); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 320 (explaining
that the attorney's obligation to investigate and present mitigating evidence must affect
what she does before and during the trial: the relationship with one's client, the
prosecutor, and the court; voir dire; and the guilt and penalty phases).
213. This investigation is critical so that the presentation to the jury at the guilt phase is
consistent with that at the punishment phase. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 328-
34 (discussing the effects of guilt-phase defenses on punishment-phase strategy); Lyon,
1191
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Complete preparation includes investigating the facts of the
crime and the defendant's life history, consulting with mental health
experts, and developing a relationship of trust with the defendant. 14
First and foremost, the defense attorney must comprehensively
investigate every aspect of the defendant's life to know what
information will help the jury understand the defendant and his
commission of the crime.215 The attorney must then consult with
mental health professionals who will use their expertise to evaluate,
test, and interpret the factual information about the defendant's life
and its relationship to the crime.216 If the attorney is court-appointed
counsel, she must seek financial assistance from the trial court to
ensure an adequate preparation.1 7 Finally, the attorney must
supra note 36, at 708-11 (explaining the importance of presenting a theory of mitigation
that is consistent with the defense at the guilt phase). As Professor Sundby concluded
from extensive interviews with jurors in capital cases, it is important to use different types
of witnesses-professional and lay experts, family and friends-to "create a coherent
defense theme." Sundby, supra note 54, at 1163-78 (analyzing the presentation of
mitigating evidence in two cases: one that did not harmonize the evidence of mental
illness and mitigation and resulted in a death sentence, and one that created a "distinctive"
integrated picture of the defendant and resulted in a life sentence); see also White, supra
note 16, at 358 (emphasizing the need to "develop a consistent theory before trial to
facilitate consistent strategies relating to jury selection, witness preparation, pretrial
motions, and overall strategy").
214. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 321-25; Kreitzberg, supra note 202, at 493-
95; White, supra note 16, at 337-45.
215. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 211; Lyon, supra note 36, at 703-08; White, supra note
16, at 340-42.
216. See Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting a mental
health expert who explained that "a 'comprehensive biopsychosocial life history outline or
evaluation' was necessary" in order to "'tie together the specific incidents of [the
defendant's] life and interpret them so as to provide the jurors a cohesive picture of the
life that he lived' "); Stebbins & Kenney, supra note 32, at 17-18 (identifying the use of a
psychological expert as the key to interpreting the defendant for the jury); see also David
C. Stebbins, Psychologists and Mitigation: Diagnosis to Explanation, CHAMPION, Apr.
1988, at 34, 35 (suggesting that a psychologist may help identify guilt-phase defenses as
well as punishment issues). Mental health experts recognize the ways in which they may
assist the defense in a capital case. See, e.g., Arlene Bowers Andrews, Social Work Expert
Testimony Regarding Mitigation in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 36 Soc. WORK 440,
441 (1991) (explaining the role of a social worker as an "impartial educator"); Douglas S.
Liebert & David V. Foster, The Mental Health Evaluation in Capital Cases: Standards of
Practice, 15 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 43, 46-53 (1994) (explaining the components
of a thorough mental health evaluation: obtaining accurate historical biopsychosocial
data, conducting a physical and neurological exam and a psychiatric and mental status
exam, performing diagnostic studies, and specifying additional experts needed).
217. See A.B.A. GUIDELINES, supra note 211, at 96 (noting that "counsel should
demand on behalf of the client all necessary experts for preparation of both phases of
trial"); Stephen B. Bright, Capital Cases: Obtaining Funds for Experts and Investigative
Assistance, CHAMPION, June 1997, at 31 (discussing the importance of making a detailed
case-specific showing of the need for experts); White, supra note 16, at 342-44. In Ake v.
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develop a relationship of trust with her client that will enable her to
inquire effectively into sensitive and painful events in the defendant's
life, including the crime and his upbringing 8
Despite the fundamental importance of this kind of extensive
preparation, far too frequently it does not occur 19 Many attorneys
who represent defendants in death penalty cases are poorly equipped
to defend their clients. They do not understand the substantive law
governing the penalty phase;220 they do not know how to investigate
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the Court recognized the necessity of providing the defense
a competent psychiatrist when the defendant's mental state would be a significant issue
either at the guilt or the punishment phase. See id. at 77, 80, 83; see also Castro, 71 F.3d at
1505 (vacating a death sentence because the trial court refused to grant counsel expert
psychiatric assistance).
218. See Blum, supra note 211, at 28-30 (observing that a client may not open up to an
attorney for "weeks or months" but it is the attorney's obligation to create the trust that
will eventually allow this to occur); Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 321-22 (discussing the
importance of having an "effective relationship" with the client); Lyon, supra note 36, at
703-05 (noting the importance of establishing trust for investigating the client's
background and for support through the trial); White, supra note 16, at 374-75 (explaining
the necessity of a trusting relationship in order to develop persuasive mitigating evidence,
to plea bargain, and to show a bond with the client that may evoke empathy from jurors).
219. See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1257 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (attributing the "general unavailability of qualified attorneys
to represent capital defendants" to two factors: the absence of standards for court-
appointed counsel and the absence of funds to compensate lawyers); Stephen B. Bright,
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1841-66 (1994) (describing the widespread problem of, and
reasons for, deficient counsel); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 397-410
(1995) (summarizing anecdotal and empirical evidence about indigent capital defendants
being denied adequate counsel); Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense, NAT'L LJ., June 11,
1990, at 30 (reporting on a six-month, six-state investigation of the quality of counsel in
capital cases); see also A.B.A., Report Submitted with Recommendation No. 107, at 5-10
(calling for a moratorium on the death penalty) (approved Feb. 3, 1997) [hereinafter
A.B.A. Moratorium Report] (recommending a moratorium in part because of the system-
wide failure to provide competent, knowledgeable, and adequately funded trial attorneys);
Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 64-71 (1990) (documenting numerous examples of attorneys
failing to adequately represent clients charged with capital crimes).
220. See Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1995) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (stating that because the lead attorney had not tried a case since before 1961,
when trials occurred in one phase, he had no sentencing phase strategy); Loyd I, 899 F.2d
at 1423, 1426 (pointing out that the state court found that trial counsel did not know the
difference between using an insanity defense and presenting mitigation evidence); Bolder
v. Armontrout, 713 F. Supp. 1558, 1567 & n.9 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (concluding that trial
counsel's decision not to investigate mitigating evidence was based on not understanding
the law), rev'd on other grounds, 921 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1990); Goodpaster, supra note 30,
at 303 n.22, 337 n.151 (compiling examples of attorneys who did not understand the
"nature and significance of the penalty trial"); Justice Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the
Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 CoLUM. L. REv.
1, 2 (1986) ("The federal reports are filled with stories of counsel who presented no
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a defendant's background"' or simply do not investigate at all;"z they
believe that the only relevant type of mitigating evidence is that
which portrays the defendant as a good person;' they do not seek, or
are denied, funds from the trial court to hire investigators or
experts;224 or they are not adequately compensated by the trial
court.22
It is true that because a death penalty case differs from other
criminal trials, many attorneys are unfamiliar with how to prepare
for, and what to present at, the punishment phase.226 For example,
evidence in mitigation of their client's sentences because they did not know what to offer
or how to offer it, or had not read the state's sentencing statute." (footnote omitted)).
221. See, e.g., Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (noting that the
trial counsel did not seek out family members, but said he would have spoken to them if
they had contacted him), vacated and remanded, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1992); Rose v.
State, 675 So. 2d 567, 571-72 (Fla. 1996) (stating that counsel conducted virtually no
investigation because he was "totally unfamiliar with the concept of aggravating and
mitigating factors").
222. See, e.g., Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1467 (8th Cir. 1983); Heiney v. State,
620 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. 1993); see also White, supra note 16, at 346-53 (discussing cases
where trial counsel conducted no investigation for the punishment phase).
223. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 813 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting that the trial attorney asked the defendant to identify people who could say
"'anything good about him' " (quoting the Trial App. at 51)); Mathis, 704 F. Supp. at 1066
(suggesting that trial counsel did not present mitigating evidence of child abuse, mental
illness, and substance abuse because he thought "that only 'good' details" were
mitigating).
224. See, e.g., Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1509 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
trial court denied counsel's request for a psychiatric expert); Loyd II, 977 F.2d at 152
(observing that counsel did not pursue independent expert assistance after the trial court
approved only part of his request for funds for experts and co-counsel did not tell him the
family had given additional money for experts); Vick, supra note 219, at 391-94 (reporting
the statutory limits on funds for hiring experts (e.g., South Carolina $2500, Illinois $250) as
well as judicially imposed limits (e.g., Georgia no funds, Texas $500)); White, supra note
16, at 350-51 (discussing cases in which the attorney did not seek independent expert
witnesses).
225. See, e.g., A.B.A. Moratorium Report, supra note 219, at 8-9 (citing examples of
attorneys being paid $500-$800 for a capital case); Bright, supra note 219, at 1853-55
(comparing the low level of compensation attorneys receive in death penalty cases to
significantly higher rates charged by lawyers in civil practice and awarded to attorneys in
civil rights cases); Kreitzberg, supra note 202, at 511-17 (discussing inadequate funding in
light of inexperienced counsel, especially compared to the greater experience and
resources in prosecutors' offices); Vick, supra note 219, at 385-91 (surveying low statutory
caps on appointed attorney fees, low judicial awards of attorney fees, and poorly-funded
public defender offices).
226. See Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 334-35 (noting that at the penalty phase of the
trial, counsel takes on an unfamiliar role); Stebbins & Kenney, supra note 32, at 16 (stating
that capital cases place a defense attorney in the unusual role of putting on an affirmative
case, and the attorney usually has no training in how to do that); White, supra note 16, at
325 (observing that unfamiliarity with the punishment phase may cause attorneys to focus
on the guilt phase).
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many attorneys are unaccustomed to presenting an affirmative case
in support of life imprisonment, 7 but instead rely on the more
familiar argument that the State has not met its burden of proof, as is
often urged at the guilt phase.' This unfamiliarity should not be
tolerated, however, as a justification for not adequately investigating
and presenting a forceful case at the punishment phase; its
consequence for the defendant is too great. 9
Not surprisingly, an attorney who does not understand the
nature and scope of mitigation often will ignore, or fail to uncover,
evidence of childhood abuse"3 She will not ask the kind of questions
that elicit information about abuse.231 If she asks the defendant to
227. See Geimer, supra note 33, at 287-88 (arguing that the defense attorney must
assume the burden of proving the case for a life sentence for the defendant); Goodpaster,
supra note 30, at 337-38 (comparing defense counsel's role at the punishment phase to that
of a plaintiff's attorney in a civil case: establishing a "prima facie case for life"); Stebbins
& Kenney, supra note 32, at 16 ("Investigating, theorizing, and presenting an affirmative
case for life is something that most attorneys are neither trained to do nor particularly
well-suited to do.").
228. See Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 337-38 (noting that most defense attorneys are
not used to this role and yet courts review their performance as though this were their
accustomed role); Stebbins & Kenney, supra note 32, at 16 (observing that the normal role
for defense counsel is to react to the prosecution's case).
229. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 816 n.14 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a defense based on making "the prosecutor 'prove his case' " is
"'tantamount to no strategy at all' " (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930, 946 (11th Cir.
1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting))); White, supra note 16, at 356-57 (arguing that it is
inadequate to adopt a strategy at sentencing of" 'put[ting] the government to its burden of
proof' ").
230. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S. at 789-95 (observing that the attorney did not pursue or
present evidence about the defendant's childhood, including abuse by his parents, because
he thought it would reveal violent behavior that was inconsistent with his punishment
phase strategy of showing the defendant was a follower); Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d
971, 979-80 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that, because the defense counsel strategy was to
present the defendant as not a danger, defense counsel did not find evidence of the
defendant's "violence-ridden and abusive" childhood); Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322,
1324-25 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that defense counsel limited his investigation to talking to
the defendant's mother and did not seek out other individuals who knew about the
defendant's abuse as a child and other difficulties); Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455,
1467 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that a failure to conduct any investigation denied the jury the
ability to consider the defendant's family history); Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 (Fla.
1996) (stating that the defense attorney adopted an "'accidental death'" theory at the
punishment phase without conducting any investigation that would have revealed a history
of abuse and mental illness).
231. See, e.g., Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
attorneys did not properly interview the defendant's mother or pursue her hints about
child abuse or contact the defendant's father); Barnes, 58 F.3d at 980 (observing that
counsel did not pursue defendant's mental health or childhood abuse because his family
only spoke of positive features); Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(stating that the attorney "failed to seek detailed information about his client's past"),
vacated and remanded, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Blum, supra note 211, at 27
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identify witnesses who will testify to his good character, it is unlikely
the defendant will understand that request to include those who
know about his abuse.232 If an attorney conveys the impression that
mitigating evidence consists of character and background
information that portrays the defendant in a positive light, the
defendant may say that he is unwilling to testify because his past,
which includes childhood abuse, will not do that. 3
Even if an attorney understands the potential scope of mitigating
evidence, she will detrimentally limit her investigation if she relies
solely on the defendant to identify individuals with relevant
information. If the defendant denies being abused he will not be in a
position to identify anyone. The defendant may refuse to talk about
his history of abuse because he may be ashamed of it235 or believes
that it was his fault. 6  Fear or embarrassment may cause the
defendant to instruct his attorney not to talk to the defendant's
family,2 7 so that no one will talk about the abuse. Even if the
(noting that the attorney must "[1]isten for any allusions to child abuse or neglect");
Donna Della Femina et al., Child Abuse: Adolescent Records vs. Adult Recall, 14 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECr 227, 230-31 (1990) (giving examples of ways to elicit information of
abuse when the individual may be protective of his parents, e.g., "Who in the household
has a temper? What's the worst that ever happened?" ... "'Were you ever hit with a
belt?'... 'Are there any scars I can't see?' "); Lewis et al., Characteristics of 15 Death Row
Inmates, supra note 125, at 844 (reporting that subjects on death row did not tell their
attorneys about their abuse or history because no one ever asked them).
232. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S. at 813 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing that the
defendant should not have been expected to tell his attorney about his abusive upbringing
when asked to identify persons who would say positive things about him); see also Lewis et
al., Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates, supra note 125, at 844 (reporting that when
researchers asked subjects why they had not told their attorneys about the abuse, they
stated that no one had asked them or they did not believe it was relevant).
233. See, e.g., Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1563 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
defendant did not want his childhood presented in mitigation and refused to testify
because he "thought it would be useless"); Thomas, 796 F.2d at 1324 (noting that the
defendant's refusal to testify contributed to the attorney conducting no investigation).
234. See Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Intrinsic and Environmental Characteristics of
Juvenile Murderers, 27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PsYCHIATRY 582, 586
(1988) (observing that subjects and families had less reason to hide information on family
violence prior to the subject committing murder-afterward they may have had fears of
self-incrimination); Stein & Lewis, supra note 61, at 523 (reporting that one reason it is
difficult to reconstruct the experience of abuse is that adults minimize or deny their
childhood abuse); supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing why adults may not
want to reveal childhood abuse).
235. See Lewis et al., Characteristics of 14 Juveniles, supra note 125, at 588; Stein &
Lewis, supra note 61, at 523.
236. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why a person may
blame himself for being abused).
237. See, e.g., Gardner v. Dixon, No. 91-4010, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971, at *14 (4th
Cir. June 4, 1992) (noting that the defendant told his lawyer about his abusive background
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attorney talks to family members, they may deny that the defendant
was abused.13 Finally, even when the defendant is willing to talk
about his abusive childhood, he may not be able to identify
corroborative sources of information239  Other sources, such as
records, neighbors, and teachers, must be sought out to provide this
critical information.240  In sum, when the attorney does not
understand the nature of the investigation that is required, she will
miss the significance of the information she receives and/or fail to
locate valuable sources of evidence about the defendant's
background, specifically his physical abuse as a child.
When the attorney's mitigation investigation is insufficient, she
will likely present an inaccurate or incomplete picture of the
but refused to allow him to involve family members in the case); Knight v. Dugger, 863
F.2d 705, 750 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that because the defendant did not want his family
history to become public knowledge, defense attorneys did not pursue character witnesses
beyond his mother); Thomas, 796 F.2d at 1324 (stating that the trial attorney testified that
he "made little effort" to find mitigating evidence in part because the defendant "did not
'want anyone to cry for him' "); Bolder v. Armontrout, 713 F. Supp. 1558, 1567 (W.D. Mo.
1989) (stating that the defendant told his attorney not to talk to his family), rev'd on other
grounds, 921 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1990); Waldrop v. State, 523 So. 2d 475, 482 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1987) (noting that the defendant never told trial attorneys about the physical and
sexual abuse that he experienced as a child); People v. Perez, 592 N.E.2d 984, 986 (Ill.
1992) (stating that the defendant refused to provide any information about his family or
background); see also White, supra note 16, at 374 n.349 (noting that without the
defendant's cooperation, it may be impossible for the attorney to find other sources of
information about the defendant). But cf Clanton v. Bair, 826 F.2d 1354, 1357 (4th Cir.
1987) (concluding that because the defendant's father was dead, "no apparent reason for
reluctance" existed for telling about his mistreatment).
238. See, e.g., Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1341 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that the record showed that the
defendant's mother denied the allegations of child abuse); Waldrop, 523 So. 2d at 483
(noting that the father denied abusing the defendant); see also Feldman et al., supra note
125, at 351 (observing that families may be more interested in concealing abuse than in
helping the defendant); Lewis et al., Characteristics of 14 Juveniles, supra note 125, at 588
(remarking that parents had "vested interests" in concealing abuse).
239. See, e.g., Parkus v. Delo, 33 F.3d 933, 938 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
defendant, who was mentally ill and borderline mentally retarded, should not be expected
to know that state agency records existed containing information about his childhood
abuse). But see Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *18-*20 (holding that the attorney
was not responsible for failing to locate social service records containing information
about the defendant's childhood because the defendant did not tell him such records
existed or what county they were in).
240. See, e.g., Thomas, 796 F.2d at 1324-25 (noting that high school teachers and former
employers would have testified about the defendant's home life); Perez, 592 N.E.2d at 987-
88 (stating that the attorney had school records that he could have used to develop
mitigating evidence even though the defendant would not provide him with family
information); see also Blum, supra note 211, at 27-30 (emphasizing the importance of
identifying individuals, including professionals, who may be sources of information about
the defendant).
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defendant to the jury. The likely result will be that the jury does not
hear any evidence of the defendant's physical abuse as a child or how
it continued to affect his behavior.24' The jury may hear testimony
about facts of the abuse from one witness, but not hear available
corroborating or interpretive testimony.242 If the jury hears an expert
provide a psychological explanation for the long-lasting effects of the
abuse, the diagnosis may be wrong243 or more aggravating than
mitigating.2' These errors will be compounded if the attorney waits
until the eve of the punishment phase to begin developing a case for
mitigation. She will not have time to conduct the kind of
investigation necessary to identify and document the defendant's
history of physical abuse and to utilize experts to construct a cogent
explanation of the defendant's crime.' The result will be a weak
241. See, e.g., Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1206-11 (6th Cir. 1995); Barnes v.
Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 979-81 (4th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1363-69
(11th Cir. 1995); Thomas, 796 F.2d at 1325; Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1466-67
(8th Cir. 1983); Bolder, 713 F. Supp. at 1567; Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062, 1065-66
(N.D. Ga. 1989), vacated and remanded, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1992); Rose v. State, 675
So. 2d 567, 571-74 (Fla. 1996); Heiney v. State, 620 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. 1993); Perez, 592
N.E.2d at 993-96; State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177,191-92 (La. 1992).
242 See, e.g., Parkus, 33 F.3d at 940 (noting that the State withheld prison records that
corroborated the defendant's brother's testimony regarding their uncle's abuse of the
defendant and that, at trial, the State ridiculed the brother's testimony as untrue); Devier
v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1453 & n.18 (11th Cir. 1993) (observing that counsel presented family
members who testified about the defendant's abuse and its effect on his early life, but not
an expert who would have testified about the effects this abuse had on the defendant's
development as a child and as an adult); see also supra note 167 (citing cases where
defense counsel failed to present expert testimony linking the defendant's childhood abuse
to his adult behavior).
243. See, e.g., Loyd I1, 977 F.2d at 154-56 (observing thal at trial, psychiatric experts
either could not explain why the defendant committed the murder or attributed the
etiology of the crime to abuse as a child, while on post-conviction review, independently
retained psychiatrists diagnosed mental illness and organic brain damage).
244. This phenomenon occurs most often when the defense trial expert states that the
defendant is a sociopath or suffers from antisocial personality disorder and the expert on
post-conviction makes a different diagnosis. See, e.g., Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494,
1511-13 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the trial psychologist labeled the defendant a
sociopath, while post-conviction experts diagnosed brain damage and schizophrenia); see
also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing
astonishment that the defendant would claim that antisocial personality is a mitigating
factor). As Dr. Pincus explains, the label of sociopath is detrimental and misleading
because it is often applied in the absence of adequate psychological and neurological
testing. See Pincus, supra note 76, at 358. But see Liebman & Shepard, supra note 51, at
829-34 (arguing that sociopathy has at least limited mitigating potential).
245. See, e.g., Brewer v. Aiken,-935 F.2d 850,851 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that in the first
case under Indiana's new death penalty statute, defense counsel asked for, and was denied,
a one-week continuance, because he did not know the penalty phase would immediately
follow the guilt phase and he was unprepared to proceed); Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d
1503, 1516 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that the attorney tried to have the defendant evaluated
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case for mitigation, lacking in corroboration and authenticity, that is
prone to attack by the prosecution and dismissal by the jury."6 The
mitigating potential of a history of childhood abuse and its long-term
negative consequences for the defendant is lost to the jury.
The mitigating weight of a history of childhood abuse may also
be lost if the defense attorney does not anticipate the possibility that
the prosecution will turn the long-term negative behavioral
consequences into aggravating circumstances. An effective
presentation of the mitigating qualities of childhood abuse will
include connecting the adverse behavioral and developmental effects
on the defendant to the commission of the murder. The defense
should expect that the State will try to use this testimony against the
defendant in a number of ways. The prosecution may argue that the
evidence of child abuse is aggravating by establishing that the abuse
has made the defendant a dangerous and violent person.247  The
prosecutor may try to use the defendant's witnesses to elicit
testimony about the defendant's prior criminal record or other
violent behavior.2' Finally, the prosecution may suggest that the jury
by a psychiatrist the morning of the sentencing hearing, but the defendant refused); People
v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839, 864 (Cal. 1987) (in bank) (observing that the attorney admitted
he gave up after the guilt phase and had not prepared for the punishment phase); Perez,
592 N.E.2d at 995-96 (concluding that as a result of the attorney's inadequate
investigation, the attorney did not know that he needed an expert who could have assisted
his communication with the defendant, thus leaving the attorney unable to make any use
of the family information the defendant provided just before sentencing); Sullivan, 596 So.
2d at 191-92 (noting that the defense counsel did not prepare for the punishment phase
because he was confident the jury would convict the defendant of second degree murder);
see also Goodpaster, supra note 30, at 324 (asserting that waiting until there is a guilty
verdict is too late to begin the "life investigation"); Sundby, supra note 54, at 1185 (noting
that integrating expert and lay testimony takes "extensive investigative time and effort").
246. See, e.g., Mathis, 704 F. Supp. at 1065-66 (stating that a full investigation of the
defendant's background would have uncovered evidence of a "disadvantaged, indeed
tormented, upbringing [that] could have resulted in a sentence less than death"); Heiney,
620 So. 2d at 173 (concluding that a proper investigation would have revealed mitigating
factors, including being chronically physically and emotionally abused as a child, that
could have established a basis for upholding the jury recommendation of a life sentence);
Perez, 592 N.E.2d at 995-97 (holding that the failure to conduct a thorough investigation of
family history made the defendant's death sentence unreliable).
247. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-24 (1989) (noting that the prosecutor
argued that a strong possibility existed that the defendant would continue to commit acts
of violence); Clark v. State, 881 S.W.2d 682, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994, pet. ref'd)
(pointing out that on cross-examination the State elicited testimony from the defendant's
expert that child abuse was "part of the roots/foundation cornerstones/building blocks of
Chronic Anger Syndrome").
248. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 792-94 (1987) (concluding that the State could
use the defendant's witnesses to show the defendant's "violent tendencies"); Porter v.
Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 935-38 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting the State's argument that it was
reasonable for the defendant's attorney not to present character witnesses about the
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discount the evidence of childhood abuse altogether because others
who were similarly abused did not commit murder.249
The potential for drawing negative inferences or introducing
other violent conduct should not deter the defense from investigating
and presenting a case for mitigation based on evidence of childhood
abuse.2 ° If the case is in a state that allows the introduction of
unadjudicated offenses, the prosecution will be able to present
evidence of prior violent behavior regardless of whether the defense
opens the door to such testimony.2 ' When properly prepared, the
defense may counter the prosecution's characterization by placing
the prior violence in context,2s2 presenting testimony about the
defendant's childhood abuse and damaging experiences in juvenile detention homes
because it would have opened the door to his prior criminal activities); Whitley v. Bair,
802 F.2d 1487, 1495-96 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by
his lawyer's failure to present mitigating evidence of child abuse and brain damage
because his extensive criminal background would have come in and, in the court's
judgment, would have outweighed the mitigating evidence). But see Pickens v. Lockhart,
714 F.2d 1455, 1467 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the district court's surmise that defense
counsel did not put on evidence of the defendant's childhood abuse because it would have
brought out his bad criminal record on the ground that "[ilt is sheer speculation that
character witnesses in mitigation would do more harm than good"). Independently, the
defense attorney must be prepared to counter the prosecutor presenting evidence of the
defendant's criminal history as part of its case in chief. See White, supra note 16, at 344-
45,358-60.
249. See Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1447 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that siblings'
testimony could have been used against the defendant in part because they emerged as
"normal citizens" even though they had suffered "similar abuse and neglect"); State v.
Wilson, No. CIV.A.92CA005396, 1994 WL 558568, at *37 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1994)
(quoting the prosecutor's argument that "'a lot of people have had tough childhoods ...
[and] we all know that lots of kids have been abused, but they don't go out and commit the
kind of offenses that [defendant] commit[ted]' "), aff'd, 659 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1996); State
v. Kinley, No. 2826, 1993 WL 224496, at *24-*25 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1993) (noting
that the prosecutor argued that other persons endured abusive childhoods and did not
commit murder), affd, 651 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1995).
250. See Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1309 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
mitigating evidence should have been presented even if it would have caused the jury to
hear aggravating information; in light of the defendant's "crazed and violent actions" on
the night of the crime, it was "doubtful that much of the additional aggravating
information would have had any significant incremental aggravating effect on the jury").
251. See Cockrum v. Johnson, 934 F. Supp. 1417, 1446 (E.D. Tex. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 119 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1997); Steven Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial.
The Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1249, 1267-77 (1993) (reviewing the laws in the 16 states that permit the
State to introduce evidence of unadjudicated offenses at the punishment phase).
252. See Burger, 483 U.S. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that minor criminal
offenses easily could have been outweighed by circumstances of child abuse and neglect);
Abdur' Rahman v. Bell, 999 F. Supp. 1073, 1099, 1100-01 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (concluding
that a mental health expert could have testified about the defendant's background and
mental health history and "could have offered an explanation placing in context the
negative aspects of [his] past" that included convictions for assault and second degree
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defendant's lack of future dangerousness,. 3 and refocusing the jury's
attention on the precipitating source of the defendant's violence-his
own abuse as a child. 4 The defendant also may rebut the claim that
the abuse is irrelevant because others who were abused did not kill
anyone. Family and expert witnesses should be prepared to testify
about individual circumstances that made the defendant's experience
of abuse especially severe and debilitating-for example, the
defendant may have endured the brunt of the abuse in the family,2-5
or his mental deficiencies may have compounded the harm from the
abuse.26  Unfortunately, courts, 57  and defense attorneys
themselves, 8 often say that the aggravating potential was a reason
murder and misconduct in prison and in school).
253. See May v. Collins, 904 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (noting that a
doctor explained that the defendant functioned well in a structured setting and was not
now dangerous); see also Logan, supra note 36, at 15, 19 (suggesting that the defendant's
lack of future dangerousness may be established by demonstrating that the circumstances
of the crime were unique, and/or that the defendant's behavior is being controlled in
prison).
254. See, e.g., Richard v. State, 842 S.W.2d 279,283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992, no pet.) (en
banc) (observing that defense counsel used cross-examination of the State's expert to
establish that "many of the circumstances of [the defendant's] brutalized past were either
contributory to or indicative of" the sociopathic personality the expert ascribed to the
defendant); see also May, 904 F.2d at 231 (per curiam) (noting that a doctor explained how
defendant's brain damage and childhood abuse may have impaired his social functioning
and emotional development and may have impaired his ability to "reflect on the
appropriateness of his actions before manifesting them").
255. See supra notes 65, 106 and accompanying text (discussing psychological literature
and cases on defendants who were singled out for abuse).
256. See supra notes 66, 83-85, 116-33 and accompanying text (discussing the negative
interactive effect of childhood abuse and mental impairments).
257. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S. at 792-95 (concluding that the defense attorney acted
reasonably in not presenting evidence of childhood abuse and turmoil because it suggested
violent tendencies at odds with his chosen penalty phase strategy-that the defendant
acted under another's influence); Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 558-60 (11th Cir. 1994)
(affirming the district court's findings that attorneys at two sentencing hearings reasonably
decided not to present evidence of the defendant's background because it included
extensive criminal activity); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1495-96 (4th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that negative aspects of the testimony of the defendant's sister about the
defendant's mother and brother beating him and expert testimony on the defendant's
organic brain dysfunction and antisocial personality disorder meant the defendant was not
prejudiced by the trial counsel's failure to develop or present such evidence); Pickens v.
Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1467 (8th Cir. 1983) (disagreeing with the district court's ruling
that counsel was reasonable not to present evidence of the defendant's background). But
see Burger, 483 U.S. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the mother's testimony
about the defendant's father kicking him out of the house in Indiana and the defendant
thereafter selling his shoes to buy food while hitchhiking to her home in Florida "may well
have outweighed the relevance of any earlier petty theft").
258. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S. at 790-94 (stating that the trial attorney did not have
defendant's mother or others testify to his abusive childhood because they might have
testified about one petty offense and juvenile probation, which were contrary to the clean
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not to present the mitigating evidence of abuse.2 9 This attitude is an
attempt to excuse the failure to investigate or present evidence of
childhood abuse rather than confront the complexity and strength of
childhood abuse as a mitigating circumstance.
2. Jury Instructions on Mitigating Evidence of Childhood Abuse
Even when the defendant's history of childhood abuse is fully
developed and presented to the jury at the punishment phase, the
defense may face an additional hurdle: jury instructions that do not
adequately guide the jury's consideration of childhood abuse as a
mitigating factor. Jury instructions play a critical role by informing
the jury how it may consider evidence it has heard regarding the
defendant's sentence.210 Empirical research suggests that, in general,
jurors have a difficult time comprehending instructions at the penalty
phase of a death penalty trial.26' Jurors appear to have an especially
criminal record then before the jury); Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 980-81 (4th Cir.
1995) (finding no prejudice from defense attorney's failure to pursue or present evidence
of child abuse or mental condition because he maintained, and the court agreed, that it
would show that the defendant was dangerous); Porter, 14 F.3d at 558 (noting that the trial
attorney did not present evidence of the defendant's troubled childhood, including
physical abuse by his stepfather, in order to "shield the jury from Porter's prior extensive
criminal activity").
259. I recognize that cases may exist where an attorney legitimately decides not to
present the defendant's childhood abuse because attendant aggravating circumstances
would overwhelm the mitigating aspects of the evidence. As Logan points out, some
forms of child abuse possess more mitigating potential than others, e.g., physical abuse
may have more mitigating potential than emotional neglect. See Logan, supra note 36, at
16. None of the cases analyzed in this Article, however, make that kind of nuanced
analysis.
260. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,190-95 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.) (discussing the importance of guiding the jury's sentencing decision); Randy
Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the
Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REV.
317, 345-46 (1981) (stating that the 1976 Supreme Court death penalty decisions
recognized that jury instructions are "an indispensable device for ensuring" proper
consideration of the evidence); Liebman & Shepard, supra note 51, at 786-89 (arguing that
a constitutional imperative exists for a court to instruct the jury on mitigating factors).
261. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on
Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996) (discussing
two studies, one showing a misunderstanding of the central issues such as the scope of
mitigation, non-unanimity on mitigating factors, and the requirements of weighing
mitigating and aggravating circumstances; and the other showing greater clarity when less
confusing instructions were given); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital
Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995) (reporting the
results of the Capital Jury Project North Carolina study, showing that jurors
misunderstood standards regarding aggravation and mitigation, burdens of proof, and the
lack of unanimity requirement). See generally Symposium, The Capital Jury Project, 70
IND. L.J. 1033 (1995) (presenting the preliminary results of the Capital Jury Project study,
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difficult time understanding the role and meaning of mitigating
evidence 62 Despite the intuitive, empathetic sense that some jurors
may have about how childhood abuse may impair a defendant's
development and subsequent adult behavior, they may not know how
it should relate to their judgment regarding the proper punishment
for the defendant.263
While it should be incumbent on trial courts to explain the
meaning of mitigating evidence in every case, it is not constitutionally
required according to the Supreme Court. The Court has held that
the Eighth Amendment does not require the trial judge to instruct
the jury on the concept of mitigation or on the existence of particular
mitigating evidence presented in the case.' 6 The Court also has
upheld death penalty statutes that do not designate sentencing factors
as mitigating or aggravating. 65 These holdings pose particular
problems when attorneys present evidence such as childhood abuse.
documenting juror misconceptions about their role and sense of responsibility, jury
instructions, and the function of the guilt and punishment phases).
262. See Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A
Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
411, 420-24, 433 (1994) (finding that statutory aggravating and mitigating factors were not
understood); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death Do Capital Jurors
Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1 (summarizing studies and anecdotal
evidence regarding juror confusion about the meaning of mitigation).
263. See WHrrE, supra note 20, at 84-85 (reporting that in a case where the defendant
presented substantial mitigating evidence, including childhood abuse, a juror remarked
that the jury did not know if the defendant's background could be considered mitigating,
but thought mitigating circumstances had to be related to the crime); Logan, supra note
56, at 36 (observing that judges and jurors report not understanding the connection
between the defendant's childhood abuse and the crime). Courts may be equally
misinformed. See, e.g., Buxton v. Collins, No. H-91-494, slip op. at 6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23,
1991), aff'd on other grounds, 925 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that evidence of
child abuse would evoke "vacuous sentimentality" or be "as likely to exacerbate as to
mitigate").
264. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757, 758-59 (1998); see also Saffle v. Parks,
494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990) (concluding that while states may not limit what the jury considers
at the punishment phase, the Constitution places no limitations on how states instruct
juries to consider that evidence).
265. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 977 (1994) (holding that the failure to
classify the sentencing factor of age as either mitigating or aggravating was not
unconstitutionally vague and noting that competing arguments by both sides regarding age
as mitigating or aggravating promote reasoned decisionmaking); id. at 981-82 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing that the failure to characterize factors as either
aggravating or mitigating reduces the risk of arbitrary sentencing); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 875 (1983) (finding the Georgia sentencing statute constitutional even though it
did not specify standards to guide the jury's consideration of mitigating and aggravating
factors); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1993) (holding that as long as the
jury can "consider in some manner" mitigating evidence, no constitutional violation
exists).
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As demonstrated above, childhood abuse is potentially double-
edged:266 Both the prosecution and the defense may argue that the
evidence of childhood abuse and its long-term consequences for the
defendant supports their positions.267 Without proper guidance, a
juror may not understand that evidence of childhood abuse and its
consequences is a legitimate basis on which to consider life
imprisonment as the appropriate punishment for the defendant.268
3. Conclusion
The confluence of inadequately prepared defense attorneys and
improperly instructed juries creates insurmountable barriers to the
effective consideration of mitigating evidence that the defendant was
abused as a child.2 69 This is not to say that jurors will always consider
such evidence mitigating enough to vote for a sentence of life
imprisonment over death, even when this evidence is adequately
presented and explained. However, when a defendant who was
abused as a child and who now faces the death penalty is so
consistently disadvantaged by systemic obstacles, the presumption
that the death penalty is no longer arbitrarily and capriciously
applied is seriously challenged.
266. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989) ("[M]ental retardation and history
of abuse is thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish [the defendant's] blameworthiness for
his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the
future."); White, supra note 16, at 364 (noting that childhood abuse, like mental illness,
may suggest that the defendant will continue to be a threat to society).
267. See supra notes 137-42, 247-49 and accompanying text (identifying how each side
may use childhood abuse to advance its case).
268. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 328.
269. See WHITE, supra note 20, at 87 (arguing that if the defendant is unable to, or does
not, present a full picture of his background, the penalty phase exacerbates the
defendant's disadvantageous position and suggesting that the penalty phase fails to reduce
the extent of arbitrariness).
270. See, e.g., Abdur' Rahman v. Bell, 999 F. Supp. 1073, 1098 (M.D. Tenn. 1998)
(recognizing that "[p]eople with bad childhoods can be sentenced to death," but that the
Constitution requires that evidence of childhood abuse be presented to the jury); Sireci v.
State, 587 So. 2d 450, 454-55 (Fla. 1991) (affirming the trial court's finding that defendant's
brain damage and childhood abuse were mitigating, causing the court to give less weight to
the heinousness aggravating factor, but still finding death the appropriate penalty); State v.
Murphy, 605 N.E.2d 884, 909-10 (Ohio 1992) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the jury
heard evidence of "neglect, physical abuse and psychological torment" that the defendant
suffered as a child and psychological testimony about the negative consequences of his
upbringing, yet the jury still imposed death, as did a majority of the court in its
independent review of the evidence).
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C. Post-Conviction Limitations on the Analysis of Childhood Abuse
as a Mitigating Factor
The trial of a defendant facing the death penalty is considered
the "'main event.' ,271 The resources of the criminal justice system
are supposed to be concentrated at the trial to ensure that the
defendant receives a fair trial.272 As the previous Parts demonstrated,
however, failures by the defense attorney or the trial court may
prevent the realization of this goal. Under these circumstances, a
defendant may raise constitutional challenges to his conviction and
sentence in post-conviction proceedings in state and federal court. 73
In general, post-conviction review of a death sentence is narrowly
circumscribed.274 This Part examines how restrictions placed on two
271. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
272. See id. ("Society's resources have been concentrated at that time and place in
order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of
one of its citizens.").
273. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) (noting that while the trial is the
main event, a defendant is entitled by federal law to challenge his conviction and
sentence). In federal court, post-conviction review is governed by statute. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-2254 (1994), as amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Title I, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA] (codified at
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.6 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997)
(explaining the role of habeas corpus review in capital cases); id. § 3.2 (outlining federal
habeas proceedings). Substantively, the statute authorizes a state prisoner to raise claims
asserting that he is being held in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See generally LIEBMAN & HERTZ,
supra, §§ 9.1-9.2 (discussing claims cognizable in federal habeas); id. § 11.2c (listing and
describing claims that have resulted in courts granting petitions for writ of habeas corpus,
including improper jury selection procedures, denial of expert assistance, improper jury
instructions, ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal, and prosecutorial
misconduct). Each state has its own statute authorizing post-conviction proceedings. See
id. § 3.1d (summarizing state court practices); id. §§ 6.1-7.2 (explaining state post-
conviction processes and constitutional issues).
274. See, e.g., LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 273, § 2.4d, at 66-71 (describing the
expansion of federal habeas corpus review in the 1960s and its contraction by the U.S.
Supreme Court beginning in 1976); Panel Discussion, Capital Punishment: Is There Any
Habeas Left in This Corpus, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523 (1996) (discussing the legal and
political factors that restrict the post-conviction review of death sentences at both the state
and federal levels). In 1996, Congress passed the AEDPA to further restrict and expedite
federal habeas corpus review of death penalty cases. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note
273, § 2.7a, at 10-12 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 944 (Conference Committee Report on the AEDPA)); see also 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266 (West Supp. 1998) (containing provisions for death penalty cases
where the state has "opted-in" to special accelerated provisions by meeting certain
standards such as the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement of state post-
conviction attorneys); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 273, § 2.7 (identifying how the new
provisions affect post-conviction litigation). How the AEDPA will actually affect death
penalty cases is an open question. See Panel Discussion, Dead Man Walking Without Due
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areas of review-procedural bars and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims-interfere with the evaluation of whether a
defendant's mitigating evidence of childhood abuse was properly
investigated, presented, and considered at trial.
1. Procedural Barriers
Numerous barriers constrain a court's consideration of the
merits of a defendant's constitutional challenges on post-conviction
review.275 For example, under the doctrine of procedural bar, a
federal court may be unable to consider the merits of a claim if the
claim was not properly and timely raised in the State court.276 While
this doctrine may apply to any constitutional claim,277 it has an
especially devastating effect when the claim is based on the jury's
inability to consider mitigating evidence of child abuse.278
In an extraordinary line of cases, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Process?, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 163 (1997) (discussing changes wrought by
the AEDPA); Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 381, 384 (1996) (suggesting that "there is more bark in this dog than bite").
275. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 273, §§ 22.1-22.2 (summarizing prerequisites,
limitations, and exceptions to federal court review, including the doctrines of exhaustion,
procedural bar, and retroactivity).
276. According to the Supreme Court, the test for when a federal court may hear a
claim that was not properly preserved in state court is as follows:
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state
court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal
habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause
for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal
law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,750 (1991). See generally LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra
note 273, §§ 26.1-26.4 (analyzing the components of the test).
277. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 273, § 26.1, at 807. Applying the procedural
bar doctrine in death penalty cases has especially dire consequences. See, e.g., Stephen B.
Bright, Death By Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due
to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 679, 683 (1990)
(arguing that between the restrictions of procedural bar and lax enforcement of
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standards, capital defendants are wrongly sentenced to
death).
278. See, e.g., Bolder v. Armontrout, 921 F.2d 1359, 1362-65 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding
that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present mitigating
evidence, including childhood beatings, was procedurally barred because no reason was
given for the post-conviction attorney's failure to present evidence supporting this claim to
the state court). But see Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447, 1451-53 (E.D. Ark. 1994)
(holding that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not procedurally barred
because "no reasonable juror would have sentenced [the defendant] to death under the
state's sentencing law" had she heard the mitigating evidence trial counsel failed to
investigate or present), affd on other grounds sub nom. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th
Cir. 1995).
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the Fifth Circuit effectively invoked a procedural bar to refuse to
hear defendants' claims that their sentences violated the Eighth
Amendment because the Texas death penalty statute kept them from
presenting mitigating evidence to the jury. 9 Defendants argued that
they had not presented available mitigating evidence at the
punishment phase because the Texas death penalty statute effectively
allowed the jury to give such evidence only aggravating
consideration 80 The court held that in order for it to hear the merits
of these claims, the defendants had to have presented the mitigating
evidence at trial.?1 Thus, if a defendant's mitigating evidence was
childhood abuse, the court of appeals required the defense attorney
to have presented this evidence to the jury at trial, even though the
jury could not give it mitigating effect under the Texas sentencing
scheme. The court ignored the untenable quandary in which this
procedural rule put the defense attorney: to present the jury with
evidence it could consider only as aggravating and thus use to
sentence his client to death, or not to present the evidence because of
its harmful potential and later risk losing a claim based on that
constitutional infirmity after the defendant was sentenced to death.M
279. See, e.g., Mann v. Scott, 41 F.3d 968, 979 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing cases); Anderson v.
Collins, 18 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1994); Callins v. Collins, 998 F.2d 269, 275 (5th Cir.
1993); Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d 167, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1992); May v. Collins, 904 F.2d
228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (May 1); id. at 234 (Reavley, J., specially
concurring).
280. This claim grew out of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), in which the Court
held that the defendant's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because, under the
Texas statute, the jury could give only aggravating effect to the defendant's evidence of
child abuse and mental retardation. See id- at 319-24. If the jury could not give mitigating
effect to such evidence, it did not make sense for the defendant to present it, but that also
meant that the jury would not hear evidence it should have been able to consider as
mitigating. See id. This situation created a classic, and deadly, "Catch-22" for defendants
facing the death penalty.
281. In May I, the court stated that the "Penry claim must fail" because the attorney
had made a "tactical decision" not to present this mitigating evidence. May 1, 904 F.2d at
232 (per curiam). Given the harsh consequences that attended presenting much of the
available mitigating evidence, the court's characterization of the failure to present
mitigating evidence as "tactical" is disingenuous at best. Subsequently, and more
forthrightly, the court described "May and its progeny" as imposing a "procedural bar" on
Penry claims if the defendant did not proffer the mitigating evidence at trial. Mann, 41
F.3d at 979.
282. See Mann, 41 F.3d at 979. Although the circuit court opinion does not mention
the nature of the mitigating evidence, the district court opinion quotes the petitioner's
description of" 'extraordinary physical abuse as a child' "in addition to" 'substantial drug
abuse.'" Mann v. Lynaugh, 690 F. Supp. 562,566-67 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
283. See May 1, 904 F.2d at 234 (per curiam) (Reavley, J., specially concurring). Post-
conviction counsel also asserted that the State, through its statute, violated the defendants'
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by chilling trial attorneys' choice
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The Fifth Circuit applied this reasoning in May v. Collins,28 in
which the defendant's mitigating evidence, presented on post-
conviction review but not at trial, included physical abuse beginning
at age three that may have "'substantially impaired his ability to
reflect on the appropriateness of his actions before manifesting
them.' "' Based on prior Fifth Circuit decisions, the court refused to
consider May's claim that his death sentence was unconstitutional
because the Texas statute would have prevented the jury from giving
mitigating effect to this evidence.26 Two judges on the panel filed a
special concurrence explaining that, while the court's holding
adhered to precedent, the result was that May's jury did not make a
"fully informed judgment of his crime and character," and that May
was "caught in a web spun of words and logic that, in the end, has
deprived May of his constitutional rights, a deprivation that may cost
him his life."'  These judges recognized the compelling nature of the
evidence of childhood abuse and the difference that it could have
made to the jury's sentencing decision. Nonetheless, the court did
not consider whether May's death sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment: Because his attorney had not presented the
information to the jury, the court held that it would not address the
merits of this claim.'
2. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Even if a defendant's constitutional claim is heard on the merits,
the court's evaluation may be governed by a standard that effectively
denies relief. This is especially true for claims that the trial attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and
present mitigating evidence of childhood abuse at the punishment
phase. The Supreme Court held in Strickland v. Washington 2 9 that to
state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-part
showing: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that
about whether to present mitigating evidence. See May v. Collins, 948 F.2d 162, 166 (5th
Cir. 1991) (May II). The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim on the ground that the attorney
made a reasonable tactical decision not to present the evidence. See, e.g., id. at 167-68; see
also Mann, 41 F.3d at 980 (affirming the holding of May fl).
284. 904 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
285. Id. at 231 (quoting the neurologist/psychiatrist who examined May during post-
conviction proceedings).
286. See id. at 232 (per curiam).
287. Id. at 234 (per curiam) (Reavley, J., specially concurring). The State of Texas
executed Justin Lee May on May 7, 1992. See DEATH Row U.S.A. REP. (NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Spring 1998, at 1147.
288. See May , 904 F.2d at 232 (per curiam).
289. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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the performance prejudiced the defendant.2 9° Key features of each
part of this test clash with the possible longterm perceptual and
behavioral effects of childhood abuse. 9'
a. Deficient Performance
The indicia for evaluating whether counsel's performance was
deficient focus on two factors: the information the defendant
provided his attorney during the investigation of mitigating evidence,
and the attorney's strategy for presenting the case for mitigation.
Under Strickland, if the defendant gave the attorney reason to
believe that certain avenues of investigation would be "fruitless or
even harmful," the attorney's failure to pursue that course will not be
considered unreasonable.192 Similarly, counsel's performance will not
be deemed deficient if the mitigating evidence investigated and
presented on post-conviction is inconsistent with the trial attorney's
punishment-phase strategy.2 93
These two factors are problematic when the defendant was
physically abused as a child and suffered long-term psychological and
290. See id. at 687. Deficient performance "requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment." Id. Prejudice "requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. To
establish prejudice the defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Id. at 694.
291. The Strickland test has been extensively criticized, especially as it is applied in
death penalty cases. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 219, at 1857-66 (analyzing cases showing
Strickland permits ineffective assistance of counsel); William S. Geimer, A Decade of
Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 92-160 (1995) (arguing that Strickland has corrupted not
only the evaluation of counsel's performance also but other components of the criminal
justice system such as the harmless error doctrine and ethical standards governing
attorney conduct); Kreitzberg, supra note 202, at 486, 499-506 (arguing that Strickland is
largely to blame for the failure of the criminal justice system to ensure that the death
penalty is constitutionally applied because Strickland ignored "the special nature of capital
cases ... and hindered the assurance of effective legal representation"); Ivan K. Fong,
Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing,-39 STAN L. REV. 461, 463
(1987) (contending that Strickland does not ensure effective assistance of counsel to
defendants at the punishment phase of death penalty cases); Note, The Eighth Amendment
and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1930-33
(1994) (arguing that Strickland imposes too high a standard). This Part builds on that
criticism by examining how the test for ineffective assistance of counsel interfaces with
one aspect of a death penalty case-the failure to investigate and present mitigating
evidence of childhood abuse.
292- Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
293. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,788-95 (1987).
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behavioral effects. Relying on the defendant to tell his attorney the
relevant sources of investigation assumes that the defendant
accurately understands the scope of mitigating evidence and that he
is able and willing to identify those aspects of his past which fit that
scope.294 This assumption belies the capacities of many defendants
facing the death penalty, 95 but it is particularly troublesome with a
defendant who was abused as a child. This defendant may believe
that certain avenues of investigation are fruitless or harmful because
his understanding of mitigating evidence is that it consists of only
positive information about his background or character. 96 While a
history of childhood abuse is certainly mitigating, it does not qualify
as "good" information.297 Thus, the defendant may not disclose his
history, or may tell his attorney not to contact family members or
others who know about the abuse, because he believes it will not help
his case.298 Furthermore, a defendant who was abused as a child may
not be aware who knew about the abuse, such as teachers, and so may
wrongly inform his attorney that he does not know anyone who can
assist the investigation. 99 Similarly, a defendant who denies a history
of abuse will not provide relevant information to his attorney."'
When an attorney is permitted to rely on her client to inform the
294. See supra notes 231-40 and accompanying text (identifying reasons, related to
childhood abuse, that a defendant may be unable or unwilling to talk about his history).
295. See White, supra note 16, at 337 & n.84 (noting that assumptions made about a
defendant's ability to have a helpful relationship with counsel were "dubious in 1984" and
are "patently incorrect today"); see also Mello, supra note 124, at 919 n.162 (describing
characteristics of most men on death row as "illiterate, retarded, and/or mentally ill");
Naftali Bendavid, Death Row Appeals Lawyers Sought: Chicago Firm's Suit Challenges
System, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1997, § 1, at 4 (reporting that a recent study of Mississippi
defendants on death row found that 32% were at least borderline mentally retarded).
296. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S. at 813 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the
attorney asked the defendant who could say "'anything good about him'" (quoting the
Trial App. at 51)); Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062, 1066 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (speculating
that counsel may have thought only "'good' details" were mitigating), vacated and
remanded, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1992).
297. See Burger, 483 U.S. at 820 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court's decisions
emphasize that mitigating evidence is not necessarily 'good.' Factors that mitigate an
individual defendant's moral culpability 'ste[m] from the diverse frailties of human kind.' "
(second alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.))).
298. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why a
defendant may not reveal his childhood abuse).
299. See supra note 239 (citing cases where the defendant was not aware of
corroborating state agency records).
300. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why a defendant
may deny a history of childhood abuse). The defendant's family may also deny that the
defendant was abused. See supra note 238 (citing examples of families denying the
defendant's abuse and psychological explanations for same).
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scope of the mitigation investigation, a grave likelihood exists that
she will not discover mitigating evidence of childhood abuse.3"' It is
unconscionable that the constitutional standard for an acceptable
level of attorney performance in a death penalty case should
countenance conduct that is so likely to result in an ineffectual
investigation. Some courts recognize that the attorney's duty to
investigate is not limited by a client's instructions or knowledge but
also includes locating witnesses and information even though the
client resists, as well as talking to the client about why he does not
want family members contacted."° Yet, unless this comprehensive
duty to investigate is required in every case, a defendant who
suffered childhood abuse too often will be put at risk by an attorney
who does not conduct the necessary investigation to ensure that the
jury hears relevant and available mitigating evidence.
301. See Gardner v. Dixon, No. 91-4010, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971, at *14-*19 (4th
Cir. June 4, 1992) (noting that the attorney did not look for sources of information beyond
the mother and father, whom the defendant told him not to contact, except for an uncle
whom the attorney described as "incoherent"); Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324-25
(11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the attorney "made little effort" to look for mitigating
evidence because the defendant told him he would not testify and he did not "'want
anyone to cry for him,' "but former teachers would have testified to his childhood mental
and physical abuse, employers to his work habits, and others that he was a "loving son"
who "struggled to succeed in life"); Bolder v. Armontrout, 713 F. Supp. 1558, 1567 (W.D.
Mo. 1989) (observing that the attorney did not talk to the family because the defendant
told him not to), rev'd on other grounds, 921 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1990).
302 See, e.g., Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1563-64 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that
when the defendant says he will not testify, attorney must explain purpose of mitigation
and use others as witnesses); People v. Perez, 592 N.E.2d 984, 995-96 (Ill. 1992)
(emphasizing the duty to investigate mitigating evidence even when the defendant is
recalcitrant and the attorney knows the defendant was abandoned by his family, which
could account for his reluctance to provide information). Other courts have reached the
same conclusion outside of the specific context of a reluctant defendant with a history of
childhood abuse. See, e.g., Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1502 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that trial attorneys may not "'blindly follow' " defendant's instructions not to
present mitigating evidence because, "'although the decision whether to use such
evidence is for the client, the lawyer first must evaluate potential avenues and advise the
client of those offering potential merit'" (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d
1447, 1451 (11th Cir. 1986))); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1093-94 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating
that a defendant's refusal to identify potential witnesses limits but does not negate an
attorney's duty to investigate); see also Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 906 (7th Cir.
1996) (giving no weight to the defendant's statement to the trial court that he did not want
mitigating evidence presented where defense counsel had not conducted any investigation
and the defendant was not told by counsel or the court of the. high likelihood of a death
sentence absent some mitigating evidence). But cf. DeLong v. Thompson, No. 92-40000,
1993 WL 24788, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1993) (holding that while the defendant's "desire
not to present mitigating evidence does not wholly exempt counsel from conducting a
reasonable investigation of potential mitigating evidence," the lawyer fulfilled his
obligation by writing one letter to the defendant's father even though the father's reply
indicated the family did not want to testify).
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Problems also arise for a defendant who was abused as a child
when courts examine the quality of the trial attorney's performance
based on the relationship between her punishment-phase strategy
and the new mitigating evidence presented in the post-conviction
proceeding. If the new evidence is inconsistent with the strategy that
the attorney employed at trial, the Supreme Court has held that this
constitutes a strategic reason for not investigating or presenting the
evidence. 303  The Court's analysis considers the extent to which the
new evidence is consistent with what the trial attorney actually did at
trial, not with what the trial attorney should or could have done had
she known about the information at the time of trial."°
This framework is untenable when the new evidence is a history
of child abuse and its negative adult behavioral consequences. If the
trial attorney's strategy was to portray the defendant as "not a violent
person," evidence of childhood abuse likely will be inconsistent with
that theory of mitigation. 5  A frequent justification for not
investigating or presenting mitigating evidence of child abuse is that
it could "open the door" to the depiction of the defendant as a
violent person with a history of criminal acts. 06 Defense counsel,
303. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788-95 (1987) (finding counsel not ineffective
for failing to pursue and present evidence of the defendant's childhood because, even
though he presented no mitigating evidence at trial, the new information about the
defendant's upbringing was inconsistent with counsel's punishment-phase strategy);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (concluding that "choices made
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation").
304. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("A fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.").
305. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S. at 793 (stating that evidence about the defendant's
childhood, which included beatings but also would have revealed "violent tendencies," was
"at odds" with portraying the defendant as a follower); Stout v. Netherland, Nos. 95-4008,
95-4007, 1996 WL 496601, at *10-*11 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1996) (concluding that the attorney
made a strategic decision not to use a psychological report that included information
about the defendant's childhood abuse because it also concluded that the defendant
suffered from anti-social personality disorder which was inconsistent with the attorney's
strategy of presenting the defendant as non-violent); Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971,
979-81 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the attorney was not ineffective where the defendant's
childhood abuse was inconsistent with portraying him as non-violent); Bertolotti v.
Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503, 1519 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that evidence of psychological abuse
and mental illness was inconsistent with a penalty phase strategy to present the defendant
as "normal"). But see Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1467 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
the district court's conclusion that the attorney did not err in failing to present any
mitigating evidence, including that the defendant was physically abused by his father,
because it might have had an adverse effect on the jury).
306. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S. at 792-95 (explaining how, if presented at trial, the
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however, should anticipate that the prosecution will present evidence
of prior violent or criminal conduct anywayY While it may
complicate the defense case at punishment, effective counsel should
be prepared to incorporate that prior conduct into the mitigation
theory-not ignore it.38 The defense should convey to the jury that it
is the source of the defendant's violent conduct as an adult that
matters. Although the defendant is responsible for committing a
murder, he should not be faulted for suffering physical abuse as a
child and then being unable to overcome its adverse effects as an
adult.
To excuse the investigation and presentation of child abuse and
its later consequences because the defendant did not point to it or
because the possibility exists that such evidence may open the door to
evidence of prior violent behavior should not be constitutionally
acceptable because it renders meaningless the promise of effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.30 9 The
pivotal issue in assessing whether the trial attorney's performance
was deficient should not be how well the new evidence of child abuse
fits the punishment-phase theory that the attorney pursued, but how
much more closely the evidence conforms to the individual
defendant's actual background and character.31 Otherwise, claims of
prosecutor could have elicited the defendant's prior criminal conduct from defense
witnesses); Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
attorney made a reasonable tactical decision not to present evidence about the defendant's
background because it would have "opened the door to damaging character evidence,
including evidence of [the defendant's] prior criminal activity"); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d
1487, 1494-96 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced by his
attorney's failure to call his sister or mental health experts because their testimony could
have entailed negative information); Pickens, 714 F.2d at 1467 (disagreeing with the
district court that found trial counsel reasonable in not presenting any mitigating evidence
because of the "potential adverse effect such evidence might have on the jury").
307. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text (discussing how a prosecutor may
utilize evidence of the defendant's childhood abuse against him).
30& See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text (explaining how the defense
attorney may effectively diffuse the prosecutor's attempt to place the defendant's
childhood abuse in a negative light).
309. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.").
310. These two issues may at times complement each other. See, e.g., Burger, 483 U.S.
at 820-22 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the mitigating evidence not presented about
the defendant's mental and emotional immaturity and his tragic childhood bore on his lack
of moral culpability and responsibility, which was the defense counsel's strategy); Jackson
v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1369 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence showing the "genesis
of [the defendant's] irrational rage through an abusive upbringing" in addition to "good
character" evidence would have benefited the defense more in explaining the murder than
trial counsel's failure to present any mitigating evidence and his weak closing argument).
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ineffective assistance of counsel are caught in a conundrum in which
inadequate lawyering itself becomes an obstacle to showing that the
lawyering was inadequate.
b. Prejudice
The second part of the ineffective -assistance of counsel test
requires a showing that the attorney's deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant. In the context of the punishment phase of
a death penalty case this part of the test requires a showing that a
reasonable probability exists that the defendant would have been
sentenced to life imprisonment rather than death. 1 In these
situations, a common refrain among courts is that in light of the
aggravating circumstances of the murder, no mitigating evidence
could have changed the defendant's sentence.312 This kind of
reasoning fails to take into account the constitutional principle that
the death penalty is not appropriate in all cases.313 Mitigating
evidence, effectively investigated and presented, may convince one
juror that life imprisonment is the proper punishment for this
individual defendant 4.3 1  This potential exists for mitigating evidence
311. Some scholars maintain that the prejudice prong should not apply in death penalty
cases. See Bright, supra note 219, at 1864-65 (arguing that the prejudice prong is
"inappropriate" because it is "impossible" to determine the difference investigation and
presentation of mitigating evidence could make); Geimer, supra note 291, at 130
(observing the "gross unfairness" of applying the prejudice prong because it results in
"rank speculation" about how jurors would respond to evidence).
312. See, e.g., Gardner v. Dixon, No. 91-4010, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971, at *24-*25
(4th Cir. June 4, 1992) (finding no prejudice because "the murders in this case were
senseless and brutal" and the additional mitigating evidence "would not have swayed the
outcome in this case"); Francois v. Wainwright, 763 F.2d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 1985)
("[Defendant] has no chance of changing the outcome of the five death sentences in this
case .... "); see also Note, supra note 291, at 1931 (suggesting that the nature of the
murder combined with "overwhelming evidence of guilt" is one reason courts reviewing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims "are often unable to imagine that a jury would
have imposed any sentence but death").
313. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (holding mandatory death sentences unconstitutional);
see also Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 710 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting State's argument
that in light of substantial aggravating factors, no amount of mitigating evidence would
matter on the ground that this would eviscerate individualized sentencing any time there
are many aggravating factors); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1028 (Utah 1989)
(recognizing that the "psychological reality" of the sentencing hearing is that aggravating
circumstances will "virtually always" outweigh mitigating circumstances because murder is
a "heinous act," but also recognizing that the Eighth Amendment "does not permit the
death penalty to be imposed for every intentional homicide").
314. Except where the jury's sentence is advisory, or the judge imposes sentence, only
one juror needs to vote for life imprisonment. See, e.g., Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898,
907 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the need to convince only one juror, in addition to other
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in general, but it is particularly true for childhood abuse because of
the potential to forge a strong connection between the defendant's
devastating childhood experience and his commission of the murder.
The limitations of post-conviction review of death sentences
inflict an especially harsh consequence on a defendant who was
abused as a child but whose jury did not receive that information.
The long-term effects of abuse that may help the jury understand the
defendant and his actions also may be seen as providing a basis for
not presenting that very evidence. Courts may invoke procedural
bars to avoid resolving this tension. In addition, the constitutional
standard that governs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
countenances a resolution of that dilemma in a way that denies the
defendant the individualized consideration of his mitigating history of
child abuse. Too often, the defendant's impairments from childhood
abuse are allowed to excuse the attorney's failure to investigate or
present that very mitigating evidence.
D. Conclusion
Despite the mitigating potential of evidence that a defendant
was physically abused as a child and continued to suffer behavioral
consequences as an adult, numerous barriers exist to a jury's
consideration of that evidence. Courts' misunderstandings about the
effects of childhood abuse may prevent proper evaluation of this
evidence as a mitigating circumstance, inadequate counsel may not
learn of the abuse or present it effectively, judges may not instruct
the jury on how to consider it, and the standard for post-conviction
review may perpetuate constitutional errors made at trial. The
presentation of childhood abuse is sabotaged by allowing the
difficulty of uncovering and presenting it to overwhelm its mitigating
characteristics. The result is that the jury is denied, rather than
guaranteed, the information necessary to make a judgment about the
individual defendant's punishment.
factors, meant that the case for mitigation that could have been presented "cannot
confidently be reckoned trivial"); Abdur' Rahman v. Bell, 999 F. Supp. 1073, 1101 (M.D.
Tenn. 1998) (concluding that, despite the "negative evidence," "had counsel presented the
other evidence of Petitioner's background and mental history, there is more than a
reasonable probability that af least one juror would have voted for a life sentence rather
than the death penalty"); Phillips v. State, 608 So. 2d 778, 783 (Fla. 1992) ("The swaying of
the vote of only one juror would have made a critical difference here.").
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III. TAKING SERIOUSLY CHILDHOOD ABUSE AS MITIGATING
EVIDENCE
A defendant's history of childhood abuse is paradigmatic
mitigating evidence in a death penalty case because it has the
potential to transform a juror's perception of the defendant from an
individual who deserves to die to a person for whom life
imprisonment is a just punishment. Despite this potential,
impediments exist throughout the trial and post-conviction review
process that prevent jurors from hearing and considering evidence of
the defendant's childhood abuse and its long-term consequences.
The chasm between the mitigating promise of childhood abuse and
the system's inability to fulfill that promise demonstrates the need for
a transformation in the way courts understand and analyze the
significance of mitigating evidence. If the constitutionally
indispensable consideration of the individual defendant's background
and character and the circumstances of the offense is to occur, then
the concepts of adequacy of trial counsel, proper instruction of jurors,
and meaningful post-conviction review must be wholly redrawn.
The expectations for, and evaluation of, trial counsel's
investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence should reflect
the importance of the jury's punishment-phase decision. As some
courts have recognized, 3 5 an attorney should not be permitted to
base her investigation of mitigating evidence on what the defendant
tells her to do or not to do. The possible long-term effects of child
abuse show that this kind of reliance may easily hide important facts
about the defendant's background and character.316 Similarly, no
attorney should be allowed to rely on a punishment-phase strategy of
presenting the defendant as a good, non-violent person when that
does not conform to the defendant's history. As others have argued,
at a minimum, every defense attorney should be required to initiate
and conduct a complete investigation, including a thorough social
history and mental health evaluation, of the defendant.17 I suggest
that the investigation should presume that the defendant's
background includes a history of child abuse and possible mental
illness or brain damage.31 The attorney must then have the training
315. See supra note 302 (citing cases where courts recognize the breadth of an
attorney's duty to investigate).
316. See supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why a
defendant may not reveal childhood abuse).
317. See supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text (discussing components of a
complete investigation).
318. The frequency with which child abuse, mental illness, and brain damage occur
1216 [Vol. 77
HeinOnline  -- 77 N.C. L. Rev.  1216 1998-1999
1999] CHILDHOOD ABUSE AND ADULT MURDER
and resources to devise an effective trial strategy3 9 and to present a
compelling case for mitigation at the punishment phase. Such a focus
will begin to allow a history of childhood abuse to be uncovered and
presented to the jury in a persuasive manner.
Judges must recognize the importance of their role, both at trial
and on post-conviction review, to ensure that the jury hears the
complete circumstances of the defendant's childhood abuse. Thus,
the judge must understand the ways in which a history of child abuse
may have contributed to the defendant's commission of the murder,
as well as the ways in which that history presently impairs
communications between the defendant and his attorney about the
crime and his childhood. The ramifications of childhood abuse, as
they affect the commission of the crime and the defendant's
relationship with his attorney, require courts to ensure that sufficient
training and resources exist for trial counsel so that she may properly
and timely investigate and present a sound mitigation theory at the
punishment phase.320 This must include access to and presentation of
among convicted murderers and those on death row demonstrates the likelihood that the
attorney will find this kind of evidence. See Blake et al., supra note 59, at 1645 (stating
that, of 31 charged or convicted murderers in their study, all but two reported that
"continuous abuse lasted a decade or more"); supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text
(discussing a study that found 12 of 15 subjects on death row had experienced severe
childhood abuse). The defense attorney must overcome the assumption that one's client is
"normal." See Blake et al., supra note 59, at 1642 (noting that in the study of 31 charged
or convicted murderers, where testing revealed that none of the subjects was
neurologically or psychologically normal, all of the attorneys, except one whose client had
cerebral palsy, thought that their clients were "normal"); cf. Pincus, supra note 76, at 359
(observing that doctors who examine violent juveniles must appreciate the high
probability that they "will have histories of severe accidents or illnesses and will manifest
neurological and psychiatric abnormalities that may contribute to their maladaptive
behaviors").
319. See, e.g., A.B.A. GUIDELINES, supra note 211, at 41-92 (proposing standards for
the appointment of attorneys and their compensation in capital cases); Norman Lefstein,
Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience and Its
Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495 (1996) (reviewing the state of capital
defense nationwide and explaining the experience in Indiana after the Indiana Supreme
Court adopted a rule setting standards for defense counsel in capital cases); see also
Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases,
18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245,251 (1990-1991) (arguing that present conditions
for defending capital cases-lack of training, experience, and funding--"virtually
guarantee" ineffective assistance of counsel).
320. See Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth
Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1360-64 (1997) (proposing reforms to the provision of
counsel, including substantially increasing compensation and available funds and
recognizing capital defense as a specialty that requires experience and specialized
knowledge); Lefstein, supra note 319, at 501-03, 505-26 (analyzing the effect of an Indiana
Supreme Court rule requiring, among other factors, training and adequate funding for
defense attorneys in capital cases, including specifically the sentencing phase); see also
1217
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expert testimony that explains the connection between the
defendant's abuse, his long-term impairments, and his commission of
the crime. When this does not occur, courts should be willing to
recognize the harm done, not only to the defendant, but also to the
expectation that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or
capriciously. 321 The constitutional promise that the jury base its
sentencing decision on characteristics of the individual defendant 322
should demand no less.323
Equally important, however, is ensuring that the jury
understands how it may consider evidence of childhood abuse as
mitigating, once evidence of that nature is presented. It is not
enough for jurors to hear testimony about the beatings the defendant
suffered, or the impact that such abuse had on the defendant as a
child and as an adult. The defense attorney must explain to the jury
how it should take the defendant's childhood abuse into account. She
could argue that the defendant's long-term impairments, while not
lessening his responsibility for the crime, make it more
comprehensible, such that life imprisonment is a sufficient
punishment; that the death penalty would be an excessive
punishment given the magnitude of his ongoing trauma from the
abuse; or that sentencing this defendant to death would not deter
others who have been subjected to similar abuse. In every case the
trial court should instruct the jury on the meaning of mitigating
Kreitzberg, supra note 202, at 511-17 (emphasizing the importance of adequate
compensation in addition to experience and skill). To the extent that legislatures restrict
the funds available to courts for death penalty cases, it should be incumbent on judges to
work with the legislature to change these limitations. See Bilionis & Rosen, supra, at
1364-66 (arguing that judges should act as the catalyst to require legislative reforms).
321. See Fong, supra note 291, at 493 (proposing that courts presume prejudice when
an attorney fails to investigate for the punishment phase, and if she investigates but does
not find any mitigating background information, she must present other arguments in
mitigation); Kreitzberg, supra note 202, at 507-OS (arguing that to ensure individualized
sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court must create a "presumption of ineffectiveness" when
counsel does not investigate the defendant's background in preparation for the
punishment phase); see also Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital Punishment:
Problematizing the "Will of the People," 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 303, 336 (1997)
(arguing that, because death is different, attorneys should be required to "provide the
humanizing social histories that give jurors a glimpse of the causal origins of the violent
actions they must judge and the life of the defendant against which it is weighed").
322. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
323. See Bilionis & Rosen, supra note 320, at 1312 (arguing that the Eighth
Amendment requires that "[a]ny jurisdiction that opts for capital punishment bears a
constitutional obligation to provide a system that minimizes the arbitrariness attributable
to inefficacies and disparities in the quality of capital defense lawyering").
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evidence generally324 and should instruct the jury that it may consider
particular evidence presented by the defendant, such as a history of
child abuse, as mitigating.3 5 Because the jury is entrusted with
making a profoundly moral judgment about the defendant's
punishment,3 26 the court must give the jury sufficient guidance to
assure that this type of judgment occurs.
Apart from specific trial-related issues, the legal system's
difficulty with allowing mitigating evidence of childhood abuse to
inform the punishment-phase decision points to an underlying moral
dilemma concerning how society addresses the connection between
the two tragedies of childhood abuse and adult murder. A child is
not blamed for being physically abused-society holds the abusers
responsible for the violence they inflict on him. At the same time,
the community acknowledges that it shares that responsibility
because it did not protect the child. When that child grows up 327 and,
as an adult, commits his own act of violence, the community's sense
324. The instruction, at a minimum, could track the language of Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), that mitigating evidence is "any aspect of [the]
defendant's character or record [or] any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." IL at 604 (plurality opinion);
see also TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(f)(4) (West 1994) (defining mitigating
evidence as "evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defendant's moral
blameworthiness"); State v. Bey, 548 A.2d 887, 910-11 (N.J. 1988) (requiring the trial
judge to instruct the jury so that "a reasonable juror will understand the meaning and
function of mitigating factors" and noting that this means more than stating the statutory
language identifying mitigating circumstances).
325. As occurs in many states, the jury should be instructed on the mitigating
circumstances on which the defendant presented evidence. See, e.g., State v. Breton, 663
A.2d 1026, 1051 (Conn. 1995) (requiring the trial court, if requested by the defendant, to
instruct the jury on "each of the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors claimed by
the defendant"); TRIAL JUDGES COMM. ON CAPITAL CAUSES, N.J. ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, JUDGES BENCH MANUAL FOR CAPITAL CAUSES app. J at J23-444 (Nov. 1,
1995) (proposing model jury charge for penalty phases that includes detailed explanatory
instructions on statutory mitigating factors). See generally Brief for Petitioner, Buchanan
v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998) (No. 96-8400), available in 1997 WL 375539, app. at *la
(summarizing every death penalty state's requirements for jury instructions identifying
and explaining mitigating circumstances).
326. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,319 (1989).
327. "If" is also an appropriate qualification here. According to the U.S. Advisory
Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, approximately 2000 infants and young children die
each year from abuse or neglect by their parents or caretakers and 18,000 are permanently
disabled. See U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES at xxiii, xxv (1995). Dr. George Curtis, one of the first
psychiatrists to suggest a correlation between childhood beatings and adult criminal
behavior, expressed concern that such children may "become tomorrow's murderers and
perpetrators of other crimes of violence, if they survive." George C. Curtis, Violence
Breeds Violence-Perhaps?, 120 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 386, 386 (1963) (emphasis added).
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of shared obligation is not the same. Despite the recognition that
childhood abuse may traumatize a person for life, when that person
commits an extreme act of violence, such as murder, society is
inclined to distance itself and hold the person solely accountable. By
denying the relationship between the childhood experience of
violence and the later adult act of violence, society tells the
defendant, in effect, that he is responsible for his abuse and for failing
to overcome its damaging consequences.
The moral tension between holding an adult responsible for his
actions and acknowledging the result of society's failure to protect a
child from harm is particularly pronounced in the context of deciding
whether to sentence a defendant to death. This tension suggests that
we need to reevaluate the underlying significance of imposing the
death penalty. Rather than view the decision to sentence a defendant
to death or life imprisonment as a statement about whether he should
be cast out of the circle of humanity,328 we should understand it as
one about recognizing that the defendant is part of the community.329
328. See, e.g., Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1453 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting the trial
court's account of the prosecutor's argument that the defendant" 'was like a cancer which
should be exorcised to protect society' "); Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 853 (7th Cir.
1991) (noting that, in following the jury recommendation of a death sentence, the trial
court stated that "[ilt is unfortunate; [the defendant's] life has been a brutal life.... But
we cannot tolerate the James Brewers of our community"); Alfieri, supra note 46, at 349
(suggesting that when the jury votes for death it is "expelling the defendant as a moral
outcast"); Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 423 (1994) (arguing
that the current capital punishment system reflects a societal view that the criminal is the
"' other' "); Haney, supra note 32, at 549 (arguing that "the long-term viability of the
system of death sentencing requires that capital defendants be depicted" as standing
outside the boundaries of the social order); Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury:
Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L.
REv. 1447, 1460-67 (1997) (positing that seeing the defendant as "defective, foreign,
deviant, or fundamentally different from themselves" is one way that jurors morally
disengage from the reality of their task of deciding the defendant's punishment, thus
making it easier to sentence him to die); Sarat, supra note 32, at 49 (explaining that the
prosecutor argued to the jury "we have a right ... to be vindicated and protected," thus
identifying the defendant as the outsider); Weisberg, supra note 16, at 361 (suggesting that
the goal of the defense is to humanize the defendant "so the jury will be less inclined to
cast him out of the human circle"); see also Smith v. Francis, 474 U.S. 925, 927 & n.1
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court must
be vigilant against the death penalty being used as part of a broader effort to rid the
community of mentally retarded defendants); cf Walter Berns, The Morality of Anger,
reprinted in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 333, 339-40 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed.,
1982) (arguing that since the Supreme Court outlawed banishment, capital punishment
serves to instill " 'profound respect or reverential fear' ").
329. See Pillsbury, supra note 33, at 657, 685-98, 703-04 (arguing that the concept of
"moral caring," combining "moral outrage ... and empathy," should determine the
defendant's deserved punishment, and proposing jury instructions that acknowledge the
jurors' anger but ask jurors to "care for the good" in the defendant); Pillsbury, supra note
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When the death penalty represents a casting out, the decision to
sentence a defendant to death does, in effect, blame the defendant
for not being strong enough to overcome the harm done to him as a
child. It allows the jury as representatives of the community to
sentence the defendant for violating society's law, while avoiding the
responsibility society had to the defendant as a child. It also
sanctions the view of courts that the defendant, rather than his
lawyer, is responsible for what is presented at the punishment phase.
A different perspective emerges if we consider the decision to
sentence a defendant to death as acknowledging that he is part of the
community. A juror may be less willing to sentence the defendant to
death if he is seen as a member of the community because she may be
more inclined to recognize that society shares responsibility for his
fate. The connection between society's failure to protect the
defendant as a child and his commission of a murder as an adult may
make life imprisonment the more appropriate societal response. In
this light, rather than dismissing the potential impact of mitigating
evidence because of the facts of the crime, courts should be more
insistent that the trial attorney present, and the jury consider, the
defendant's individual mitigating circumstances. To take seriously
the mitigating qualities of childhood abuse requires restructuring
what constitutes competent trial attorney representation, adequate
jury instructions, and appropriate post-conviction review. Only then
will we be in a position to assess accurately the appropriate
punishment for a defendant who was abused as a child and who now
faces the death penalty.
CONCLUSION
Childhood abuse takes a tremendous toll on individuals and on
our society as a whole. When a defendant who faces the death
penalty was also abused as a child, the jury's assessment of
115, at 752 ("We punish offenders not because they stand outside of society, not because
they are alien enemies, but because they are fundamentally like the rest of us."); Robin
West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases from
the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 175-76 (1990) (arguing that liberals
on the U.S. Supreme Court should, in addition to continuing to emphasize the defendant's
rights in death penalty cases, write about the defendant's life story, so that we might "learn
once again to recognize these people as human, as 'like us' ").
330. See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 58, at 105 (noting that society fears the association
between child abuse and adult aggression); Alexander C. McFarlane & Bessel A. van der
Kolk, Trauma and Its Challenge to Society, in TRAUMATIC STRESS, supra note 70, at 24, 27
(observing that society is asked to be compassionate toward those who suffer trauma but
that it is resentful at having its illusion of safety shattered).
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punishment ought to reflect society's understanding and appreciation
of the connection between the childhood abuse, the murder, and the
sentence. This will not occur until fundamental changes are made in
the trial proceedings and post-conviction review of capital cases. The
fact that these changes would constitute a major transformation in
how a death penalty trial is conducted is a powerful indication of how
far the current law is from the promise that the "diverse frailties of
humankind""33 will be an integral part of the decision to sentence a
defendant to death. The inability of the death penalty system to
ensure that mitigating evidence of childhood abuse is effectively
investigated, presented, and considered exemplifies the depth of this
chasm.
331. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).
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